Nuclear Fuel Fabrication - Current Issues (USA) 
(last updated 11 Sep 2024)
Contents:
> See also Current Issues for
Criticality and operational safety most common areas for reported events at U.S. nuclear fuel facilities
In its Fuel Cycle Annual Operating Experience Report 2019 
, NRC staff made the following observations:
"An analysis by performance area highlights that the most common areas for reported events
continue to be criticality and operational safety. In addition, the staff observed that the
events reported under these areas in 2019 were related to unanalyzed conditions, failures of
CAAS, and operational safety (e.g. configuration, control, procedural noncompliance, fire
incident)."
"Similar to previous years, the predominant contributing factors associated with the events in 2019 were failures or degradation of management measures (i.e., configuration
management, adherence to procedures)."
TVEL aims to sell nuclear fuel in the US market by 2014
> See here
(for UF6 transport, see extra page)
Cargo vessel carrying enriched uranium from Russia to USA detained at Rostock port (Germany)
The cargo ship "Atlantic Navigator II" has been docked in the Rostock seaport for around three weeks. The responsible customs authority prohibits further travel until further notice. This is because the ship was carrying goods that are on the EU sanctions lists.
According to information from the "Ostsee-Zeitung", the freighter is said to be loaded with birch wood and enriched uranium for US nuclear power plants.
As the "Bild" newspaper reports, the ship is only banned from continuing its journey because of the birch wood - not because of the enriched uranium, which Russia is still allowed to sell internationally.
The cargo ship left the port of St. Petersburg at the beginning of March. The "Atlantic Navigator II" only arrived in Rostock harbor because of repairs.
(Focus Apr. 2, 2024)
A cargo ship from Russia earlier detained in Germany on suspicion of breaching sanctions is now free to leave the port of Rostock, the Stralsund main customs office confirmed on Friday (Apr. 19) without providing any further details.
(Reuters Apr. 19, 2024)
The captain of the Russian freighter "Atlantic Navigator II", which was held in the Rostock overseas port for weeks, has had to pay a fine of 8,000 euros. The Rostock public prosecutor's office announced that the proceedings against the man have now been finally closed and concluded. The recipient of the money is the human rights organization Human Rights Watch.
On board were 251 containers of birch plywood, which is subject to EU sanctions.
Enriched uranium for nuclear power plants was also said to have been on board. However, this is not on the EU sanctions list.
(Der Spiegel July 4, 2024)
Framatome requests NRC approval of increase of enrichment values to 8% for nuclear fuel shipped in TN-B1 containers
> View here
Framatome receives NRC approval to transport nuclear fuel enriched to 8%
> View here
Truck carrying uranium fuel rods wrecked in Tennessee
A truck carrying uranium fuel rods was struck from behind by another vehicle on I-40 westbound near U.S. Highway 64 Tuesday (Nov. 15) night at 7:50 p.m.
Hazmat crews, Tennessee Highway Patrol, Memphis police and Memphis fire personnel responded quickly.
No fuel rods fell off the truck.
Emergency crews were relieved no one was hurt and that no spill occurred.
(WREG-TV Nov. 15, 2011)
Truck hauling low-grade uranium overturns on U.S. highway exit in North Carolina
On Dec. 21, 2006, a tractor-trailer hauling about 6,000 pounds (2,700 kilograms) of low-grade uranium overturned as it exited a major U.S. interstate highway south of Raleigh, North Carolina, but the crash did not pose a threat to the public, authorities said.
The truck crashed onto its side after the driver lost control on an exit ramp along Interstate 95, said Jason Barbour, Johnston County's emergency communications director.
The truck was carrying a radioactive material called packaged fissile, Highway Patrol spokesman Lt. Everett Clendenin said. The powdered uranium was packed in containers that weren't breached by the accident, he said.
The uranium was being transported by Portsmouth Marine Terminal, from Portsmouth, Virginia, to Global Nuclear Fuels in Wilmington, North Carolina.
(The International Herald Tribune Dec. 22, 2006)
Truck carrying nuclear fuel assemblies overturned on Interstate 80 in Utah
On June 8, 2004, at 5:30 am EDT, a tractor trailer carrying a sea land container which contained twelve recently manufactured fuel assemblies overturned on Interstate 80 at mile marker 34 in Tooele County, Utah. The unirradiated fuel assemblies were being transported from GNF's nuclear fuel facility in Wilmington, North Carolina, to Oakland, California for shipment to Japan. The licensee reported that both drivers were injured but there did not appear to be any damage to the overturned sea land container.
(NRC PNO-II-04-004, June 8, 2004)
The shipment was driven back to Wilmington. GNF performed a limited visual inspection of the RAJ-II containers that could be seen through the open top and doors of the sea land, and stated there did not appear to be any significant damage to these containers. GNF plans to unload the sea land container and fully inspect the RAJ-II packages.
(NRC PNO-II-04-004A, June 14, 2004)
Nuclear Fuel Services awarded contract for downblending of 20.2 t HEU for use in commercial reactors to produce tritium for U.S. nuclear weapons:
> View here
TVA to down-blend highly enriched uranium for use in commercial reactors to produce tritium for U.S. nuclear weapons:
The Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) intend to enter into an interagency agreement to down-blend highly enriched uranium (HEU) in support of national security missions.
Down-blending HEU to low-enriched uranium (LEU) promotes national security by enabling the production of tritium, a key component of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.
NNSA must down-blend its unobligated HEU inventory to provide LEU for defense missions because there is no source of unobligated enriched uranium available through the open market today.
Unobligated HEU is material that is free from peaceful use restrictions.
> View NNSA release Aug. 23, 2018
> Federal Register Volume 83, Number 176 (Tuesday, September 11, 2018) p. 45919-45920 (download full text )
Urenco has no objections to potential supply of enriched uranium for production of tritium required for U.S. nuclear weapons
> View here
Urenco selected to supply enriched uranium for TVA reactors that produce tritium for U.S. nuclear weapons
> View here
Shutdown of Paducah gaseous diffusion enrichment plant deferred for one year -- to re-enrich depleted uranium for military purposes
> View here
> see also: Downblending of U.S. Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) for use in commercial reactors to produce tritium for U.S. nuclear weapons
DOE invites comment on issues related to continued sale of excess uranium
> View here
Project On Government Oversight demands more efforts for downblending of U.S. surplus weapons-grade uranium for reactor use
On Sep. 14, 2010, the Project On Government Oversight (POGO) released U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: How the Country Can Profit and Become More Secure by Getting Rid of Its Surplus Weapons-Grade Uranium, an investigative report which has found that the Obama Administration's efforts of securing and disposing of bomb-grade material around the world is not being realized here in the U.S.
The U.S. has nearly 400 metric tons (MT) of highly enriched uranium (HEU), a fissile material used in nuclear weapons, that is not necessary for U.S. defense needs, the vast majority of which has not been declared surplus so that it can be properly eliminated. This is the equivalent of more than 16,000 nuclear warheads.
Although not necessary for defense purposes, this vast store of HEU could be used for nefarious purposes by terrorists.
Despite this danger, one of the most practical ways of reducing the risk has fallen by the wayside. The pace of converting surplus, expensive-to-secure HEU into low enriched uranium (LEU), which is unusable in weapons, has slowed to a snail's pace.
As recently as 2004, this process-known as downblending-was occurring at a rate close to ten times that of the downblending rate planned for the next four decades. The reason for the slow-down appears to be that the Department of Energy (DOE) has not made downblending a priority.
The U.S. government has the capacity to ramp up downblending of surplus HEU to previous levels, and even exceed them. Also, far more HEU can be declared surplus than has been.
> View POGO release Sep. 14, 2010
> Download POGO report U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: How the Country Can Profit and Become More Secure by Getting Rid of Its Surplus Weapons-Grade Uranium, Sep. 14, 2010
U.S. DOE awards further contract for downblending of U.S. Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) for commercial reactor use
On June 23, 2009, DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) announced that it has awarded a $209 million contract to down-blend 12.1 metric tons (MT) of surplus U.S. highly enriched uranium (HEU) and store the resulting low-enriched uranium (LEU).
Under the agreement, 12.1 metric tons of HEU will be down-blended to about 220 metric tons of LEU at the Nuclear Fuel Services facility in Erwin, Tennessee. The resulting LEU will have a market value of more than $400 million. NNSA expects the down-blending to begin in 2009 and to be completed in 2012. The contractors performing the down-blending work will be compensated with a fraction of the LEU; the remainder of the LEU will be stored to support the mixed oxide (MOX) program for disposition of surplus weapons plutonium.
DOE presents downblending options for its unallocated HEU
DOE is considering to "Down-blend 12.1 metric tons of uranium (MTU) of unallocated highly enriched uranium (HEU) to about 220 MTU of LEU of which about 170 MTU could be used for a general or special-purpose DOE LEU inventory." (Excess Uranium Inventory Management Plan, Dec. 16, 2008)
> See also: DOE issues Excess Uranium Inventory Management Plan
In October 2007, DOE released a supplement analysis for its Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium Final Environmental Impact Statement, DOE/EIS-0240, June 1996. This supplement analysis (SA) summarizes the status of HEU disposition activities conducted to date and evaluates the potential impacts of continued program implementation. In addition, this SA considers the potential environmental impacts of proposed new DOE/NNSA initiatives to support the surplus HEU disposition program. Specifically, DOE/NNSA is proposing new end-users for existing program material,
new disposal pathways for existing program HEU discard material, and down-blending additional quantities of HEU.
> Download Supplement Analysis for the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium, DOE/EIS-0240-SA1, October 2007 (181k PDF)
U.S. DOE awards contract for downblending of U.S. Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) for commercial reactor use
On June 29, 2007, the Department of Energy awarded a contract to convert 17.4 metric tons of bomb-grade uranium stored in Tennessee into low-enriched fuel for civilian reactors overseas.
The highly enriched material is now held at the Y-12 nuclear weapons plant in Oak Ridge. It will be diluted or "downblended" at Nuclear Fuels Services in Erwin, Tennessee, then shipped for storage to Westinghouse Electric Company's fuel fabrication plant in Columbia, South Carolina.
The downblending work at Nuclear Fuel Services is to begin later this year and be completed by 2010.
(AP Jun 29, 2007)
DOE plans downblending of enriched uranium for reactor fuel
More than 17 tons of highly enriched uranium currently stored at the Y-12 nuclear weapons plant will be "down-blended" to eliminate its weapons capability and make it available for reactor fuel.
The government unveiled the three-year project earlier this week, and in December 2006 or January 2007 will solicit companies interested in bidding on the work.
According to the U.S. Department of Energy, the 17.4 short tons [15.8 t] of HEU will be converted into about 290 short tons [263 t] of low-enriched uranium with an estimated value of $750 million. The uranium stocks to be used in the down-blending project have an enrichment that ranges from about 20 percent up to 93.3 percent. The materials will be mixed with lesser stocks of uranium to reduce the enrichment to 4.95 percent U-235, a level suitable for use in commercial power reactors.
(The Knoxville News Sentinel Nov. 11, 2006)
> View: Presolicitation Notice - Down Blend of Highly Enriched Uranium and Establishment of Reliable Fuel Supply, Nov. 8, 2006
BWX Technologies completes downblending of weapons-grade uranium
Two private companies announced on July 13, 2006, they have finished converting 50 metric tons of weapons-suitable highly enriched uranium to uranium that can be used by commercial nuclear power plants.
The conversion by mixing the highly enriched uranium with depleted uranium was conducted by BWX Technologies at its facility in Lynchburg, Va., for the USEC Inc., the uranium enrichment company that supplies reactor fuel for the nuclear industry.
About 660 metric tons of low-enriched uranium was produced and already has been provided to dozens of utilities to be used in power reactors.
Separately, the Energy Department is providing 39 tons of highly enriched uranium to the Tennessee Valley Authority, which, after converting it (at NFS' Erwin Tn., plant), uses it in TVA's power reactors. About half of that amount already has been converted.
(AP July 14, 2006)
DOE to release 20 Metric Tons of Highly Enriched Uranium for Downblending
On Nov. 7, 2005, Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman announced that the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) will remove up to 200 metric tons (MT) of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), in the coming decades, from further use as fissile material in U.S. nuclear weapons and prepare this material for other uses.
About 20 MT will be down-blended to low enriched uranium (LEU) for eventual use in civilian nuclear power reactors, research reactors or related research. The other material will be used for Naval Reactors or for Space Programs.
(DOE Nov. 7, 2005)
DOE considers downblending of 100 short tons of HEU stored at Oak Ridge, Tennessee
Hearing: DOE Nuclear Security: What Are the Challenges, and What's Next?
U.S. House of Representatives, The Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, May 11, 2004:
Witness Testimony: The Honorable Kyle E. McSlarrow, Deputy Secretary, US Department of Energy
"[...] Third, we need to explore whether we can down-blend
substantial quantities of our HEU holdings. Potentially, this
could yield a number of security benefits, but the
programmatic impact of a major campaign of down-blending
needs to be assessed. We have also directed NNSA to
conduct a study to assess the down-blending of large
quantities, perhaps as much as 100 tons, of the HEU stored
at Y-12 and to assess the programmatic impacts of such a
large campaign."
DOE/EIS-0240 - Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium Final Environmental Impact Statement, (June 1996)
> Download DOE/EIS-0240 Summary, 1996 (5MB PDF - FAS)
> View DOE Record of Decision (Federal Register: August 5, 1996 (Volume 61, Number 151) p. 40619-40629):
"SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) has decided to implement a
program to make surplus highly enriched uranium (HEU) non-weapons-usable by blending it down to low-enriched uranium (LEU), as specified
in the Preferred Alternative in the Disposition of Surplus Highly
Enriched Uranium Final Environmental Impact Statement (HEU Final EIS,
DOE/EIS-0240, June 1996). DOE will gradually sell up to 85 percent of
the resulting LEU over time for commercial use as fuel feed for nuclear
power plants to generate electricity (including 50 metric tons of HEU
and 7,000 tons of natural uranium that will be transferred to the
United States Enrichment Corporation), and will dispose of the
remaining LEU as low-level radioactive waste. This program applies to a
nominal 200 metric tons of United States-origin HEU that the President
has declared, or may declare, surplus to defense needs. [...]"
> See also:
- Uranium Downblending · Uranium Downblending Calculator
- USEC : Megatons to Megawatts · USEC-DOE HEU PROGRAM
- U.S. Higly Enriched Uranium Disposition (NTI)
- DOE Highly Enriched Uranium Disposition Program Office
- DOE Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (?)
- Highly Enriched Uranium: Striking A Balance - A Historical Report on the United States Highly Enriched Uranium Production, Acquisition, and Utilization Activities from 1945 through September 30, 1996 , U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, January 2001 (released on FOIA request)
- HEU downblending at Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina
- NFS Blended Low-Enrichment Uranium (BLEU) project, Erwin, Tennessee
- Downblending of Highly Enriched Uranium at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
- Downblending of Russian HEU for use in U.S. nuclear power plants
NRC License No. SNM-1097, Docket No.
Aerial View: Google Maps · MSRMaps
> See also: GE Silex laser isotope separation enrichment demonstration facility project in Wilmington, North Carolina
Defects found with fuel elements produced at GNF Wilmington nuclear fuel plant
Global Nuclear Fuel discovered instances of GNF3 fuel assembly spacers relocating within the fuel bundle. A safety communication was issued in 2022 following the discovery of a raised water rod (WR) at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. Shutdown inspections in February 2024 at Lasalle identified five spacers out of position. Shutdown inspections at Limerick in April 2024 identified one spacer out of position. Those discoveries prompted this Part 21 report. An evaluation concluded that the relocated spacers could result in a degraded critical power margin, but the evaluation of this condition indicates it will not compromise or greatly reduce protection to public health and safety.
(NRC Event Notification Report for April 23, 2024, Event Number: 57088 , NRC Event Notification Report for April 29, 2024, Event Number: 57088 )
> Download: Final Report Notification , Apr. 22, 2024
GNF Wilmington nuclear fuel plant ships fresh fuel elements in container with unbolted inner lid
The RAJ-II package is a rectangular metal box used to transport a maximum of two unirradiated boiling water reactor (BWR) finished fuel assemblies. It is comprised of one inner container (IC) and one outer container (OC), both made of stainless steel. [...] Both the IC and OC have a removable top lid to allow loading of the contents that are reinstalled and secured with bolts prior to shipment. Internal procedures require these bolts to be securely tightened to a specified torque. [...]
On November 5, 2023, GNF-A shipped RAJ-II inner container serial number RB-2180 containing unirradiated fuel assemblies to a domestic customer reactor site without the required 10 IC top lid bolts being installed and tightened. There were no incidents or accident conditions during the use of the affected package and no components or systems of the package failed.
(GNF 60 Day Report, Jan. 5, 2024 )
[No attempt is made in the report to explain (away) the causes of the failure to install the bolts, nor the failure to notice the absence of the bolts before shipment.]
Radiation doses for workers in Ceramics Area of GNF Wilmington nuclear fuel plant underestimated for more than 20 years
In September of 2022 while conducting reviews of personnel dosimetry the licensee identified that a potentially inappropriate algorithm was applied to thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) data for workers in the Ceramics Area [since 2001]. Further review revealed the algorithm significantly undercalculated deep dose equivalent and lens dose equivalent, resulting in inaccurate monitoring of occupational total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) for workers in the affected area.
> Download: NRC Inspection Report Nov. 3, 2023 (PDF)
Violation of criticality rules at GNF Wilmington nuclear fuel plant
"It was discovered on 12/2/2022, that an Item Relied on For Safety (IROFS) had failed because it was determined to not be available and reliable in the sinter test grinder (STG) dust collection system. On 11/29/2022, a mass of dry uranium oxide powder greater than expected was identified in the grinder swarf collection can, prompting a shutdown of the STG and further investigation. Subsequent equipment cleanout identified approximately 28.4 kilograms of dry uranium oxide compared to the system safety limit of 43.39 kg. The investigation determined that the safety limit could have been challenged. The failed IROFS resulted in a failure to meet performance requirements. The STG operation remains shut down. [...]"
(NRC Event Notification Report for December 05, 2022, Event Number: 56256 )
> Download: Inspection Report and Notice of Violation , May 3, 2023 (PDF)
GNF submits Supplemental Environmental Report for Natrium Fuel Fabrication Facility (NFFF) Project:
The Natrium reactor uses high-assay, low-enriched uranium (HALEU) metallic fuel. HALEU, by definition, can have a candidate enrichment of up to 20 wt% U-235. HALEU metal would be shipped to GNF-A, which would fabricate the HALEU into Natrium fuel rods and assemblies.
As a part of this effort, GNF-A plans to design, license, and construct a standalone Category II fuel fabrication facility, the Natrium Fuel Fabrication Facility (NFFF), for the Natrium demonstration reactor within an existing controlled access area at its facility in Wilmington, North Carolina.
GNF-A will request a license amendment to permit nuclear fuel fabrication at enrichments of up to 20.0 wt% U-235 and authorize operation of the NFFF.
> Download: GNF Cover Letter Mar. 6, 2023 · Supplemental Environmental Report, Feb. 2023 (PDF)
On Mar. 8, 2024, GNF notified NRC that it "has decided to withdraw the supplemental environmental report at this time and provide this information at a later date."
GNF and Terra Power announce Natrium HALEU Fuel Facility Project:
On Oct. 21, 2022, Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas (GNF-A) and TerraPower announced an agreement to build the Natrium™ Fuel Facility at the site of GNF-A's existing plant site near Wilmington. The Natrium Fuel Facility will be jointly funded by TerraPower and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) through the Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program, which aims to speed the demonstration of advanced reactors through cost-shared partnerships with U.S. industry. The facility represents an investment of more than $200 million.
Construction on the Natrium Fuel Facility is anticipated to begin in 2023.
The Natrium Fuel Facility would utilize high-assay, low-enriched uranium (HALEU).
Global Nuclear Fuel - Americas L.L.C. is requesting a license amendment to permit nuclear fuel fabrication at material enrichments up to 8.0 wt.% U-235 which is also referred to as LEU+.
> Download: License Amendment Request, June 24, 2022
> Download: GNF-A 8 wt% License Amendment Request - Meeting Slides, May 3, 2022 (10.3MB PDF)
> see also: GNF Wilmington nuclear fuel plant requests increase of enrichment limit from 5 to 8 percent
In addition, GNF requested the approval of the Model No. RAJ-II Package for the transportation of GNF3 10x10 fuel assemblies with enrichments up to 8 weight percent U-235 (Request for Revision and Renewal of Certificate of Compliance (CoC), Sep. 23, 2022 ).
On Oct. 26, 2023, NRC issued its Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact for the proposed increase of enrichment limit from 5 to 8 percent.
> Federal Register Volume 88, Number 210 (Wednesday, November 1, 2023) p. 75076-75078 (download full text )
> Download: Environmental Assessment , Oct. 2023 (1.3MB PDF)
> Access Docket ID NRC-2023-0179
On Dec. 11, 2023, NRC approved the increase of enrichment limit from 5 to 8 percent. (ML23311A379 )
Improperly secured locking mechanism discovered at package containing UF6 heels shipped by GNF Wilmington (USA) plant
On December 3, 2021, GNF-A made a shipmenmt of four DN30 PSPs [protective structural packaging] to URENCO Netherlands (UNL) each with an empty 30B cylinder containing a solid residual heel of enriched UF6. Subsequently, UNL discovered that one of the six pins in the mortise-and-tenon locking mechanism on DN30 PSP serial number UREJ870217 was not fully inserted as required. As confirmed by UNL, all six mortise-and-tenon pins had the locking bolts properly torqued, but one pin was not fully engaged in the joint.
(60 Day Report, GNF Mar. 11, 2022 )
10 CFR 71.95 Report Evaluation Form , Mar. 11, 2022
Violation of criticality rules at GNF Wilmington nuclear fuel plant
"[...] on or about January 29, 2021, it was determined that IROFS 203-12 [item relied on for safety] did not perform its required safety function of closing the main UF6 flow valve (XV#2905) and a secondary set of UF6 flow valves (XV#1902/903 & XV#1922/923) in the vaporization room when the actual flow rate was considerably lower than the trip setpoint. On August 31, 2018, the licensee failed to apply management measures for the purpose of providing reasonable assurance that IROFS 203-12 would be available and able to perform its function when needed. Specifically, the licensee's "maintenance" management measure failed to assure that IROFS 203-12 was kept in a condition of readiness to perform its design function when required. Additionally, on January 29, 2021, the licensee failed to characterize the as-found condition of IROFS 203-12 as a failed IROFS and maintain records of that failure in accordance with 10 CFR 70.62."
"The safety function of IROFS 203-12 is to stop UF6 flow to the reactor upon indication of the hydrolysis steam flow rate dropping below its setpoint. The purpose of this low flow control is to prevent unreacted UF6 from carrying over into the HF off-gas stream to HF Recovery, which could otherwise result in a criticality downstream in unfavorable geometry process vessels within the HF Recovery System."
(Global Nuclear Fuel - Americas, L.L.C - Integrated Inspection Report 07001113/2021004 and Notice of Violation , Jan. 30, 2022)
Loose bolt discovered at package containing fuel elements shipped by GNF Wilmington (USA) plant
GNF-A shipped RAJ-II package serial number RA-1274 containing unirradiated fuel assemblies to a customer reactor site without one of the required 24 outer container lid bolts being securely tightened and torqued. [...]
On August 9, 2021, a domestic customer reactor site notified GNF-A that it discovered one of the 24 outer container lid bolts on RA-1274 was not securely tightened or torqued as required.
> Download: 10 CFR 71.95 - 60 Day Report - RAJ-II Certificate Condition of Approval Not Observed , Oct. 5, 2021 (PDF)
Thermal plug discovered missing at UF6 heels cylinder arriving from GNF Wilmington (USA) plant at Urenco Almelo (The Netherlands)
> View here
On Oct. 31, 2019, Global Nuclear Fuel requested a license amendment to increase the enrichment limit from 5 to 8 percent at its Wilmington nuclear fuel plant. However, as the subject of the request initially was withheld from public disclosure, it became only apparent in the subsequent NRC correspondence.
> Download: License Amendment Request , Oct. 31, 2019 (PDF)
> Download: December 03, 2019, Telephone Call Summary , Dec. 19, 2019 (PDF)
> Download: Non-acceptance with Opportunity to Supplement for GNF-A 8 Percent Amendment Request , Dec. 20, 2019 (PDF)
> Download: Acceptance Review and Request for Supplemental Information , Feb. 6, 2020 (PDF)
On June 23, 2020, Global Nuclear Fuel withdrew the license amendment request.
> see also: GNF Wilmington nuclear fuel plant again requests increase of enrichment limit from 5 to 8 percent
U.S. Nuclear fuel facilities seeking exemption from reporting requirements for contamination events
> View here
Hydrogen Fluoride leak at GNF Wilmington nuclear fuel plant
"On 11/17/2018, at approximately 1445 EST, it was discovered that the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Dry Conversion Line 1 kiln seal began to leak and caused an alarm on the Hydrogen Fluoride (HF) room detection system. This manufacturing process equipment is within an established FMO contamination-controlled area which is designed to contain and control this type of release. The area was not occupied at the time, there were no personnel exposures or releases from the area and the affected process was shut-down. [...]"
(NRC Event Notification Report for November 27, 2018, Event No. 53744 )
Violation of criticality rules at GNF Wilmington nuclear fuel plant
"[...] During the annual shutdown work activities and routine inspections, an accumulation of material was identified in a safe geometry Radwaste accumulation tank.
The accumulation appears to have occurred due to reduced recirculation flow, an engineered feature that mixes the contents of the tank as part of a density control. The accumulation of material is an indication that the tank density control had degraded. [...]"
(NRC Event Notification Report for April 23, 2018, Event No. 53331 )
> Download GNF-A Written Follow-up Report, June 12, 2018 (PDF)
> Download NRC Inspection Report and Notice of Violation, Aug. 3, 2018 (PDF)
Unanalyzed criticality hazard identified at GNF Wilmington nuclear fuel plant
"At 1700 EDT on June 16, 2017 it was determined that an unanalyzed condition was identified that failed to meet performance criteria. This report is conservatively being made in accordance with 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(1).
In the powder process, a non-radioactive additive is added to a can of uranium in a hood. A previous process hazard analysis (PHA) determined that a criticality in the associated HEPA filters was not credible during this step. A recent update to a criticality analysis identified a potential condition where small amounts of uranium could build up in the HEPA filter over decades. [...]"
(NRC Event Notification Report for June 26, 2017, Event No. 52811 )
"A shipment of contaminated stainless steel metal piping containing low enriched uranium
associated with the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) waste treatment facility was not
properly surveyed and thus inadvertently transported to a local metal recycle center on
September 29, 2016. The material set off the portal monitor radiation alarm(s) at the recycling facility and was immediately returned to the GNF-A facility.
Initial assessments of the material, after it had been returned to the GNF-A facility, were based upon SNM 1097, Section 1.3.2, 'Authorized Guidelines for Contamination-Free Articles'. Under those Section 1.3.2 guidelines, the material did not appear to meet the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 20.2203. On or about March 13, 2017, based on additional survey results and volumetric determinations, GNF-A determined the uranium concentration in the material exceeded ten times the volumetric license release limit of 30 pCi/gram [1.11 Bq/g] authorized for the disposal of industrial waste treatment products in SNM 1097, Section 1.3.6.1 and met the reporting requirement of 10 CFR 20.2203."
(GNF-A Written Report - Contaminated Material in Unrestricted Area, Mar. 20, 2017 [emphasis added])
> Download GNF-A Written Report , Mar. 20, 2017 (612k PDF)
On July 25, 2017, NRC issued an Inspection Report, covering this incident, among others.
"Through interviews, the inspectors learned that the RPM [Radiation Protection Monitor] only surveyed the pipes with an alpha radiation detecting instrument because the scrap piping could not fit inside of a Small Article Monitor (SAM). SAM has the capability to also detect beta radiation. The scrap piping had inaccessible areas where potential for contamination existed. The utilized alpha radiation detecting instrument cannot detect internal (to piping) contamination due to shielding from the metal piping and calcium fluoride (CaF2) residue in the piping. [...]
Subsequently, on February 2, 2017, based on additional survey results and volumetric determinations, GNF-A determined that the uranium concentration in the scrap metal piping exceeded 10 times the volumetric license release limit of 30 pCi/gram [1.11 Bq/g] authorized for the disposal of industrial waste treatment products in Section 1.3.6.1 of their NRC license application.
GNF-A determined that samples previously analyzed from the scrap metal piping contained uranium concentrations ranging between 1,456 pCi/gram up to 9,076 pCi/gram [53.87 - 335.8 Bq/g] for uranium-234, 53 pCi/gram up to 325 pCi/gram [1.96 - 12 Bq/g] for uranium-235, and 257 pCi/gram up to 1,193 pCi/gram [9.51 - 44.14 Bq/g] for uranium-238. These levels were greater than 10 times the release limit of 30 pCi/gram [1.11 Bq/g]."
> Download NRC Inspection Report 70-1113/2017-003 , July 25, 2017 (160k PDF - see p.5 ff)
On Dec. 14, 2017, NRC issued a Confirmatory Order to Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas, L.L.C., which is the result of an agreement reached during an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mediation session conducted on October 25, 2017. NRC refrains from proposing a civil penalty.
> Federal Register Volume 82, Number 242 (Tuesday, December 19, 2017) p. 60219-60223 (download full text )
> Download NRC release Dec. 15, 2017 (191k PDF)
> Download NRC cover letter to GNF, EA-17-090 , Dec. 14, 2017 (78k PDF)
> Download NRC Confirmatory Order , Dec. 14, 2017 (97k PDF)
> Access Docket ID NRC-2017-0234
Violation of NRC rules at GNF Wilmington nuclear fuel plant
During an NRC inspection conducted on October 17 through 21, 2016, a violation of NRC
requirements was identified. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy.
On or before October 20, 2016, the licensee failed to ensure the requirements of the Radiological Contingency and Emergency Plan were implemented through approved documented procedures. Specifically, three EO [Emergency Organization] position holders failed to participate in (or fill the role of a Controller/Evaluator) a minimum of one drill (or actual qualifying event) that permitted demonstration and evaluation of the major responsibilities for the positon within a two year period, thus not completing their biennial requalification drill as required in WI-20-108-01, Rev. 2.2.
(NRC integrated inspection report and notice of violation, Jan. 26, 2017)
Violation of criticality rules at GNF Wilmington nuclear fuel plant
During an NRC inspection conducted on September 12 through 15, 2016, a violation of NRC
requirements was identified. "Specifically, the licensee failed to establish
adequate procedures to ensure the passive geometric features of the dry scrap recovery
furnace screener (IROFS 301-05) were maintained. This is a Severity Level IV violation [...]"
> Download NRC Inspection Report and Notice of Violation, Oct. 28, 2016 (PDF)
NRC finds unspecified violation at GNF Wilmington nuclear fuel plant
During an inspection conducted on September 19 - 22, 2016, NRC found a Severity Level IV
violation of NRC requirements at the GNF Wilmington nuclear fuel plant. Details are withheld.
> Download NRC Inspection Report and Notice of Violation, October 17, 2016 (PDF)
Violation of criticality rules at GNF Wilmington nuclear fuel plant
"It was discovered at 2100 on January 18, 2016 that an accumulation of uranium oxide powder existed that indicated a degradation of an IROFS [Items Relied on for Safety] in the dry scrap recycle furnace off-gas system. Approximately 42 kg of uranium oxide powder was removed from the favorable geometry off-gas dropout. The degraded IROFS resulted in a failure to meet performance requirements in the event of a fire. The dry scrap recycle operation had been shut down on 1/14/16 and was not in operation at the time."
(GNF letter to NRC, Mar. 11, 2016)
NRC finds unspecified violation at GNF Wilmington nuclear fuel plant
During an inspection conducted on August 24 - 27, 2015, NRC found a Severity Level IV
violation of NRC requirements at the GNF Wilmington nuclear fuel plant. Details are withheld.
> Download NRC Inspection Report and Notice of Violation, Oct. 5, 2015 (PDF)
Violation of criticality rules at GNF Wilmington nuclear fuel plant
"It was determined at 1200 [EDT] on 7/13/14, that one of the Items Relied on for Safety (IROFS) associated with the Dry Scrap Recycle operation failed to meet performance requirements. At approximately 1730 [EDT] on July 12, 2014, a potable water line (1/2 inch poly) failed and resulted in a release of approximately 10 gallons of water into the area. The leak was contained and cleaned up. However, this water release is a failure of IROFS 900-03 for Moderation Restriction.
Although the second IROFS (Process Equipment Barriers IROFS 301) prevented moderation intrusion into equipment and containers, it alone was not sufficient to meet performance requirements."
(Event Number: 50276, NRC Event Notification Report for July 14, 2014)
Violation of criticality rules at GNF Wilmington nuclear fuel plant - NRC conducts special inspection
"It was determined at 1:30PM today (3/28/14) that one of the Items Relied on for Safety (IROFS) associated with the Dry Conversion Process recycle operation was inoperable. Although the second IROFS preventing moderation intrusion to the recycle container continued to operate within its allowable parameters, it alone was not sufficient to meet performance requirements. [...]"
(Event Number: 49969, NRC Event Notification Report for March 31, 2014)
> Download NRC Begins Special Inspection at Global Nuclear Fuel in Wilmington, NRC release Apr. 14, 2014 (PDF)
Violation of criticality rules at GNF Wilmington nuclear fuel plant
"On October 26, 2011 at approximately 3:00 p.m., a deficiency was identified during a routine criticality safety review of a proposed revision to an operating procedure for transporting and storing 3-gallon cans. One of the controls needed to meet double contingency was not available to restrict the movement of cans that exceed the specified mass limit for these storage locations. This resulted in a condition where the mass control documented in the criticality safety analysis had not been maintained. The second control, geometry, was maintained."
(Event Number: 47380, NRC Event Notification Report for October 28, 2011)
Violation of criticality rules at GNF Wilmington nuclear fuel plant
On Sep. 15, 2011, GNF reported a failure to maintain double contingency criteria:
"During a GNF-A Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) team walk-down of HVAC systems in the decontamination facility area, it was observed that a log entry for a waste-oil can mass was greater than the limit specified in procedural requirements.
Upon further investigation it was determined at 3:30PM on September 14, 2011 that an operator had incorrectly processed a waste oil can with a gross weight in excess of the limit specified by criticality safety requirements. This resulted in a condition where one of the two controls on mass documented as being necessary to meet double contingency had not been maintained. The second criticality control on mass was maintained at all times."
> View NRC Event Notification Report for September 16, 2011
Violation of criticality rules at GNF Wilmington nuclear fuel plant
On Sep. 14, 2011, GNF reported a potential failure to maintain double contingency criteria:
"As part of the ongoing GNF-A Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) project, reviews of documentation for scrap accumulation hoods were performed that identified procedural actions that were different than described in the criticality safety analysis. It was determined at approximately 2:45 PM on September 13, 2011 that uranium mixed with small amounts of moderator were not prevented from movement into these hoods. This resulted in a condition where the moderation criticality control documented as being necessary to meet double contingency may not have been maintained. The other criticality control on geometry was maintained at all times. [...]"
> View NRC Event Notification Report for September 15, 2011
Violation of criticality rules at GNF Wilmington nuclear fuel plant; NRC proposes $17,500 penalty
On March 2, 2011, the NRC was notified through Event Notification 46650 that GNF-A had
failed to maintain mass control of UO2 powder in the sinter test grinding station HEPA filter enclosure. Specifically, on March 1, 2011, GNF staff identified that approximately 46 kilograms of UO2 powder had been present in the sinter test grinder filter housing, which was greater than the analyzed safe mass to prevent a criticality.
Based on the results of an inspection conducted March 14 - 18, 2011, the NRC has determined that two Severity Level IV violations of NRC requirements occurred.
(NRC Special Inspection Report and Notice of Violation, June 29, 2011, ADAMS Acc. No. ML111810118 )
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has proposed a $17,500 civil penalty against Global Nuclear Fuel - Americas LLC in Wilmington, N.C., for violations of NRC requirements related to a March incident at the fuel manufacturing facility.
The violations involved a failure of Global Nuclear Fuel’s staff to maintain mass control of uranium oxide in particulate air filters in one area of the facility.
> Download NRC news release Nov. 15, 2011 (PDF)
> Download Notice of Violation EA-11-095, Nov. 14, 2011 (PDF)
NRC finds two violations at GNF Wilmington nuclear fuel plant
During an NRC inspection conducted February 22-26, 2010, two violations of NRC
requirements were identified: the licensee failed to report within 24 hours
of discovery, a loss or degradation of an item relied on for criticality safety, and, the licensee failed to install automatic fire detection equipment in the Process Technology laboratory area where fire hazards were present. (ADAMS Acc. No. ML100850027 )
NRC finds five apparent violations at GNF Wilmington nuclear fuel plant
During inspections conducted from November 7, 2008, through August 28, 2009, five apparent violations were identified and are being considered for escalated enforcement action. The apparent violations involve the failure to identify credible accident scenarios during process hazard analyses or document them in the Integrated Safety Analysis Reference Report; the failure to identify criticality accident scenarios as high consequence events; and three separate failures to designate controls as items relied on for safety.
"The apparent violations are of concern to the NRC because they appear to indicate a programmatic issue with your Integrated Safety Analysis. Specifically, these apparent violations indicate a systematic and consistent failure to identify and categorize accident sequences and declare items relied on for safety in accordance with your Integrated Safety Analysis methodology and the requirements of 10 CFR Part 70." (NRC letter to GNF, Nov. 6, 2009, ADAMS Acc. No. ML093100078 )
Violation of criticality rules at GNF Wilmington nuclear fuel plant
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has established a Special Inspection Team at the Global Nuclear Fuel - Americas commercial nuclear fuel plant near Wilmington, N.C., to inspect and assess facts and circumstances associated with an event in which moisture was detected on Jan. 30, 2008, in a process vessel which should not have contained moisture so as to prevent a nuclear criticality.
> View NRC release Feb. 1, 2008
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff has proposed a $16,250 civil penalty against Global Nuclear Fuel - Americas, L.L.C., for incorrectly categorizing an emergency level declaration during a Jan. 30, 2008, incident at the plant's low-enriched uranium processing line in Wilmington, N.C.
> View NRC release Aug. 14, 2008
GNF requests 40-year license renewal for Wilmington nuclear fuel plant
On April 2, 2007, Global Nuclear Fuel - Americas, L.L.C., requested a 40-year license renewal for its Wilmington nuclear fuel plant, North Carolina.
Notice of License Renewal Request for Global Nuclear Fuel -- Americas, LLC, Wilmington, North Carolina, and Opportunity To Request a Hearing.
A request for a hearing must be filed by August 17, 2007.
Federal Register: June 18, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 116) p. 33539-33541 (download full text )
On June 25, 2009, NRC approved the requested license renewal for the continued operation of GNF's Wilmington nuclear fuel plant for 40 years. No hearing requests were
received.
Federal Register: July xx, 2009 (Volume 74, Number xx) p. xx
> See extra page
> See extra page
NRC License No. SNM-42, Docket No.
Aerial view: Google Maps 
· MSRMaps
Scrap metal shipped from BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant activates radiation alarm
POSSIBLE OVEREXPOSURE DUE TO LOSS OF CONTROL
The following information was provided by the BWXT Nuclear Operations Group, Inc. (BWXT NOG-L) via email:
"At approximately 1025 EDT on Monday, July 29, 2024, a BWXT NOG-L recycle vendor notified the licensee that a shipment of scrap aluminum machining chips was identified as being potentially radioactive and/or contaminated. The shipment of material activated the recycle vendor's portal detectors. BWXT NOG-L responded to the vendor's facility and performed a preliminary assessment, exterior smears of the shipping container and inside the transport vehicle confirmed no contamination. The recycle vendor obtained a special permit, from the Commonwealth of Virginia, to return the container back to BWXT NOG-L for evaluation of uranium contamination. Upon return of the container, the contents were re-packaged into drums, values established through non-destructive assay (NDA), and stored within a radiation-controlled area.
"No one was exposed and the material did not pose a risk to the public or the environment during its transportation to and from the recycle vendor. BWXT NOG-L recognizes the potential exposure implications had this material processed through the recycler's facility and is reporting accordingly under 10 CFR 20.2202(b). BWXT NOG-L also recognizes the failure to properly ship radioactive material in accordance with 10 CFR 71.5.
"The resident inspector has been notified. "
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
As a corrected action the licensee has suspended shipments until an evaluation is completed.
(NRC Event Notification Report for August 06, 2024, Event Number: 57251 )
Undisclosed violation identified at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
A licensee-identified violation which was determined to be Severity Level IV is documented in
this report.
(NRC Inspection Report Mar. 4, 2024 )
Criticality alarm system at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant dysfunctional for 11 years
On October 16, 2023, BWXT NOG-L identified a deficiency in the Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS). An input parameter that was utilized in modeling the placement of criticality detectors within the BWXT NOG-L facility was questioned. Upon further examination of this parameter, it was identified that a limited number of process areas in the facility did not have adequate criticality detection capability to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a)(1). BWXT NOG-L determined this condition to be reportable under 10 CFR 70.50(b)(2). The condition was reported on October 17, 2023, as EN-56768.
(30 Day Written Report of Event Notification EN-56768 , Nov. 16, 2023)
Note: Event Number 56768 in Event Notification Report for October 10, 2023 is not related. The correct Event Number is 56800, which was publicly released on Sep. 9, 2024, only.
> View Event Number 56800 in Event Notification Report for September 10, 2024
On March 28, 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection
at your BWXT Nuclear Operations Group facility in Lynchburg, VA. The purpose of the
inspection was to follow up on an Event Notification (EN) submitted by BWXT on October 17,
2023 (EN 56800).
(NRC Inspection Report June 20, 2024 )
Loss of criticality controls and spill at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
On the evening of January 19, 2023, a spill occurred from overfilling the Annular Waste Organic Tank in BWXT NOG-L's Uranium Recovery Facility. On January 20, 2023, during the next periodic inspection of the ventilation duct drain, personnel noted the presence of organic solution, indicating some of the overflowed waste solution had been drawn into the ventilation ductwork.
(60-Day Written Report for Event Notification Number EN-56336 , Apr. 4, 2023 -- Enclosure released on Aug. 3, 2023)
[...] from April 11, 2012, to January 19, 2023, an IROFS [item relied on for safety] was not designed, implemented, and maintained as available and reliable to reduce the likelihood of occurrence of a high-consequence event so that, upon implementation of such controls, the event is highly unlikely. Specifically, the air gap between the Annular Organic Tank vent and the ventilation system was inadequately designed, such that it failed to prevent the overflow of liquid from the Annular Organic Tank into the ventilation system which could lead to a criticality event in the ventilation system.
[...] from April 11, 2012, to January 19, 2023, an IROFS was not designed, implemented, and maintained as available and reliable to reduce the likelihood of occurrence of a high-consequence event so that, upon implementation of such controls, the event is highly unlikely. Specifically, an intact rupture disk was located in the overflow line for the Annular Organic Tank, which blocked flow through the overflow line preventing the IROFS from performing its safety function of preventing a criticality event in the ventilation system.
(Inspection Report and Notice of Violation , May 5, 2023)
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff will hold a predecisional enforcement conference with officials from BWXT Nuclear Operations Group Inc. on June 21, 2023, to discuss two preliminary violations of regulatory requirements that occurred at the Lynchburg, Virginia, fuel fabrication facility in January 2023.
(NRC News release June 15, 2023 )
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has proposed an $87,500 civil penalty to BWXT Nuclear Operations Group Inc. for two violations of regulatory requirements related to safety controls at its fuel fabrication facility in Lynchburg, Virginia.
The violations were discovered after a January 19 event when a storage tank at BWXT's Uranium Recovery Facility overflowed, spilling uranium solution onto the floor and into a ventilation system. Two safety controls designed to prevent such a spill failed, increasing the risk of an accidental criticality. The event did not endanger the plant workers, the public, or the environment.
(NRC News Release Aug. 23, 2023 )
> Download: Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty , Aug. 22, 2023
NRC cites four of five apparent violations in connection with fire resulting in death of employee at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
"This was an event follow-up inspection of BWXT Nuclear Operations Group to review a fire that occurred on June 19, 2020 in the supercompactor building that resulted in the loss of a BWXT employee's life. [...]
List of Violations
During the inspection, five apparent violations of NRC requirements were identified. The apparent violations involved failure to:
- implement the established Fire Protection Program and work area spill response requirements to control the accumulation of flammable liquids necessary to prevent fires from occurring;
- minimize the amount of alcohol present in drums compacted for disposal;
- take the necessary precautions to control ignition sources and prevent the ignition of flammable vapors;
- maintain process safety information in the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) that was complete and accurate in all material respects;
- assure the adequate evaluation of the change to the supercompactor prior to implementing the change."
> Download: Inspection Report and Apparent Violations, June 6, 2022 (PDF)
Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff will meet with BWXT Nuclear Operations Group Inc., Sept. 22, to discuss five apparent violations of regulatory requirements related to a June 2020 flash fire in the supercompactor facility that resulted in the death of a BWXT employee.
> Download: NRC News Sep. 14, 2022 (PDF)
> Download: Sep. 22, 2022 Pre-decisional Enforcement Conference Meeting Summary , Oct. 4, 2022
"Based on the results of the inspection and information that BWXT provided during the PEC, the NRC has determined that four Severity Level IV violations of NRC requirements occurred."
> Download: Inspection Report and Notice of Violation , Jan. 24, 2024 (PDF)
NRC determines two undisclosed violations occurred at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
Based on the results of an inspection conducted on Feb. 28 - Mar. 3 and Mar. 14, 2022, the NRC has determined that two Severity Level IV violations of NRC requirements occurred.
> Download: Inspection Report April 12, 2022
NRC identifies two undisclosed apparent violations at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
On November 4, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an onsite inspection at BWXT Nuclear Operations Group-Lynchburg.
Based on the results of this inspection and review, two apparent violations (AVs) were identified, and are being considered for escalated enforcement action, in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy.
> Download: Inspection Report, Dec. 22, 2021 ·
Notice of Violation, Apr. 4, 2022
NRC approves requested changes to criticality safety requirements at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
> Download: Request to Amend License SNM-42, Chapter 5, Nuclear Criticality Safety , BWXT, June 11, 2021 (PDF)
> Download: Request for Additional Information (RAI) , NRC, Sep. 10, 2021 (PDF)
> Download: Response to Request for Additional Information to Amend License SNM-42, Chapter 5, Nuclear Criticality Safety , BWXT, Oct, 8, 2021 (PDF)
> Access: Amendment 42 - Approval of Request to Amend Chapter 5, Nuclear Criticality Safety, of the License Application for Materials License SNM-42 (includes Cover Letter and Safety Evaluation Report)
Violation of criticality safety procedures at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
"[...] the licensee failed to establish adequate management measures (maintenance and corrective action program) to ensure that the specialty fuel facility waste sink drain line, identified as an IROFS [item relied on for safety], was maintained such that it remained available and reliable to perform its function, to comply with the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61."
(NRC Integrated Inspection Report and Notice of Violation, Oct. 25, 2021 )
Violation of criticality safety procedures at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
The inspectors identified an NRC-identified, Severity Level IV, cited violation for the licensee's failure to perform PMT [post-maintenance test] following corrective maintenance on items relied on for prevention of nuclear criticality.
(NRC Integrated Inspection Report and Notice of Violation, Jan. 29, 2021 )
NRC approves exemptions from certain safety requirements at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant in view of COVID-19 pandemic
On Dec. 31, 2020, NRC approved a number of exemptions from safety requirements, as requested by BWXT for its Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant, including radiation safety inspections, recurring instrument calibrations, emergency drills, among others.
Criticality hazard from unexpected accumulation of HEU in ventilation system of BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
"[...] the inspectors identified a URI [unresolved item] associated with an accumulation of fissile material that occurred in RTRT's [research and test reactors and targets] highly enriched uranium (HEU) arc-melter pre-filter and its associated housing. Specifically, on April 16, 2020, while performing the annual pre-filter replacement for the ventilation system of that arc-melter, the nuclear material control (NMC) group recorded an initial count of greater than 50 grams of U-235 on the filter. Upon further investigation, NMC determined the filter contained 87.3 grams of U-235 and an additional accumulation of 111.45 grams of U-235 in the pre-filter housing for a total of 198.75 grams of U-235. Although this accumulation was greater than expected, the routine operating limit for the pre-filter is 350 grams of U-235; therefore, no NCS limits were violated. [...]
[...] the licensee identified that they had improperly credited an IROFS [items relied on for safety] to perform an annual duct survey as additional protection in this accident sequence [...], when, in fact, that IROFS did not apply. [...]
The significance of this violation was determined to be very low (i.e., SL [severity level] IV)"
(NRC Integrated Inspection Report Oct. 27, 2020 )
Employee dies in fire incident at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
"At approximately 1030 EDT on Friday, June 19, 2020, a BWXT NOG-L employee lost his life due to a fire incident. There were no eye witnesses, but workers in the area reported hearing a pop and then found the victim on the floor in the Supercompactor Room (an intermediate controlled work area). At this time the investigation has not determined what caused the event. The fire did not continue and was out before the Emergency Team could respond to the incident. There was no release of radioactive material above 1 DAC [Derived-Air-Concentration]."
(U.S. NRC Event Notification Report for June 29, 2020, Event Number: 54751 )
NRC identifies two violations of criticality safety procedures at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
Two Severity Level IV violations of NRC requirements were identified regarding the failure
of management measures to ensure
- the reliability of an IROFS (item relied on for safety) for preventing a criticality in the pickling area, and
- the integrity of heat exchanger IROFSs for preventing a criticality in the UR (Uranium Recovery) facility.
> Download: NRC Inspection Report Apr. 30, 2020 (PDF)
DOE awards further contract for preparation of High Assay Low-Enriched Uranium (HALEU) fuel fabrication at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant:
On Mar. 11, 2021, BWX Technologies, Inc. announced that the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) awarded a $17.9 million contract to BWXT NOG to complete the second phase of the construction of a new research reactor fuel line BWXT previously announced.
The contract funds the repurposing of a portion of the Lynchburg uranium processing facility to be used to manufacture uranium-molybdenum alloy High Assay Low Enriched Uranium (U-Mo HALEU) fuel.
DOE awards contract for preparation of High Assay Low-Enriched Uranium (HALEU) fuel fabrication at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant:
On Feb. 11, 2020, BWX Technologies, Inc. announced that the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has awarded an initial $3.6 million contract to the BWXT Nuclear Operations Group, Inc. subsidiary as the manufacturer of a uranium-molybdenum alloy High Assay Low Enriched Uranium (U-Mo HALEU) fuel that will facilitate the conversion of high-performance U.S. research reactors from the current use of high-enriched uranium.
The contract funds engineering work for the decommissioning and refurbishment of portions of the Lynchburg, Virginia, facility for future production of U-Mo HALEU.
This award will allow BWXT to begin preparation activities for fabricating U-Mo HALEU at the uranium processing facility in Lynchburg, Virginia. Assuming additional future awards, BWXT anticipates that fuel production could begin by 2024.
> See also: High Assay Low-Enriched Uranium (HALEU)
U.S. Nuclear fuel facilities seeking exemption from reporting requirements for contamination events
> View here
BWXT Lynchburg starts production of TRISO nuclear fuel for microreactor:
On Dec. 7, 2022, BWX Technologies, Inc. celebrated the production of TRISO nuclear fuel that will power the first microreactor built and operated in the United States.
Under a $37 million award from the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), BWXT will manufacture a core for Project Pele, TRISO fuel for additional reactors and coated particle fuel for NASA. INL administers the contract and provides the technical support and oversight. Fuel for the reactor will be downblended from U.S. government stockpiles of high-enriched uranium (HEU) to high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) and fabricated into TRISO fuel at the BWXT facility in Lynchburg, Virginia. BWXT facilities are the only private U.S. facilities licensed to possess and process HEU.
BWXT Lynchburg awarded contract amendment to manufacture TRISO nuclear fuel:
On Jan. 24, 2022, BWX Technologies, Inc. announced it has been awarded a $4.9 million contract amendment by Battelle Energy Alliance LLC to manufacture TRISO nuclear fuel. BEA manages Idaho National Laboratory on behalf of the Department of Energy.
The award amends a competitively bid base award announced in July 2020 and brings the overall contract value to $31.2 million. The initial award funded expansion of BWXT's TRISO manufacturing capacity and upgrades to the existing systems in support of anticipated fuel needs for both the Department of Defense (DoD) and NASA. The project is jointly funded by the DoD Operational Energy Capabilities Improvement Fund Office and NASA, with overall program management provided by the DoD Strategic Capabilities Office.
Under the terms of the amendment, BWXT subsidiary Nuclear Operations Group, Inc. will manufacture a quantity of natural uranium TRISO particles and demonstrate those operations on a production schedule.
BWXT Lynchburg announces restart of TRISO nuclear fuel manufacturing:
On Nov. 10, 2020, BWX Technologies, Inc. announced that its BWXT Nuclear Operations Group, Inc. subsidiary has completed its TRISO nuclear fuel line restart project and is actively producing fuel at its Lynchburg, Va. facility.
BWXT Lynchburg awarded contract for expansion of TRISO nuclear fuel manufacturing line:
On July 1, 2020, BWX Technologies, Inc. announced that its Nuclear Operations Group, Inc. subsidiary has been awarded a competitively bid contract by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to expand and upgrade its TRISO nuclear fuel manufacturing line.
BWXT Lynchburg awarded TRISO nuclear fuel manufacturing contract:
On March 11, 2020, BWX Technologies, Inc. announced that its BWXT Nuclear Operations Group, Inc. (NOG) subsidiary has been awarded a contract from the Department of Energy's Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to manufacture TRISO nuclear fuel to support the continued development of the Transformational Challenge Reactor (TCR).
BWXT had previously announced that it is restarting its TRISO production line at its Lynchburg, Virginia manufacturing site. Restart activities will be finalized to allow for production to be completed by the fall of 2020.
BWXT to restart TRISO nuclear fuel production line in Lynchburg and expand capacity:
"BWX Technologies, Inc. (NYSE: BWXT) announced today that it is in the process of restarting its existing TRISO nuclear fuel production line and is planning to expand its existing capacity within approximately 12 months. The expansion to BWXT's existing TRISO fuel production capability will position the company to meet emergent client interests in Department of Defense microreactors, space reactors, and civil advanced reactors.
TRISO refers to a specific design of uranium nuclear reactor fuel. (TRISO is a shortened form of the term TRIstructural-ISOtropic. TRIstructural refers to the layers of coatings surrounding the uranium fuel, and ISOtropic refers to the kernel being the same size in each direction since it takes the shape of a sphere.) TRISO fuel can withstand extreme heat and has very low proliferation concerns and environmental risks."
(BWXT Oct. 2, 2019)
On December 18, 2019, BWX Technologies, Inc. announced that its TRISO nuclear fuel manufacturing restart activities are progressing ahead of schedule. BWXT technicians are now producing uranium solutions for TRISO fuel as the company moves forward with its previously announced plans to restart its manufacturing line and increase capacity at its Lynchburg, Va. facility.
NRC identifies violation of criticality safety procedures at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
"[...] prior to March 18, 2019, the licensee failed to implement adequate management measures to ensure periodic replacement of the recovery furnace system ventilation high-efficiency particulate air bank pre-filters, identified as an IROFS [Items Relied on for Safety], was maintained to ensure it was available and reliable to perform its function when needed to comply with the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61.
Specifically, periodic replacement was an IROFS to prevent excessive accumulation of
fuel in the pre-filters."
> Download: NRC Inspection Report, July 30, 2019 (PDF)
NRC identifies undisclosed safety violation at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
> Download Inspection Report July 12, 2019 (84kB PDF)
NRC identifies violation of criticality safety procedures at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
"[...] NCS [Nuclear Criticality Safety] postings and/or procedures did not describe controls for the U3O8 room as appropriate to provide operators guidance for safely complying with U235 mass limits during operation. The mass limits on NCS postings 15-22-01, 'blending station,' and 15-22-24, 'storage location,' were expressed as 'grams U235'. The operator charge weights prescribed by operating procedure were expressed as 'grams U3O8'. A calculation using percent uranium and U235 was necessary to check compliance with the postings.
The noncompliance occurred on August 22, 2018, when the charging station operator
erroneously added more U3O8 powder to a charge jar than required by procedure. The operator notified engineering of the error, but because there was no guidance for rejecting a charge jar at the powder stage, the operator was directed to move the charge along the process for later rejection. When the charge jar was moved to the blending station, the U235 charge jar mass overload occurred. The posting violation was
discovered during the engineering review of the rejected charge."
> Download: Inspection Report , Jan. 30, 2019 (187kB PDF)
NRC identifies two undisclosed safety violations at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
> Download: Inspection Report and Notice of Violation , Nov. 27, 2018 (106kB PDF)
NRC identifies violation of criticality safety procedures at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
"[...] the licensee failed to conduct an ISA [Integrated Safety Analysis] that identified accident sequences involving the effect of natural phenomena, specifically seismic events, on racks on which special nuclear material is stored."
> Download: Inspection Report and Notice of Violation , Aug. 18, 2017 (174 kB PDF)
"On July 4, 2017 at 1533 [EDT] it was identified that two desiccant filters serving a dry train ventilation system on a uranium processing glovebox line contained a uranium compound. The two containers were located within close proximity to one another, but were separated during maintenance activities associated with the equipment prior to knowledge of the uranium mass presence. This was assumed to be a non-uranium-bearing system and there were no documented controls in the Integrated Safety Analysis to prevent accumulations. The system was not included in typical duct surveys to identify such accumulations. Uranium processing operations were shut down and the plant is in the summer shutdown outage. There was no immediate risk of criticality or threat to the safety of workers or the public as a result of this event. Security is controlling access to the area and the area will remain shutdown."
> View: NRC Event Report, Event Number 52840 , July 5, 2017
> Download: 60-Day Written Report for Event Notification Number 52840 , Aug. 9, 2017 (7.2MB PDF)
During a special inspection conducted from July 6-14, 2017, NRC identified three unresolved items.
> Download: NRC Special Inspection Report No. 70-27/2017-007 , Sep. 7, 2017 (737kB PDF)
During inspections conducted from Aug. 30 to Dec. 11, 2017, NRC identified three apparent violations that are being considered for escalated enforcement: failure to ensure criticality accident sequences remain highly unlikely, failure to assure that under normal and credible abnormal conditions, all nuclear processes were subcritical including use of an approved margin of subcriticality, and failure to maintain adequate process safety information for Process Systems.
On Nov. 11, 2017, NRC rated the event Level 2 on the INES scale.
On Mar. 8, 2018, NRC issued a Notice of Violation citing three violations:
"In summary, the first violation involves the failure to ensure that high consequence accident sequences remain highly unlikely as required by 10 CFR 70.61(b). The second violation involves the failure to assure that under normal and credible abnormal conditions, the UAlx glovebox air purifier system was subcritical as required by 10 CFR 70.61(d). The third violation involves the failure to maintain adequate process safety information for process systems associated with the UAlx glovebox systems as required by
10 CFR 70.62(b)."
NRC does not propose a civil penalty in this case.
> Download: NRC Inspection Report No. 70-27/2018-006 and Notice of Violation , Mar. 8, 2018 (124kB PDF)
> See also: NRC issues further Information Notice on potential for uranium accumulation in ventilation systems at nuclear fuel facilities
Unanalyzed criticality accident scenario discovered at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
High enriched scrap fuel material is processed in BWXT NOG-Lynchburg's Uranium Recovery facility to reclaim as much of the uranium as possible. The material is dissolved in acid and transferred to a series of horizontal columns where the acid is neutralized. The solution may be transferred to a set of accountability weigh columns for measurement prior to entering the uranium extraction process. The solution is subsequently transferred to a series of horizontal feed columns. Process water is used to periodically flush the horizontal columns during cleanup for materials accountability.
On June 9, 2016, a BWXT Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) engineer was notified that a bluish tint had been observed in the favorable geometry process water connection to the horizontal columns. By procedure, a blue dye is added to the acid to aid in its identification in the event of a spill. Further evaluation determined that the favorable geometry process water line was directly connected to the horizontal column system and the presence of the blue dye indicated a potential backflow of uranium bearing solution into the water line. The favorable geometry water line is under constant water pressure. The valves controlling the water flow are normally closed. There is also a check valve in the line to prevent backflow. The line is supplied from a favorable geometry header on the mezzanine above. The header supplies water to other processes in Uranium Recovery, including an unfavorable geometry hot water heater.
The Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) was reviewed and an accident sequence for this potential backflow could not be identified. On June 9, 2016 at 1330 [EDT] it was the determined the accident sequence was unanalyzed and not properly documented in the ISA. [emphasis added]
> View: NRC Event Report, Event Number 51998 , June 12, 2017
NRC identifies safety violation which resulted in "unplanned" fire at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
On January 5, 2016, "the licensee failed to ensure a carrier holder with carrier had been moved to the carrier/boat unloading position. Specifically, the failure to follow OP 0061556 resulted in an unplanned fire in the conversion furnace prefilter located in the direct cooling filter housing and the activation of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC)."
> Download NRC Inspection Report and Notice of Violation , May 2, 2016 (159k PDF)
NRC identifies safety violation at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
The Container Storage Facility (CSF) wet-pipe sprinkler system "was in a degraded state for approximately 30 minutes due to the concurrent testing of the fire pumps and an existing system impairment that had already isolated part of the fire/service water loop from its water source."
> Download NRC Inspection Report and Notice of Violation , Jan. 28, 2016 (150k PDF)
NRC identifies two violations of criticality safety procedures at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has launched a special inspection at the BWX Technologies fuel facility in Lynchburg, Va., to assess the circumstances surrounding the discovery that workers may have exceeded controls for criticality safety in a production line glovebox.
> Download: NRC release Sep. 25, 2015 (PDF)
> Download Inspection Report and Notice of Violation , Dec. 30, 2015 (105k PDF)
NRC issues Confirmatory order for weapons use at B&W Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
> Federal Register Volume 80, Number 172 (Friday, September 4, 2015) p. 53588-53591 (download full text )
> Download: NRC staff's technical evaluation , January 29, 2015
> Access: Docket ID NRC-2015-0201
NRC finds two violations of criticality safety procedures at B&W Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
> Download NRC Inspection Report and Notice of Violations, June 18, 2015 (178k PDF)
NRC finds further violation of criticality safety procedures at B&W Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
> Download Inspection Report and Notice of Violations, Oct. 30, 2012 (160k PDF)
NRC finds further violations of criticality safety procedures at B&W Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
> Download Inspection Report and Notice of Violations, Aug. 15, 2012 (272k PDF)
NRC finds further violations of criticality safety procedures at B&W Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
> Download Inspection Report and Notice of Violations, Jan. 30, 2012 (1.7M PDF)
NRC finds further violation of criticality safety procedures at B&W Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
> Download Inspection Report and Notice of Violation, July 15, 2011 (132k PDF)
NRC finds further violation of criticality safety procedures at B&W Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
> Download Inspection Report and Notice of Violation, Nov. 4, 2010 (278k PDF)
EPA invites commment on proposal to exclude sludge from wastewater treatment facility at B&W Lynchburg nuclear plant from hazardous waste regulation
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is proposing to grant a petition submitted by Babcock & Wilcox Nuclear Operations Group, Inc., [...] to exclude (or delist) on a one-time basis from the lists of hazardous waste, a certain solid waste [sludge produced by its wastewater treatment facility] generated at its Mt. Athos facility near Lynchburg, Virginia.
The Agency is requesting comments on this proposed decision.
To make sure we consider your comments on this proposed exclusion, they must be received by November 22, 2010.
> Federal Register: October 7, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 194) p. 62040-62048 (download full text )
NRC issues Notice of Opportunity To Request a Hearing and Provide Written
Comments on Order Approving Indirect License Transfers of BWX Lynchburg (VA) and Erwin (TN) nuclear fuel facilities
A request for a hearing must be filed by July 1, 2010. Comments must be received by July 10, 2010..
Docket ID NRC-2010-0199
Federal Register: June 11, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 112) p. 33362-33365
(download full text )
Alert over potential criticality issue after discharge of highly enriched uranium at B&W Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has proposed a $35,000 civil penalty against the Babcock & Wilcox facility in Lynchburg, Va., for a violation of NRC requirements related to the company's emergency declaration for an event in July 2009.
The violation involved a failure of Babcock & Wilcox facility staff to declare an Alert emergency classification in a timely manner as required by their emergency plan. On July 15, 2009, company employees failed to declare the emergency for more than two hours after they discovered a band saw cooling reservoir did not have the proper criticality controls.
> View NRC release Jan. 12, 2010
> Download Notice of Violation Jan. 11, 2010 (ADAMS Acc. No. ML100110209)
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff has scheduled a predecisional enforcement conference in Atlanta for Nov. 6, 2009, to discuss with officials of Babcock and Wilcox Nuclear Operations Group in Lynchburg, Va., apparent violations of NRC requirements associated with the loss of nuclear criticality controls on a mechanical saw.
> View NRC release Oct. 29, 2009
A scare at the B&W Nuclear Operations Group in Lynchburg Wednesday (July 15) prompted a review by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission after oil containing an unknown amount of highly enriched uranium discharged at the facility.
The incident began around 7:45 p.m. Wednesday (July 15). According to a news release from the NRC, a saw used to cut fuel components discharged some of that oil. The facility declared an alert and the NRC called in its response teams.
Staff at the facility analyzed the materials and determined only a small amount of uranium was in the oil.
(WDBJ7 Roanoke News July 16, 2009)
Violation of criticality criteria during planned upgrades at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
On Dec. 10, 2008, BWXT Technologies Inc. issued an Event Notification to the NRC, reporting that planned upgrades to the Low Level Dissolver System had led to the use of dissolver trays with an inadequate geometry violating the criticality criteria.
NRC orders $32,500 fine for liquid hydrogen fluoride (HF) spill at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff has ordered B&W Nuclear Operations Group in Lynchburg, Va., to pay a $32,500 civil penalty for B&W's failure to have adequate instructions for workers on how to neutralize acid spills.
> View NRC release June 17, 2010
On April 28, 2008, a process operator received an exposure of liquid hydrogen fluoride (HF) to the eye, while trying to neutralize a liquid HF spill.
> Download EA-08-204: Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty - $32,500 , NRC Region II, Oct. 20, 2008 (ADAMS Acc. No. ML082960026)
NRC releases old event reports for BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant (Virginia)
On May 12, 2008, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission released event notification reports for two nuclear fuel fabrication facilities, Nuclear Fuel Services (NFS) in Erwin, Tenn., and BWX Technologies (BWXT) in Lynchburg, Va., for the period 2004 - 2007, which were previously withheld for security reasons.
> View NRC release No. 08-091, May 12, 2008
NRC finds further violation of criticality safety procedures at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
"...on October 22, 2007, the licensee failed to conduct operations
according to administrative limits (e.g., quantity of containers and moderating materials)
established by NCS and provided on an NCS posting. Specifically, a 2.5 liter container
and a zip lock bag were observed in the Cyclone Glovebox, located in the Specialty
Fuels Facility. The NCS posting on the Cyclone Glovebox limits the glovebox to a
maximum of one container with a volume less than or equal to 2.5 liters and also limits
the moderating materials permitted in the glovebox to only materials that are necessary
for normal operations."
(NRC Inspection Report No. 70-27/2007-205, Nov. 14, 2007)
NRC finds further violation of criticality safety procedures at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant; proposes $32,500 fine
The apparent violation involved the failure to analyze the nuclear criticality safety associated with the transfer of Raschig ring vacuum cleaners at the facility. This condition was identified on July 26, 2007, when a Raschig ring vacuum cleaner spilled its contents of special nuclear material-bearing solution, during transfer, into an attached plastic bag being used for contamination control. The failure to analyze the transfer activity resulted in special nuclear material-bearing solution being in a condition without any nuclear criticality safety controls. (NRC Inspection Report No. 70-27/2007-006, October 19, 2007)
On Jan. 24, 2008, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Thursday proposed a $32,500 fine against BWX Technologies for this violation of NRC safety requirements.
> View NRC release Jan. 24, 2008
NRC announces notice of license amendment, and opportunity to request a hearing for exemption to criticality accident requirements at BWX Technologies, Inc. Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has received, by letter dated May 2, 2007, a license amendment application from BWX Technologies, Inc. (BWXT), requesting an exemption to the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24, Criticality Accident Requirements, in its materials license, at its Mt. Athos site located in Lynchburg, Virginia.
Federal Register: July 3, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 127) p. 36515-36516 (download full text )
On Nov. 30, 2007, NRC issued an Environmental assessment (EA) and finding of no significant impact (FONSI).
Federal Register: December 7, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 235) p. 69234-69236 (download full text )
Federal Register: December 13, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 239) p. 70899-70900 (download full text )
License renewal
Notice of Issuance of Renewed License, BWX Technologies, Inc., Lynchburg, VA
Federal Register: April 6, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 66), p. 17195 (download full text )
Notice of Availability of Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact for License Renewal for BWX Technologies, Inc., Lynchburg, VA
Federal Register: March 31, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 62) p. 16348-16349 (download full text )
The NRC provides notice that this is a proceeding on an application for a license amendment regarding the license renewal for BWX Technologies, Inc.
Federal Register: March 6, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 43) p. 11231-11232 (download full text )
NRC again finds further violation of criticality safety procedures at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
On Feb. 7, 2005, NRC issued a Notice of Violation to BWXT for violating the criticality safety procedures in the scrap material storage cabinet.
NRC again finds further violation of criticality safety procedures at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
On March 31, 2004, NRC inspectors observed special nuclear material in a storage location not in conformance with the nuclear criticality safety posting requirement.
NRC finds further violation of criticality safety procedures at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
On March 2, 2004, NRC inspectors observed special nuclear material in a storage location not in conformance with the nuclear criticality safety posting control requirement.
NRC finds violation of criticality safety procedures at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
During an inspection held on Feb. 9-13, 2004, the U.S. NRC identified a violation of the prescribed criticality safety procedures: an item had been introduced into the Uranium Recovery facility without the required Nuclear Criticality Safety review and approval.
NRC issues Environmental Assessment and FONSI to approve the Final Status Survey Plan and Decommissioning Plan for Industrial Waste Landfill 1 at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
Federal Register: November 14, 2003 (Volume 68, Number 220) p. 64665-64668
(download full text )
NRC cites BWXT for inoperable criticality monitors in Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
> View NRC enforcement document: EA-03-119 - BWX Technologies, Inc. (Aug. 11, 2003)
> Download related NRC Information Notice: IN 2003-10 (Aug. 4, 2003) (PDF)
NRC relaxes air monitoring requirements for BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
> Federal Register: October 2, 2002 (Vol. 67, No. 191) p. 61929-61931 (download full text )
"Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact of License Amendment for BWX Technologies, Inc.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is considering the amendment
of Special Nuclear Material License SNM-42 to authorize elimination of
Lynchburg Technology Center (LTC) stack continuous monitoring and
revise other air monitoring stack action levels at the BWX
Technologies, Inc., facility located in Lynchburg, VA, and has prepared
an Environmental Assessment in support of this action."
The license amendment was issued on September 30, 2002.
Two uranium fuel plants in Lynchburg, Virginia, and Erwin, Tennessee, must immediately adopt stricter anti-terrorist measures such as more guards, vehicle barriers and patrols, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission said on Aug. 22, 2002.
The plants, owned by BWX Technologies Inc. and Nuclear Fuel Services, take enriched uranium and make it into fuel for nuclear reactors.
The NRC said it ordered the two plants to adopt similar measures already put in place by U.S. nuclear power plants as a precaution after the Sept. 11 attacks. (Reuters Aug. 22, 2002)
> View NRC release Aug. 22, 2002
> Federal Register: August 27, 2002 (Vol. 67, No. 166) p. 55039-55040 (download full text )
> see also: Downblending of U.S. Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) for commercial reactor use
NRC issues license amendment for HEU metal dissolution facility
Federal Register: January 16, 2002 (Vol. 67, No. 11), p. 2251-2254 (download full text ):
"Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact of
License Amendment for BWX Technologies, Inc., and Notice of Opportunity
To Request a Hearing
ACTION: Amendment of BWX Technologies, Inc., Materials License SNM-42
to authorize the installation and use of the Metal Dissolution
Facility."
The Metal Dissolution Facility (MDF) is required for the dissolution of high enriched uranium (HEU) metal to support BWXT's downblending operations.
The license amendment was issued on January 25, 2002.
(formerly AREVA NP Inc., Framatome ANP, Siemens Power Corp., Advanced Nuclear Fuels)
License No. SNM-1227, Docket No. ,
Aerial view: Google Maps · MSRMaps
NRC Facility Info (Decommissioning)
Defective fuel rods manufactured by Framatome Richland nuclear fuel plant discovered at Oconee Unit 3 NPP
During startup testing at the affected plant [Oconee Unit 3], unexpected high reactor peaking factor readings resulted from an incorrect boron concentration of Al2O3-B4C pellets in two burnable poison rod assemblies (BPRAs). The cause of the issue was due to 0.2 percent boron concentration Al2O3-B4C pellets inadvertently combined with the intended 2.0 percent boron concentration Al2O3-B4C pellets, which were then placed back into inventory labeled as 2.0 percent.
(NRC Event Notification Report for June 24, 2024, Event Number: 57186 )
Air filter defective at Framatome Richland nuclear fuel plant
"This concurrent report is being made because a HEPA filter on a scrap recovery line had degraded below the efficiency that would allow it to remain in service (76.85 percent versus 99.95 percent). This condition is reportable to the Washington Department of Health in accordance with Radioactive Air Emissions License (RAEL) 038. The scrap recovery line has been shut down pending further investigation into the cause of the loss of filter efficiency. Investigation has revealed that no limits were exceeded and no additional reporting is required."
(NRC Event Notification Report for June 12, 2024, Event Number: 57162 )
HALEU metallization pilot production facility under construction at Framatome Richland nuclear fuel plant
On May 29, 2024, Framatome and TerraPower announced an agreement to design and develop a high-assay low enriched uranium (HALEU) metallization pilot line at Framatome's nuclear fuel manufacturing facility in Richland, Washington. The pilot line will further verify Framatome's ability to convert uranium oxide (UO2) into HALEU metal, initiating a long-term collaboration to supply metal feedstock and help TerraPower build a domestic HALEU supply chain. [...] The HALEU pilot line, which is currently under construction, will prove the viability of Framatome's technology for metallization to support the development of the advanced reactor market.
Safety violation at Framatome Richland nuclear fuel plant
"At approximately 1015 PDT on 5/7/2024, three items were found in a storage area.
Those items were:
1. A metal table that had been used in contaminated areas.
2. A cart that had been used in contaminated areas to transport material, with an additional weight standard stored on it.
3. An out-of-service overpack, designed to transport pellet sintering boats between buildings.
The items were removed and sent to an outside waste area for gamma spectrometry measurement. The gamma spectrometry results at 1445 PDT on 5/7/2024, indicated that less than 8 grams of uranium were present in the transfer vault. This is more than the annual portion quantity of the building containing the storage area. The limit per stack license for Emission Unit 1511 is 1 gram of uranium.
The other items were found to not be contaminated. There was no removable contamination on the items as measured by health and safety technicians."
(NRC Event Notification Report for May 10, 2024, Event Number: 57116 )
Framatome plans expansion of Richland plant for manufacture of fuel for advanced reactor designs:
Framatome Inc. is seeking property tax breaks from the city of Richland as it considers investing $39 million to expand its nuclear fuels facility at Horn Rapids.
The project, referred to in planning documents as "Project Eagle Phase 1," would expand the Framatome facility at 2101 Horn Rapids Road by 15,852 square feet [1,473 m2].
That project is used to recover scrap uranium that has picked up contaminants in its nuclear fabrication operation.
(Tri-City Herald Dec. 30, 2023)
Framatome signs joint venture for manufacture of fuel for advanced reactor designs:
Framatome Inc. (Framatome) and Ultra Safe Nuclear Corporation (USNC) today signed an agreement to establish a joint venture (JV) [...]. This JV will provide nuclear fuel for the fourth generation Micro-Modular™ Reactor (MMR®) and other advanced reactor designs. The fuel supply will include commercial quantities of Tri-structural Isotropic (TRISO) particles and USNC's proprietary Fully Ceramic Microencapsulated (FCM®) fuel.
(Framatome Nov. 28, 2023)
Air filter efficiency deficient at Framatome Richland nuclear fuel plant
"On December 17, 2023 a routine DOS [di-octyl sebacate] test of one of Framatome's final filter banks had an efficiency of 99.78% which was below the 99.95% efficiency credited by Framatome's radioactive air emissions license. In compliance with Framatome's radioactive air emissions license (RAEL-038), Framatome made the required written notification to the Washington Department of Health (WDOH).
"The loss of efficiency did not cause emissions to be above allowable limits."
(Event Notification Report for December 21, 2023, Event Number: 56904 )
Framatome Richland nuclear fuel plant improperly installed valves at 30B cylinders for enriched uranium hexafluoride all the time
On October 16th, 2023, during a 30B cylinder valve installation, the improper use of a torque wrench was observed which potentially exceeded the torque setting of the wrench. Through investigation, this improper practice was determined to be common. As a result of the improper use of a torque wrench, the maximum regulatory torque of 400 ft-lbf may have been slightly exceeded during the
installation of 30B cylinder valves used to transport Uranium Hexafluoride.
Framatome provides 30B cylinder recertification services for the enriched uranium products industry. This issue potentially affects all 30B cylinders that have been through the five year periodic inspections and tests performed by Framatome at the Richland, WA facility.
> Download: 60-day follow-up report , Dec. 7, 2023
Framatome obtains NRC approval of increase of enrichment values to 8% for nuclear fuel shipped in TN-B1 containers:
On August 28, 2024, Framatome announced that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved a license amendment allowing transport of fresh nuclear fuel assemblies in the U.S. having U-235 enrichments up to 8 weight %, using its existing TN-B1 boiling water reactor (BWR) fuel assembly shipping containers.
Framatome requests NRC approval of increase of enrichment values to 8% for nuclear fuel shipped in TN-B1 containers:
> Download: Amendment Request for Increased Enrichment Values, Jan. 31, 2023
Undeclared hazardous material discovered in waste shipment from Framatome Richland nuclear fuel plant
On October 21, 2022, the Framatome Richland facility concurrently reported to the NRC Operations Center that on August 5, 2022, an undeclared hazardous material was discovered following a completed waste shipment. The undeclared material was 18.3 grams of U-238 (depleted uranium).
> Download: 60-day follow-up report , Dec. 7, 2022
Loss of criticality safety controls at Framatome Richland nuclear fuel plant
"Two gamma monitors on filters associated with the waste water treatment system were discovered to be non-functional during their monthly calibration check. These gamma monitors are designated as an Item Relied on for Safety (IROFS) and are used to prevent gradual long term accumulations of uranium from exceeding a safe mass.
The system has been shut down and will remain down until the required safety function is restored." (NRC Event Notification Report for May 16, 2022, Event Number: 55897 )
> Download: 60-day report , July 11, 2022 (PDF)
Framatome receives NRC approval to transport nuclear fuel enriched to 8%
On Feb. 22, 2022, Framatome announced that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recently approved a license amendment allowing Framatome's shipping containers to transport fresh nuclear fuel assemblies in the U.S. having U-235 enrichments up to 8 weight%.
This license amendment enables Framatome to use its NRC-licensed shipping containers to transport nuclear fuel with enrichments above the industry standard 5 weight% to U.S. customers.
[This is an authorization for a maximum of 2 shipments of channeled
Framatome Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) ATRIUM 11 (11x11) unirradiated fuel assemblies]
> Download: NRC authorization , Feb. 11, 2022
> Download: Safety Evaluation Report , Feb. 11, 2022
Technician contaminated with uranyl nitrate solution at Framatome Richland nuclear fuel plant
On December 8, 2021 at approximately 0745 an instrument technician was contaminated with uranyl nitrate solution while calibrating process instrumentation.
(30-Day Report, Framatome Jan. 7, 2022 )
Framatome seeks NRC approval of a reduction of the minimum margin of safety for criticality at its Richland nuclear fuel plant: the maximum evaluated neutron multiplication factor k95/95 is to be changed from 0.95 to 0.97 [an uncontrolled nuclear chain reaction occurs, if the neutron multiplication factor reaches 1.0]
The change is a "key initial step" to support Framatome's Advanced Fuel Management [AFM] project which comprises enrichments above 5.0 wt% and increased fuel burnup.
> Download: Environmental, Health, Safety and Licensing (EHS&L) Document, NRC Materials License SNM-1227 - Chapter 5, Version 3.0 (PDF - contains old strikeout and new versions of page 5-6)
> Download: Framatome presentation , Oct. 22, 2021 (PDF)
> Download: Framatome Inc. Richland Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Facility's Intent to Amend License No. SNM-1227 , Aug. 23, 2022 (PDF)
Framatome seeks change of minimum margin of safety for criticality at Richland nuclear fuel plant:
"Framatome Inc., requested this meeting to discuss an amendment it is preparing to submit for NRC review. The amendment would change the minimum margin of safety for criticality as currently established in its license. [...]
Attendance at part of this meeting is closed to members of the public due to the sensitive nature of information to be discussed pursuant to 10 CFR 2.790."
> Download: NRC Meeting Notice , Oct. 14, 2021 (PDF)
Uranyl nitrate spill at Framatome Richland nuclear fuel plant
At about 0630 PDT [on Oct. 12, 2021] while a process operator was attempting to move a pallet of four plastic 55-gallon [208 litres] drums containing uranium nitrate (UN) solution off of a containment pallet, two drums fell off of the pallet and into the sea-land container where they were stored. One of the drums split and leaked UN solution into the sea-land container contaminating the area within the sea-land container, the forklift, and the asphalt under and adjacent to it. This drum contained approximately [DELETED] of uranium. The uranium concentration in the UN solution was about [DELETED] and approximately half of the drum volume spilled. [...]
(NRC Event Notification Report for October 13, 2021, Event Number: 55517 )
The drum contained approximately 2.5 kg of uranium. The uranium concentration in the UN solution was 14.23 grams per liter, of which 3.93 per cent by mass was U235. The spill volume was less than twenty gallons [76 litres]; isotope activities corresponding to a spill of that volume are 351.86 µCi [13.019 MBq ≘ 1.046 kg] U238 and 93.14 µCi [3.446 MBq ≘ 43 g] U235.
(30 Day Follow Up Report, Public Version , Framatome, Dec. 2, 2021)
"Unplanned" surface contamination found on heeled UF6 cylinders received at Framatome Richland nuclear fuel plant
Heeled 30B UF6 Cylinders arrived at Framatome at approximately 1235 (PDT) on September 12, 2019. The cylinders were inspected/surveyed for loose surface contamination at approximately 1335 (PDT). Two cylinders were identified to have greater than 24 dpm/cm2 alpha contamination limit and the 240 dpm/cm2 beta/gamma contamination limit set by DOT [Department of Transportation] and NRC. Each cylinder contained contamination on and around the valve cover. One cylinder contained 250 dpm/cm2 alpha and 2,500 dpm/cm2 beta/gamma, and another 35-40 dpm/cm2 alpha and 2,000 dpm/cm2 beta/gamma.
(NRC Event Notification Report for September 13, 2019, Event Number 54273 )
Loss of criticality safety controls at Areva Richland, WA, nuclear fuel plant
During an inspection conducted from August 29 through September 1, 2016, NRC identified a violation of NRC requirements concerning seismic design and failure to arrange for anchor bolt installation inspections of fuel storage racks at Areva's Richland nuclear fuel plant.
(NRC Sep. 30, 2016)
NRC identifies violation at Areva Richland nuclear fuel plant - details withheld
> Download: NRC cover letter to Areva NP, Inc. , Aug. 6, 2015 (93k PDF)
NRC increases U-235 posession limit for Areva Richland nuclear fuel plant
On May 14, 2015, NRC amended Materials License SNM-1227 to allow an undisclosed increase in the maximum amount of uranium enriched up to 5.00 wt. % U-235 that the licensee may possess at any one time.
(NRC May 14, 2015)
Loss of criticality safety controls at Areva Richland, WA, nuclear fuel plant
On October 20, 2014, AREVA Richland staff noticed during the annual PM [Plant Maintenance] that a check valve on the UO2 Building steam supply subsystem failed to prevent backflow as required. (NRC Nov. 10, 2014)
Depleted uranium required for MOX fuel fabrication at MELOX plant (France) to be imported from USA
> View here
Cracks found in shipping containers for fuel assemblies at Areva's Richland nuclear fuel plant
On Feb. 7, 2014, Areva notified NRC pursuant to shipments of enriched uranium-containing fuel assemblies in Model MAP-12 licensed shipping containers. Certain of the MAP-12 containers were discovered to have small cracks in, and minor buckling of, the base spacer
weldments which support the package during transportation. According to Areva "the conditions are judged to be of low safety significance and not indicative of a component failure.".
DOE starts sale talks with Areva for usage of off-spec uranium hexafluoride at Richland nuclear fuel plant
The Department of Energy has started negotiations with Areva for the sale of off-specification uranium hexafluoride owned by the federal government, DOE announced Wednesday (Nov. 27).
If awarded the contract, Areva's fuel fabrication plant in Richland will convert the material into nuclear fuel for use in commercial power plants in the United States.
Areva has well-established technology and licensed operations for blending this type of material with other uranium feed material, according to DOE.
(The Bellingham Herald Nov. 27, 2013)
> View DOE EM release Nov. 27, 2013
> See also: DOE request for expressions of interest for Paducah gaseous diffusion enrichment plant facilities and DOE depleted and off-specification UF6 inventories
Framatome requests to postpone decommissioning of Uranyl-nitrate storage building at Richland nuclear fuel plant
On Jan. 18, 2019, Framatome requested a delay in the initiation of decommissioning the Uranyl Nitrate Building (UNB), which only became operational in 2012.
> Download: Framatome letter to NRC, Jan. 18, 2019 (PDF)
On Feb. 12, 2019, NRC granted the request, extending the date for initiating the decommissioning of the UNB is extended to December 31, 2020.
> Download: NRC letter to Framatome, Feb. 12, 2019 (PDF)
NRC approves new uranyl nitrate building at Areva Richland nuclear fuel plant
On May 30, 2013, NRC issued a license amendment approving the Uranyl Nitrate Building (UNB) at Areva's Richland nuclear fuel plant.
Loss of criticality safety controls at Areva Richland, WA, nuclear fuel plant
During an NRC inspection conducted February 11-14, 2013, two Severity Level IV violations of NRC requirements were identified: The violations involve changes associated with the construction and operation of the Uranyl Nitrate Building (UNB). The first Severity Level IV violation is the construction and operation of the UNB without obtaining a license amendment. The second Severity Level IV violation is the failure to perform and document an adequate evaluation of the changes.
These violations are not being cited, as the guidance provided by the NRC lacked sufficient clarity.
(Inspection Report no. 70-1257/2013-201 and exercise of enforcement discretion, March 20, 2013)
Areva Richland fuel facility's shipments of UO2 powder to Japan routinely violated criticality safety rules
On Nov. 12, 2012, Areva NP Inc., notified NRC that it discovered on September 13, 2012, that the majority of its past shipments of UO2 powder to a Japanese customer utilizing the TNF-XI packaging did not fully comply with the payload restrictions in U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) Competent Authority Certificate (CAC) USA/0653/AF-96. The violation concerns the material loading limits, which are based on the criticality safety analysis.
Small fire in ventilation system of AREVA's Richland nuclear fuel plant
A small fire broke out about 3 p.m. Friday (Sep. 7) in a ventilation system of the Areva plant in Richland, which manufactures fuel assemblies for nuclear power reactors.
No radioactive material is believed to have been involved, said Tom Huntington, a Richland Fire Department battalion chief.
There also were no contaminants released from the plant, according to Areva.
The fire was in the uranium oxide building, where uranium is manufactured into fuel pellets for reactor fuel assemblies, but was in a small back room used to cut metal, said Areva spokeswoman Anna Markham.
The ventilation system there is part of a system that is self-contained, with no air blowing outside, she said. Air samples taken in the room showed no abnormal conditions, she said.
Firefighters discovered a series of small fires in the ventilation system that were difficult to access, he said. Because they had to tear apart enough of the system to reach the fires, it took until 4:05 p.m. to extinguish them, Huntington said.
(Tri-City Herald Sep. 8, 2012)
On Apr. 11, 2012, Areva NP Inc. notified NRC that it had received a non-compliant 30B cylinder with enriched UF6 that had been sent by Urenco Gronau via Areva Pierrelatte. "The noncompliance was due to the UF6 cylinder having inadequate valve thread engagement per ANSI N14.1-2001." There is, however "no evidence that the valve connection leaked".
(ADAMS Acc. No. ML12104A276)
The cylinder apparently was part of a shipment of 21 cylinders announced in Advance Notification 21116-TNI-001-02 (ADAMS Acc. No. ML11125A126, ML11125A109).
Loss of criticality safety controls at Areva Richland, WA, nuclear fuel plant
During an NRC inspection conducted between October 17 and 20, 2011, a Severity Level IV violation of NRC requirements was identified: the licensee failed to verify prior to use in the process that HEPA Filter Cabinet Criticality Drain (C186DR14) was able to fulfill the requirements identified in the criticality safety analyses. Specifically, the licensee failed to verify that drain C186DR14, IROFS 6914, prevented retention of uranyl nitrate solution inside the HEPA filter cabinet beyond a favorable geometry (depth), by directing liquid overflow to the room floor.
(NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT NO. 070-01257/2011-005, January 25, 2012)
Loss of criticality safety controls at Areva Richland, WA, nuclear fuel plant
During a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection from February 7-11, 2011, a Severity Level IV violation was identified: the licensee failed to implement items relied on for safety for the ammonia recovery facility stripper column to prevent an inadvertent nuclear criticality, which is a credible high consequence event.
(INSPECTION REPORT NO. 70-1257/2011-201 AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION, March 11, 2011)
NRC identifies willful falsification of documents at Areva NP's Richland nuclear fuel plant
An investigation initiated on April 3, 2009, by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Office of Investigations, Region II, determined that a former Advisory Engineer, AREVA NP Inc. willfully falsified transit approval forms regarding overseas shipments of low enriched uranium and also that the same Advisory Engineer failed to follow procedural requirements for release of criticality calculations that pertained to uranium shipments.
(NRC EA-10-041, Aug. 10, 2010)
On Dec. 3, 2010, NRC issued a Confirmatory Order to the Areva Richland facility.
> Download NRC release Dec. 3, 2010 (PDF)
> Download Confirmatory Order EA-10-041 , Nov. 29, 2010 (ADAMS Acc. No. ML103280261)
> Federal Register: December 13, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 238) p. 77675-77677 (download full text )
NRC issues Confirmatory Order to Areva NP's nuclear fuel processing facility in Richland, Wash.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued a Confirmatory Order to Areva NP's nuclear fuel processing facility in Richland, Wash., which has agreed to a series of corrective actions related to materials safety.
The settlement was achieved under the NRC's Alternative Dispute Resolution process, which was initiated at the request of Areva NP to address a willful violation of a facility safety procedure. On Jan. 6, the NRC notified Areva that an agency investigation determined that a plant employee had willfully defeated the function of a tool relied upon for safety.
> View NRC release Apr. 27, 2010
> Download Confirmatory Order EA-09-272, Apr. 26, 2010 (PDF)
Loss of criticality safety controls at Areva Richland, WA, nuclear fuel plant
During a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection from September 18 through 23, 2009, a Severity Level IV violation was identified regarding the presence of prohibited unfavorable geometry containers (open and unattended plastic bags larger than 5.5 gallons) in Room 102A.
(NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 70-1257/2009-202 AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION, October 21, 2009)
Areva to move Lynchburg nuclear fuel production to Richland
Areva announced Tuesday (Sep. 29) that it plans to move all nuclear fuel-making operations to its Richland plant, which will add 50 jobs to the facility and allay fears generated last year that the company might leave the Tri-Cities.
The multinational company said it will end fuel production in Lynchburg, Va., and produce fuel assemblies only in Richland, where it has operated for decades. The transition will begin next spring.
(The News Tribune Sep. 30, 2009)
NRC denies Areva NP's request to withhold Advanced Notifications of Export Shipments from public disclosure
On Aug. 19, 2009, NRC denied a request by Areva NP to withhold Areva's Advanced Notifications of Export Shipments from public disclosure. NRC will rather continue to make these notifications available to the public, 30 days after the material has
been delivered.
(ADAMS Acc. no. ML091550364 )
Security guard falsified access authorization forms at AREVA NP Inc. Richland nuclear fuel plant
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory has issued a Confirmatory Order to AREVA NP Inc.'s Richland facility as part of a settlement agreement involving a security guard who falsified access authorization forms. The guard's actions caused AREVA to be in violation of its security procedures, and allowed unauthorized individuals unescorted access to the Richland, Wash., nuclear materials facility.
> View NRC release July 24, 2009
Areva obtains approval for installation of supercritical CO2 uranium recovery process at Richland nuclear fuel plant
By letter dated June 12, 2008, AREVA NP, Inc., applied for a license amendment of its Richland Facility for the installation of a supercritical CO2 uranium recovery process. The process will be utilized to recover uranium from solid uranium-containing residues, most notably incinerator ash.
Notice of Opportunity To Request a Hearing for License Amendment
Request From AREVA NP, Inc., Richland, WA and Order Imposing Procedures
for Access to Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information and
Safeguards Information for Contention Preparation.
A request for a hearing must be filed by March 17, 2009.
Federal Register: January 16, 2009 (Volume 74, Number 11) p. 3110-3114 (download full text )
On July 28, 2010, NRC amended the license, effective immediately.
> Download Safety Evaluation Report , July 2010
> Federal Register: September 24, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 185) p. 58446-58447 (download full text )
License renewal for AREVA NP Inc. Richland nuclear fuel plant
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has received, by
letter dated October 24, 2006, a license renewal application from AREVA
NP, Inc. (AREVA), requesting renewal of License No. SNM-1227 at its
Richland fuel fabrication facility located in Richland, Washington.
AREVA requested renewal of their license for a period of 40 years [!].
Any person whose interest may be affected by this
proceeding and who desires to participate as a party must file a
written request for a hearing and a specification of the contentions
which the person seeks to have litigated in the hearing. A request for a hearing must be filed by May 14, 2007.
Federal Register: March 15, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 50) p. 12202-12204
(download full text )
On March 27, 2009, NRC issued a Notice of Availability of Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact for License Amendment for AREVA NP, Inc., Richland, Washington.
Federal Register: April 3, 2009 (Volume 74, Number 63) p. 15312-15313 (download full text )
> Download Environmental Assessment Feb. 2009 (2.4MB PDF) (ADAMS Acc. No. ML090700258)
On April 24, 2009, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) announced that it has renewed the operating license of Areva NP's nuclear fuel fabrication facility in Richland, Wash., for an additional 40 years of operation. This is the first 40-year renewal of a nuclear facility license in the United States.
> View NRC release April 24, 2009
Federal Register: May 26, 2009 (Volume 74, Number 99) p. 24886
(download full text )
Workers Exposed To Hydrogen Fluoride (HF) Release
On Oct. 23, 2006, two workers were exposed to HF leaking from a cracked weld of conversion process line 3. One of the two workers was subsequently hospitalized for exposure to HF vapor. On October 26, 2006, evidence of a second crack was found in the weld near the original crack in the line 3 equipment. The licensee shut down line 3 conversion operations.
> Download NRC PNO-II-06-004, Oct. 26, 2006 (ADAMS Acc. No. ML063050036)
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff is scheduled to meet with representatives of AREVA NP, Inc. on Thursday, April 12, 2007, to discuss apparent violations of agency requirements involving a small hydrogen fluoride release at the company's Richland, Wash., facility in late October 2006.
> View NRC release April 6, 2007
Uranium container falls off truck at Richland
A cargo container filled with about 4.5 short tons of uranium oxide powder fell off a truck leaving Richland's Framatome ANP nuclear fuel plant on Sep. 26, 2005, but company and state officials said there was no sign the toxic material inside had escaped. The accident happened about 3 p.m. when the cargo container fell from a flatbed truck as it pulled out of the plant's gate, said Chris Powers, a project manager for Framatome, which also is known as Areva.
(Tri City Herald Sep 27, 2005)
See also: NRC Preliminary Notification of Event or Unusual Occurrence PNO-II-2005-007, September 27, 2005
On October 16, 2003, the U.S. NRC issued import license IW009, authorizing Framatome ANP Inc. to import 1200 kilograms uranium contained in Class A Radioactive Waste consisting of combustible materials (paper, wood, clothing, plastic) contaminated with low enriched uranium (LEU) oxide powder, enriched to 5% w/o maximum, generated during the LEU fuel fabrication process (conversion of UF6; production of UO2 powder; pressing UO2 powder into pellets; and loading pellets into fuel assemblies).
The waste originates from Advanced Nuclear Fuels GmbH (ANF), Lingen, Germany.
Framatome ANP Inc. will incinerate contaminated combustible materials to recover uranium. Slightly contaminated non-combustibles from processing will be returned to ANF in Germany, in accordance with NRC export license XW005 (issued Oct. 17, 2003). Arrangements for disposal of low-level radioactive waste at the US Ecology, Inc facility in Richland, Washington are in place.
On March 20, 2009, Areva NP applied for an extension of the expiration date of IW009/01 and filed a new export license application XW015 for the return of the
non-combustibles to ANF.
Small fire in the feed hopper of the solid waste uranium recovery incinerator at Framatome ANP Richland, WA, nuclear fuel plant
"On February 20, 2003, at approximately 0630 hrs., a small fire occurred in the feed hopper of the solid waste uranium recovery incinerator involving a cardboard waste box, containing about 9.75 grams of U-235, which caught fire before it was fully fed into a waste incinerator. [...] There was no release of radioactive material from the facility as demonstrated by stack air sample results and samples taken from the roof and surroundings. The two employees in the facility were checked and no detectable contamination identified. [...]"
(NRC Preliminary Notification PNO-IV-03-014, Feb. 21, 2003)
"On April 3, 2002, the licensee reported the loss of a criticality control (neutron absorbing poison) on a
45 gallon [170 litre] drum of UO2 powder in the UO2 processing building on April 2, 2002. [...] The filled drum contained 250 kg of powder from floor sweepings and dried grinder sludge that was to be reprocessed. [...] According to the licensee, a criticality in the affected drum could theoretically be possible only had the moisture content been over ten times the process limit, or over fifty times the actual moisture content of
the affected drum. [...]"
(NRC preliminary notification of event or unusual occurrence -- PNO-IV-02-019,
April 4, 2002)
"On April 18, 2002, the onsite portion of a reactive inspection was completed at Framatome, ANP
Richland [...] The inspection confirmed that corrective actions taken
by the licensee were adequate to continue the dry powder loading operations. However, the
NRC engaged the licensee at the preliminary exit briefing and by telephone conference call on
April 23, 2002, to request additional followup actions to address potential broader concerns
related to procedures and management controls at the facility.[...]"
(NRC Weekly Information Report for the Week Ending April 26, 2002 - emphasis added)
On August 30, 2002, NRC imposed a $15,000 civil penalty on Framatome ANP.
> View NRC EA-02-099, Aug. 28, 2002
In consequence of the merger of the nuclear businesses of Siemens and Framatome into Framatome ANP (Framatome 66%, Siemens 34%), Siemens Power Corp becomes Framatome ANP Richland, Inc. (Framatome/Siemens news release 31 Jan 2001 PDF)
On November 9, 2000, Siemens Power Corp. reported the loss of criticality mass limit controls identified during an accountability audit of waste material transfers in the waste handling and packaging area the previous day.
(NRC Preliminary Notification PNO-IV-00-031, Nov 9, 2000 )
On October 12, 2000, Siemens Power Corp. reported the loss of criticality mass limit controls identified during operations in the Modular Extraction/Recovery Facility (MERF) the previous day.
(NRC Preliminary Notification PNO-IV-00-027, October 13, 2000 )
On June 29, 2000, a range fire approached the Siemens Richland, WA, nuclear fuel plant to 800 meters. Plant production circuits were shutdown and non-essential personnel was evacuated. (NRC Preliminary Notification PNO-IV-00-016, June 29, 2000 )
By letter dated April 26, 2000, Siemens Power Corporation (SPC) is requesting a license amendment to increase the allowed transuranic activity (from Plutonium and Neptunium) for the UF6 feedstock processed at its Richland, WA, nuclear fuel plant. SPC requests a 15-fold increase from 3.3 to 50 Bq/g U.
The transuranics are introduced into the feedstock through uranium reprocessed from spent nuclear fuel. For Np-237, 50 Bq correspond to 1.9 µg, for Pu-239, 50 Bq correspond to 0.022 µg.
For enrichments above 2.18 weight-%, the 1 µg Pu per g U-235 criterion of 10 CFR 50.2 would be met; and for 3% enriched uranium, the dose from inhalation of the material would increase by 0.65% compared to pure uranium, according to SPC.
> Retrieve 10 CFR 50.2: via NRC (Note: "106 grams" should read "10-6 grams") · via GPO (look for Production facility)
> SPC letter and attachments available through ADAMS (Docket No. )
> See also Properties of UF6
Siemens withdraws license application for use of waste solutions as fertilizer
In a letter to NRC, dated Nov. 30, 2000, Siemens Power Corp. (SPC) withdraws its application, dated May 19, 1999, for a license amendment to allow release of ammonium hydroxide / ammonium nitrate (AH/AN) solution for use as fertilizer. SPC has committed to the State of Washington to pursue non-agricultural uses for this material.
WA Department of Agriculture Registers Siemens Fertilizer
A liquid fertilizer produced by Siemens Power Corp. (SPC) at its commercial nuclear fuel plant in Richland was registered on June 23, 2000, by the Washington State Department of Agriculture; the stop-sale, ordered on February 11, 2000, is rescinded.
"According to the Department of Health (DOH), use of Siemens' ammonium hydroxide product as a fertilizer will have no adverse impacts on public health or the environment when used as directed. DOH found the level of uranium measured in a test sample was 250 times lower than the maximum level of 0.05 parts per million allowed in Siemens' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission license. In analyzing the product for radiological constituents, results showed the solution contains significantly less uranium than found naturally in soil and is exempt from the DOH's radioactive materials licensing requirements."
(WSDA News Release, June 23, 2000)
WA Department of Agriculture Issues Stop-sale Order for Uranium-containing Fertilizer Product
On Feb. 11, 2000, the Washington State Department of Agriculture (WSDA) issued a statewide stop-sale order to Siemens Power Corporation of Richland regarding the unauthorized distribution of an unregistered, hazardous waste-derived fertilizer.
The product is an ammonium hydroxide solution that is a waste material from the production of nuclear reactor fuel.
WSDA is taking this action after discovering that Siemens Power
Corporation has been distributing the waste product for use as a
fertilizer since 1996. The stop sale and distribution order is issued
under WSDA's authority to prohibit distribution of unregistered
fertilizers in the state.
> View WSDA News Release (Feb. 11, 2000)
Siemens' Richland, WA, nuclear fuel plant plans to sell waste solutions as fertilizer
"Washington State Comments on Draft Environmental Assessment on Release of Solutions at Siemens Nuclear Fuel Facility
On January 4, 2000, the Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards (FCSS)
received a letter dated December 27, 1999, from the Washington State
Departments of Health and Ecology commenting on the draft Environmental
Assessment associated with a proposal by Siemens to sell solutions
containing trace amounts of uranium as fertilizer. The state raises a
number of concerns about the proposal, including state jurisdiction over
such releases. FCSS plans to discuss the concerns with the licensee and the
state. Once the comments have been adequately addressed, a final decision
will be made relative to the acceptability of the Siemens' proposal."
(U.S. NRC Weekly Information Report for the week ending Jan. 14, 2000)
The solutions have concentrations of uranium enriched to 5% of up to 0.05 mg/l.
> Background documents available at ADAMS (Docket No. )
Group demands end to US-Germany cooperation aimed at importing, dumping highly radioactive German spent fuel at DOE's Savannah River Site
Cooperation between the U.S. Department of Energy's Savannah River Site (SRS) and a German nuclear waste management company to import, reprocess and dump highly radioactive German spent fuel at SRS must be terminated, according to a a letter by SRS Watch to Secretary of Energy Dan Brouillette.
The proposal to ship highly radioactive spent fuel from two long-closed experimental gas-cooled reactors in Germany to SRS, a 310-square mile facility located near Aiken, South Carolina, has been dragging on since 2012. The two reactors in question, AVR and THTR-300, were fueled with graphite spheres impregnated with uranium. The 900,000+ irradiated spheres in question, some with highly enriched uranium and some with low-enriched uranium, are stored in 457 casks at sites in Jülich and Ahaus, Germany, both located in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW).
The materials would be shipped by sea via port facilities Charleston, South Carolina to SRS, where the graphite spheres would be reprocessed and removed uranium disposed of as waste and high-level waste possibly dumped into the SRS waste tanks, increasing the waste burden at the site. The research work into technical aspects of the proposal is being conducted by the Savannah River National Laboratory, which is managed by private contractor Savannah River Nuclear Solutions.
(Savannah River Site Watch Feb. 20, 2020)
> Download: SRS Watch letter to DOE terminate SRS JEN agreement , Feb. 20, 2020 (1MB PDF)
ATSDR assessment finds no health threat from airborne emissions at Savannah River site
The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) is seeking public comment on a public health assessment released today evaluating whether exposures to radioactive materials and other chemical pollutants in the air around the Savannah River site could affect human health.
The Savannah River site is a U.S. Department of Energy facility in Aiken, South Carolina that was used in manufacturing nuclear materials for weapons and other medical and industrial purposes. All nuclear reactors at the site were permanently shut down by 1993. ATSDR assessed whether people living around the site were exposed to airborne radioactive and chemical contaminants from 1993 through 2010.
ATSDR concluded that airborne emissions of radioactive materials and most chemical pollutants from the Savannah River site were below levels that could cause harmful health effects. Limited data were available on a few air pollutants (trichloroethylene, South Carolina Standard No.8 toxic air pollutants, sulfuric acid), so the agency could not determine whether they were at levels that could affect health.
The public comment period ends August 12, 2013.
> View ATSDR release July 1, 2013
> Download Draft Evaluation of OffSite Air Contamination From The Savannah River Site (USDOE), July 1, 2013 (8.5M PDF)
The final report was released on Feb. 7, 2014.
> View ATSDR release Feb. 7, 2014
> Download Evaluation of OffSite Air Contamination From the Savannah River Site (USDOE), Feb. 3, 2014 (4.3MB PDF)
ATSDR assessment finds no radiation-based health threat from eating plants and animals found near the Savannah River Site, while mercury exposure might increase health risks
Eating plants and animals grown or produced near the U.S. Department of Energy's Savannah River Site (SRS) does not expose people to harmful levels of radioactive contaminants, says the federal Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) in a recently released public health assessment. However, consuming large amounts of bowfin, largemouth bass, and catfish from certain portions of the Savannah River might increase health risks from mercury exposure, especially to children or other sensitive populations.
> View ATSDR release March 26, 2012
> Download: Public Health Assessment for Evaluation of Exposures to Contaminants in Biota Originating from the Savannah River Site (USDOE), Aiken, South Carolina, Feb. 29, 2012 (17.9M PDF - ATSDR)
> See also here
U.S. DOE announces decision to use the dilute and dispose strategy, rather than the Mixed
Oxide Fuel (MOX) Program for surplus plutonium disposal
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semi-autonomous agency within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), is issuing this Record of Decision (ROD) for the Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program (SPDP) (SPDP EIS) (DOE/EIS-0549). In this ROD, NNSA announces its decision to use the dilute and dispose strategy, rather than the Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX) Program, to permanently dispose of 34 metric tons (MT) of plutonium surplus to the defense needs of the Nation (surplus defense-related plutonium). NNSA will implement the Base Approach Sub-alternative of the Preferred Alternative as described and analyzed in the SPDP EIS.
> Federal Register Volume 89, Number 77 (Friday, April 19, 2024) p. 28763-28767 (download full text )
> Download: DOE/EIS-0549: Record of Decision , April 19, 2024
U.S. DOE issues Final EIS on Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program involving dilution and disposal
> Federal Register Volume 89, Number 13 (Friday, January 19, 2024) p. 3642-3644 (download full text )
> Access: DOE/EIS-0549: Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program (DOE Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance)
U.S. DOE issues Draft EIS on Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program involving dilution and disposal
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semi-autonomous agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), announces the availability of a Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program (SPDP EIS) (DOE/EIS-0549) in compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). NNSA is also announcing a 60-day public comment period and four public hearings to receive comments on the Draft SPDP EIS. NNSA prepared the Draft SPDP EIS to evaluate the potential environmental impacts of dispositioning 34 metric tons (MT) of surplus plutonium. [...]
NNSA's Preferred Alternative is to use the dilute and dispose strategy for 34 MT of surplus plutonium comprised of both surplus pit and non-pit surplus plutonium. [...]
The activities that are part of the Preferred Alternative would occur at five DOE sites -- Pantex in Texas, LANL in New Mexico, SRS in South Carolina, the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) in Tennessee, and the WIPP facility in New Mexico.
Submit comments by February 14, 2023.
> Federal Register Volume 87, Number 241 (Friday, December 16, 2022) p. 77096-77098 (download full text )
> Download: DOE/EIS-0549: Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program
> Access related documents: NNSA NEPA reading room
Groups demand termination of plutonium disposition EIS process
On May 8, 2013, fifteen environmental groups sent a letter to DOE demanding the termination of the plutonium disposition EIS process: "Given that the plutonium disposition program is now under review and subject to change, the EIS as is now being pursued is no longer valid and must be halted."
> View/download: group letter to DOE, May 8, 2013
U.S. DOE issues Draft Supplemental EIS on Surplus Plutonium Disposition: fabrication into MOX fuel is preferred alternative
The comment period remains open through October 10, 2012.
> Download EIS-0283-S2: Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement - Surplus Plutonium Disposition , U.S. Department of Energy, July 2012
> See also: Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (DOE NNSA)
Savannah River Site facility to be used to feed future MOX plant
The federal government is going to use a facility at the Savannah River site near Aiken to produce tons of plutonium oxide for the complex's future mixed-oxide fuel plant.
The National Nuclear Security Administration said Monday it has decided to use H-Canyon at the Savannah River Site to produce nearly 4 metric tons of plutonium oxide for the MOX plant.
The mixed-oxide, or MOX, plant is designed to dispose of plutonium from dismantled bombs by blending the plutonium with uranium to make commercial reactor fuel. Officials say the H-Canyon decision is saving 90 jobs.
The SRS complex once produced plutonium and tritium for atomic bombs. Construction on the MOX facility began in 2007. Officials say the facility is on schedule and should be running in 2016.
(Charlotte Observer Oct. 31, 2011)
Plan would send contaminated plutonium from Savannah River Site to New Mexico for disposal
About 500 kilograms of weapons grade plutonium now stored at Savannah River Site could leave South Carolina within four years, according to a proposal to send the tightly guarded material to a permanent disposal site in New Mexico.
The plutonium is among six metric tons that is contaminated or otherwise unsuitable for conversion to commercial nuclear reactor fuel in the government's mixed oxide "mox" plant under construction at the site.
"We already know that, no matter what we wanted to do, we cannot make it suitable for mox," said Jim Giusti, an Energy Department spokesman. "Instead of having it sit here, we know we can blend it with materials that remove the security requirements for it, and it can be disposed of as transuranic waste."
According to an environmental bulletin (400k PDF) issued Wednesday (Oct. 26), the plutonium would be moved to the government's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico during a series of 120 shipments over a three-year period. The site, near the city of Carlsbad, includes a repository 2,000 feet below the surface within layers of geologic salt.
Before being shipped, the plutonium would be blended with a classified material, known only as "stardust," that can convert highly contaminated plutonium into a less dangerous form that is also proliferation resistant.
"It would then become very difficult and very expensive for anyone to try to recover the plutonium," Giusti said. "It would also no longer be required to have the high security safeguards that are now required."
The bulk of the government's surplus plutonium - about 34 metric tons from about 17,000 dismantled warheads - is scheduled to be processed at a $4.8 billion mox plant, scheduled for startup in 2016.
The material would be blended with traditional uranium to make fuel suitable for use in commercial reactors.
(The Augusta Chronicle Oct. 26, 2011)
> Download Interim Action Determination, Disposition of Certain Plutonium Materials Stored at the Savannah River Site , Oct. 17, 2011 (880k PDF)
DOE issues amended Notice of Intent to modify the scope of the Surplus
Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement and
Conduct Additional Public Scoping
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) announces its intent to
modify the scope of the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental
Environmental Impact Statement (SPD Supplemental EIS, DOE/EIS-0283-S2)
and to conduct additional public scoping. DOE issued its Notice of
Intent \1\ (NOI) to prepare the SPD Supplemental EIS on March 28, 2007
(72 FR 14543). DOE now intends to revise the scope of the SPD
Supplemental EIS to refine the quantity and types of surplus weapons-usable plutonium material, evaluate additional alternatives, and no
longer consider in detail one alternative identified in the NOI
(ceramic can-in-canister immobilization). Also, DOE had identified a
glass can-in-canister immobilization approach as its preferred
alternative in the NOI; DOE will continue to evaluate that alternative
but currently does not have a preferred alternative.
DOE now proposes to analyze a new alternative to install the
capability in K-Area at the Savannah River Site (SRS) to, among other
things, disassemble nuclear weapons pits (a weapons component) and
convert the plutonium metal to an oxide form for fabrication into mixed
uranium-plutonium oxide (MOX) reactor fuel in the Mixed Oxide Fuel
Fabrication Facility (MFFF); under this alternative, DOE would not
build the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF), which DOE
previously decided to construct. This K-Area project also would provide
capabilities needed to prepare plutonium for other disposition
alternatives evaluated in the SPD Supplemental EIS and to support the
ongoing plutonium storage mission in K-Area.
DOE also proposes to
evaluate a new alternative to dispose of some surplus non-pit plutonium
as transuranic waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New
Mexico, provided the plutonium would meet the criteria for such
disposal.
In addition, DOE will analyze the potential environmental
impacts of using MOX fuel in up to five reactors owned by the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA) at the Sequoyah (near Soddy-Daisy, TN) and
Browns Ferry (near Decatur and Athens, AL) nuclear stations. TVA will
be a cooperating agency with DOE for preparation and review of the
sections of the SPD Supplemental EIS that address operation of TVA
reactors.
The public scoping period will end on September 17, 2010.
Federal Register: July 19, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 137) p. 41850-41853 (download full text )
DOE issues Notice of Intent To Prepare a Supplemental Environmental Impact
Statement for Surplus Plutonium Disposition at the Savannah River Site
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) intends to prepare a
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) to evaluate the
potential environmental impacts of plutonium disposition capabilities
that would be constructed and operated at the Savannah River Site (SRS)
near Aiken, South Carolina. DOE completed the Surplus Plutonium
Disposition (SPD) EIS (DOE/EIS-0283) in November 1999, and on January
11, 2000, published a Record of Decision (ROD) in the Federal Register
(65 FR 1608). DOE decided to dispose of approximately 17 metric tons of
plutonium surplus to the nation's defense needs using an immobilization
process and up to 33 metric tons by using the surplus plutonium as
feedstock in the fabrication of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel to be irradiated
in commercial reactors. DOE selected the SRS as the site for all
surplus plutonium disposition facilities. Subsequently, DOE cancelled
the immobilization portion of its disposition strategy due to budgetary
constraints (ROD, 67 FR 19432, April 19, 2002). The selection of the
SRS as the location for disposition facilities for up to 50 metric tons
of surplus plutonium remains unchanged. Site preparation for the MOX
Fuel Fabrication Facility at the SRS began in November 2005.
The 2002 decision left DOE with about 13 metric tons of surplus
plutonium that does not have a defined path to disposition (about 4
metric tons of the 17 metric tons originally considered for
immobilization has been designated for programmatic use). DOE has been
investigating alternative disposition technologies and will now prepare
an SEIS for Surplus Plutonium Disposition at the SRS (DOE/EIS-0283-S2)
to evaluate the potential environmental impacts of those alternatives.
DOE's preferred alternative is to construct and operate a vitrification
facility within an existing building at the SRS. This facility would
immobilize plutonium within a lanthanide borosilicate glass inside
stainless steel cans. The cans then would be placed within larger
canisters to be filled with vitrified high-level radioactive waste in
the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) at the SRS. The canisters
would be suitable for disposal in a geologic repository. DOE also would
prepare some of the surplus plutonium for disposal by processing it in
the H-Canyon at the SRS, then sending it to the high-level waste tanks
and DWPF. DOE seeks to take this action to reduce the threat of nuclear
weapons proliferation worldwide by disposing of surplus plutonium in
the United States in a safe and environmentally sound manner. The
preferred vitrification technology, along with processing in H-Canyon,
would fulfill this need for
disposition of surplus plutonium materials that are not planned for
disposition via fabrication into MOX fuel.
Federal Register: March 28, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 59) p. 14543-14546 (download full text )
ATSDR assessment finds no contamination in off-site groundwater from the Savannah River Site
The federal Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) has found no contamination in off-site groundwater from the Savannah River Site (SRS). While site-related contaminants were detected in off-site surface water, they pose no health concern. In the course of its investigation, ATSDR also found naturally occurring radium in the municipal drinking water at levels that could pose health concerns, especially for infants drinking formula and juice mixed with tap water. In December 2006, authorities removed from service the well where radium was found.
> View ATSDR release Dec. 21, 2007
> Download Public Health Assessment (PDF)
> see also: Downblending of U.S. Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) for commercial reactor use
HEU downblending starts at Savannah River Site
The first step in a government program to convert weapons-grade uranium into electricity has begun at Savannah River Site.
The process involves combining the excess uranium, which has been chemically enriched, with natural uranium to make low-enriched uranium fuel. The fuel will be used in Tennessee Valley Authority nuclear reactors.
In order to get the uranium into its new form and ready for shipment, SRS built or modified buildings for purifying, blending and loading the material.
(Augusta Chronicle May 22, 2003)
License No. SNM-33, Docket No.
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> View more recent issues
The nuclear fuel plant in Hematite, Missouri, was closed in summer 2001. The plant was formerly owned by CE Nuclear Power LLC and is now owned by BNFL/Westinghouse.
On June 10, 2000, a plant operator at the CE Nuclear Power LLC's Fuel Fabrication Facility in Hematite, Missouri, identified that several "erbia" pellets were mixed in with a normal lot of uranium oxide pellets. Erbia pellets are used in fuel assemblies as neutron absorbers and the erbia manufacturing process line is separate from the uranium oxide process lines." [...]
"The licensee's investigation team has not yet completed its onsite activity; however, sufficient information has been obtained to conclude that the mixing of erbia pellets was a deliberate act."
NRC PNO June 16, 2000
"On May 22, 2000, Westinghouse-Hematite fuel fabrication facility in the
U.S. shipped a presumed empty pellet container (drum) to Westinghouse Atom
AB in Sweden. When the container was opened in Sweden for re-filling, it
was found to contain almost 40 kg of fresh fuel pellets. The pellets are
believed to have been produced originally in Sweden and then delivered to
Hematite, where they should have been removed. The container should then
have been returned to Sweden empty. A preliminary investigation at Hematite
indicates that the pellets were natural uranium with gadolinium, however
the paper trail is unclear. Because the drum was thought to be empty,
standard procedures for nuclear material shipments were not followed. The
Swedish nuclear authorities are also investigating the incident. They plan
to analyze the pellets and will report the results to us. The investigation
in the U.S. is continuing." (NRC Weekly Information Report For the Week Ending June 30, 2000)
"ABB's fuel fabrication plant at Hematite, Missouri, is to close, consolidating
most of Westinghouse's US fuel operations at its Columbia plant in South Carolina. Westinghouse is owned by BNFL, and ABB finalised the sale of its nuclear activities to BNFL last week." (UI News Briefing 00.20, May 17, 2000)
(formerly Framatome ANP, Framatome Cogema Fuels)
NRC License No. SNM-1168 (terminated), Docket No.
Virginia Radioactive Materials License No. 680-515-1
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> see decommissioning issues
NRC terminates licence for Areva's Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
On Sep. 28, 2012, NRC terminated licence SNM-1168 for Areva's Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant. The final decontamination and decommissioning of the facility will be conducted under Areva's Radioactive Materials license with the Commonwealth of Virginia.
Areva to close Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
Areva announced Tuesday (Sep. 29) that it plans to move all nuclear fuel-making operations to its Richland plant.
The multinational company said it will end fuel production in Lynchburg, Va., and produce fuel assemblies only in Richland, where it has operated for decades. The transition will begin next spring.
(The News Tribune Sep. 30, 2009)
By letter dated August 25, 2010, Areva NP, Inc. provided notification to the NRC of its
intent to cease fuel manufacturing and the use of special nuclear material at the Mt. Athos Road Site in Lynchburg. This letter also requests postponement of the initiation of decommissioning of the facility.
On Oct. 29, 2010, NRC requested the submission of a decommissioning plan within 12 months. Areva's request to postpone the initiation of decommissioning was denied.
Framatome ANP applies for relaxed criticality safety requirements at Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
On Feb. 27, 2004, Framatome ANP applied for a license amendment to increase the Keff limit, a parameter describing the criticality safety. Framatome requests an increase of the Keff limit for credible abnormal conditions from 0.95 to 0.98 and the Keff limit for normal conditions from 0.87 to 0.95.
On Oct. 4, 2004, Framatome ANP withdrew the license amendment application.
NRC issues EA and FONSI for License Renewal of Framatome ANP Lynchburg plant
Federal Register: May 7, 2003 (Volume 68, Number 88) p. 24521 (view full text )
NRC to issue Finding of No Significant Impact
No requests for a hearing were received. Based on an evaluation of the environmental impacts of the renewal request, the NRC has determined that the proper action is to issue a Finding of No Significant Impact. (NRC Memorandum April 2, 2003)
NRC issues Notice of Intent To Prepare an Environmental Assessment, and Notice of Opportunity for a Hearing
Federal Register: August 9, 2002 (Vol. 67, No. 154) p. 51894-51895
(view full notice )
