Current Issues: Operating Uranium Conversion/Enrichment and Nuclear Fuel Plants - France
(last updated 11 Sep 2024)
> See also Current Issues for
> See also:
Information about French nuclear fuel cycle plants 
(Nuclear Safety Authority - ASN, in French)
EDF does not intend to halt uranium trade with Russia
Two years after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the French company EDF does not intend to change course. The electrician confirmed on Thursday March 28 that it would continue its imports and exports of uranium with Russia, as authorized by law.
(Le Monde Mar. 28, 2024)
France restarts use of reprocessed uranium - enriched in Russia
On February 5, 2024, reactor 2 of the Cruas power plant restarted with the first fully recycled uranium reload.
Reprocessed uranium (URT) is uranium from spent fuel from nuclear reactors after reprocessing at Orano la Hague. It is a recoverable material which can be converted and enriched -- and then becomes enriched reprocessed uranium (URE) -- to be recycled in our current reactors. In France, only the four reactors at the Cruas-Meysse power plant, in Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes, are certified to use URE.
Historically, the enrichment operation, which requires centrifuges solely dedicated to the URT, was entrusted to the Rosatom site in Seversk for industrial and economic reasons. However, the new geopolitical situation since the start of the conflict in Ukraine could lead to a rethinking of these contracts without difficulty. Several Western players are able to build workshops dedicated to enriching the URT.
(SFEN Feb. 12, 2024)
Inmidst Ukraine war, France receives further batch of enriched uranium from Russia
This morning in Dunkirk, the Russian freighter Baltiyskiy 202 arriving from Saint Petersburg unloaded 25 cylindrical containers containing Russian enriched uranium for the French group Orano. They were loaded onto a dozen trucks bound for Pierrelatte in Drôme.
While the war in Ukraine has been going on for more than a year and the National Assembly is preparing to vote tomorrow on the nuclear acceleration law, Greenpeace France denounces the continuation of a scandalous nuclear trade with Russia.
Greenpeace France calls for a definitive halt to all nuclear trade with Russia and the termination of all current contracts between the French nuclear industry and Rosatom and its subsidiaries, starting with the contracts concerning uranium trade between Tenex, subsidiary of Rosatom, EDF and Orano.
(Greenpeace France Mar. 20, 2023)
Greenpeace report highlights dependence of France's nuclear industry on Russia
Rosatom has control over a large part of natural uranium imports from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. However, the latter represent nearly half of the natural uranium imported into France each year. The French nuclear industry, far from being a guarantee of French energy sovereignty, is therefore dependent on the Russian nuclear industry at all stages of the uranium journey, with no credible alternative possible.
> Download: La Russie, plaque tournante de l'uranium , Greenpeace France, Mar. 11, 2023 (2.3MB PDF - in French)
Inmidst Ukraine war, France receives first batch of recycled uranium from Russia in ten years
In 2018, the tricolor electrician [EdF] reactivated a Russian partnership to recycle uranium from its spent fuel, after these Franco-Russian relations had been suspended for ten years for economic and environmental reasons. The fruit of this revisited partnership materialized for the first time in France on Tuesday, November 29 with the delivery of uranium recycled in Russia. A first for ten years.
Although legal, since nuclear energy is not on the list of Western sanctions against Russia, this operation carried out by a public company is a challenge as the war in Ukraine continues and this recycled material does not appear to be essential for the operation of reactors. One of the four reactors at the Cruas (Ardèche) power plant will soon be loaded with it.
(La Tribune Dec. 2, 2022)
Greenpeace denounces continuous nuclear trade between France and Russia
The nuclear trade between France and Russia continues. This Tuesday [Nov. 29] morning, in the port of Dunkirk, in the North, the cargo ship Mikhail Dudin unloaded dozens of drums of enriched uranium and ten containers of natural uranium from Russia, according to Greenpeace. The NGO asks the Minister for Energy Transition, Agnès Pannier-Runacher, for "the termination of contracts on uranium trade with Russia".
(20 Minutes Nov. 29, 2022)
French exports of reprocessed uranium to Russia continue in spite of Ukraine war
While the European Union has agreed to curtail its use of Russian oil and gas, its member nations continue to import and export nuclear fuel that is not under EU sanctions -- to the chagrin of the Ukrainian government and environmental activists.
A cargo ship carrying uranium that departed from the French port of Dunkirk traveled across the North Sea on Thursday (Sep. 29), heading toward the Russian Baltic port of Ust-Luga. It was the third time in just over a month that the Panama-flagged Mikhail Dudin ship docked in Dunkirk to transport uranium from or to Russia.
According to Greenpeace France, reprocessed uranium meant to be transported to Russia were loaded onto the Mikhail Dudin on Wednesday (Sep. 28). Pauline Boyer, an energy campaigner at Greenpeace France, said the ship's repeated trips between Russia and France show "the extent to which the French nuclear industry is trapped in its dependence on Russia."
(AP Sep. 29, 2022)
In the middle of Ukraine war, France receives shipment of Russian uranium
A messy delivery, the day after Emmanuel Macron's exhortation to show "no weakness, no spirit of compromise" towards the aggressor of Ukraine. France received 52 barrels of enriched uranium from Russia on August 24.
The cargo, shipped from St. Petersburg, was unloaded in the morning from the freighter Mikhail Dudin, according to an Aug. 25 Greenpeace statement. It was then loaded onto trucks bound for the Rhône Valley, where the nuclear sites of Pierrelatte and Romans-sur-Isère are located, where the nuclear fuels supplying the French power stations are manufactured.
(Reporterre Aug. 25, 2022)
French nuclear regulator acknowleges that nuclear fuel "cycle" is a phantom, requests worst case analysis in view of spent fuel storage congestion problems
In its comments on the 2021-2025 national radioactive materials and waste management plan [Plan national de gestion des matières et déchets radioactifs - PNGMDR], French nuclear regulatory ASN demands a worst case analysis of the impacts of the spent fuel storage congestion problems due to the production difficulties experienced at the La Hague reprocessing plant and the MELOX MOX fuel plant. By using quotes, ASN acknowledges that the nuclear fuel "cycle" is a phantom:
"ASN considers it necessary for the following actions to be added to the 2021-2025 PNGMDR:
- given the malfunctions observed in 2021 in certain installations essential to the operation of the fuel "cycle", the operators will have to study in the coming months pessimistic scenarios for the operation of this "cycle", from the point of view of the quantities of materials and waste produced, and proposing appropriate countermeasures, if necessary. They must also regularly report on the forecast deadlines for the saturation of spent fuel storage capacities. In any case, the estimate of the prospects for saturation of the spent fuel storage capacities carried out in application of the ENT.1 action should not be based on the hypothesis of a permanent recourse to the densification of the pools planned by Orano on its La Hague site which does not constitute a technical solution that complies with the most recent safety standards; [...]" [quotes and emphasis as in original]
> Download: Avis no 2021-AV-0390 de l'Autorité de sûreté nucléaire du 9 novembre 2021 sur le projet de plan national de gestion des matières et déchets radioactifs 2021-2025 , Nov. 9, 2021 (196kB PDF - in French) [released May 9, 2022]
Jury condemns Orano for misleading public on recycling of nuclear fuel
An advertisement from the nuclear group Orano was singled out by the Advertising Ethics Jury for statements about recycling "likely to mislead the public", following a complaint from the NGO "Sortir du nucléaire", the latter announced this last Wednesday (Apr. 20). [...]
The jury particularly criticizes Orano's assertion that "today, we are already able to reuse 96% of the recyclable materials of a fuel which is basically completely spent". [...]
But in reality only 1% is currently actually reprocessed to produce fuel called Mox, while the remaining 95% (reprocessed uranium or URT) is currently stored pending possible recovery. The jury notes in passing that "only foreign operators, in particular Russians, are able to carry out these upstream operations necessary for recycling".
(Le Figaro Apr. 20, 2022)
> Download: Opinion of the Advertising Ethics Jury (339kB PDF - in French)
In view of Russian invasion of Ukraine, Robin des Bois calls for halt of French exports of reprocessed uranium to Russia
Cancel the Franco-Russian contract for the conversion and enrichment of reprocessed uranium (URT):
Each year, the La Hague [reprocessing] plant produces approximately 1,000 tonnes of URT from spent fuel leaving French nuclear power plants. The URT stock is currently around 27,000 tonnes. The re-enrichment of the URT to remake "new" fuel cannot be done in France. The only URT to URE (Enriched Reprocessed Uranium) conversion plant is in Russia. The French nuclear circular economy goes through Tomsk in Siberia.
(Robin des Bois Feb. 24, 2022)
Greenpeace disrupts shipment of reprocessed uranium from France to Russia
A dozen activists from the NGO Greenpeace disrupted this Friday (Oct. 29) around 9 a.m. in the port of Dunkirk (North) the loading of twenty French containers with reprocessed uranium on board the cargo ship Conmar Elbe which is to take the route to Saint Petersburg, in Russia.
In a statement, the non-governmental organization called for "the final end of French reprocessed uranium exports to Russia, which are environmental, social and economic nonsense." For the activists, uranium must "fit into the waste category, as is the case in the majority of nuclear countries around the world."
Still according to Greenpeace, these containers left Drôme by train early Monday (Oct. 25) afternoon and arrived in Dunkirk on Wednesday (Oct. 27) evening.
(Le Parisien Oct. 29, 2021)
Greenpeace denounces shipments of reprocessed uranium from France to Russia
Greenpeace activists protested this Tuesday, October 12 in front of the headquarters of the French nuclear group Orano in Châtillon (Hauts-de-Seine) against "exports of French reprocessed uranium to Russia", calling for their "final stop" and classification as "waste" of these spent fuels.
According to the environmental NGO, "several tens of tons of uranium resulting from the reprocessing of spent fuel (were) loaded on board the ship Kapitan Lomonosov bound for Saint Petersburg on January 20 and February 12, 2021" from the port of Le Havre and Orano admitted to being at the origin of these expeditions.
According to Greenpeace, a new shipment is due to take place by the end of the year as part of an Orano contract on "the sale of more than 1,000 tonnes of reprocessed uranium with the Russian state-owned company of nuclear, Rosatom, which is supposed to reuse them in its nuclear reactors after transformation in the Seversk plant (Tomsk 7), in the heart of Siberia".
A spokesperson for Orano confirmed to AFP that the group had concluded a contract with Rosatom at the end of 2020 for the sale of just over 1,000 tonnes of reprocessed uranium intended for the manufacture of "nuclear fuel for Russian power stations". A first transport took place at the beginning of the year and others "are in progress" according to this source, who stressed that this contract had been concluded thanks to "rather favorable market conditions".
(Ouest France Oct. 12, 2021)
Advertising ethics jury finds Orano advertising on recycling of nuclear fuel is misleading and ambiguous
Nuclear advertisements broadcast by Orano were singled out by the advertising ethics jury (Jury de Déontologie Publicitaire), which particularly noted their misleading and ambiguous nature, after complaints lodged by the "Sortir du nucléaire" Network (RSN) and Greenpeace France, announced the two associations this Monday (May 4).
In two separate opinions issued on Monday, the advertising ethics jury found that these advertisements violated several recommendations of the Professional Advertising Regulation Authority (Autorité de régulation professionnelle de la publicité - ARPP).
(Le Figaro May 4, 2020)
> View: Advertising ethics jury release , May 4, 2020 (in French)
Individual radiation doses received by French nuclear fuel fabrication workers now exceed those received by nuclear reactor workers more than threefold
According to the 2017 report of the French Radiation Protection Authority Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN), the workers receiving the highest individual doses in the French nuclear industry are those employed in nuclear fuel fabrication. In 2017, the average individual dose of exposed workers in fuel fabrication was 2.55 mSv (unchanged from 2016), more than three times the 0.83 mSv (2016: 0.98 mSv) received by exposed workers in reactor operation. The group receiving the second highest individual doses are the logistics and maintenance workers with 1.68 mSv (2016: 1.54 mSv).
> View IRSN release Sep. 26, 2018 (in French)
> Download: La radioprotection des travailleurs - Exposition professionnelle aux rayonnements ionisants en France: bilan 2017 , IRSN, Sep. 2018 (4.8MB PDF - in French)
Note: The figures for 2018 were 2.59 mSv for exposed workers in nuclear fuel production and 0.90 mSv for exposed workers in reactor operation.
> Download: La radioprotection des travailleurs - Exposition professionnelle aux rayonnements ionisants en France: bilan 2018 , IRSN, Sep. 2019 (5.7MB PDF - in French)
Note: The figures for 2019 were 2.62 mSv for exposed workers in nuclear fuel production and 0.91 mSv for exposed workers in reactor operation.
> Download: La radioprotection des travailleurs - Exposition professionnelle aux rayonnements ionisants en France: bilan 2019 , IRSN, June 2020 (2.5MB PDF - in French)
Note: The figures for 2020 were 2.61 mSv for exposed workers in nuclear fuel production and 0.72 mSv for exposed workers in reactor operation.
> Download: La radioprotection des travailleurs - Exposition professionnelle aux rayonnements ionisants en France: bilan 2020 , IRSN, June 2021 (11.2MB PDF - in French)
Note: The figures for 2021 were 2.58 mSv for exposed workers in nuclear fuel production and 0.72 mSv for exposed workers in reactor operation.
> Download: La radioprotection des travailleurs - Exposition professionnelle aux rayonnements ionisants en France: bilan 2021 , IRSN, Sep. 2022 (3.5MB PDF - in French)
Note: The figures for 2023 were 2.14 mSv for exposed workers in nuclear fuel production and 0.66 mSv for exposed workers in reactor operation.
> Download: La radioprotection des travailleurs - Exposition professionnelle aux rayonnements ionisants en France: bilan 2022 , IRSN, Sep. 2024 (3.1MB PDF - in French)
Note: The figures for 2023 were 2.12 mSv for exposed workers in nuclear fuel production and 0.66 mSv for exposed workers in reactor operation.
> Download: La radioprotection des travailleurs - Exposition professionnelle aux rayonnements ionisants en France: bilan 2023 , IRSN, Sep. 2023 (3.8MB PDF - in French)
EDF plans to restart use of reprocessed uranium in some of its reactors
The French utility wants to reduce its stocks of reprocessed uranium which increase by 1,000 t per year.
They are six or seven warehouses, aligned on a site of the huge nuclear site of Orano Tricastin (Drôme), in which accumulate some 20,000 t of reprocessed uranium originating from EDF's nuclear power plants. A stock that grows every year by an additional 1,000 t since the shutdown of the recycling channel of this fuel five years ago, but that EDF has decided to relaunch.
"We recycled reprocessed uranium from 1994 to 2013, before stopping following an unsatisfactory effluent treatment process. For two years, we have been working on rebuilding a strong and competitive sector. This allows us to recycle a valuable material and reduce our purchases of uranium," explains Denis Lépée, director of the nuclear fuel division at EDF.
A long-term recovery: it is only from 2023 that the four 900 megawatt (MW) reactors of Cruas (Ardèche), on the banks of the Rhône, should again consume 600 t of enriched reprocessed uranium. And from 2028, one and then three reactors of 1,300 MW should be added to this program. At the end of this ten-year plan (2023-2032), 1,300 t of enriched reprocessed uranium are used per year, which only then makes it possible to start reducing stocks.
Today, EDF recycles some of its spent fuel through MOX, used in about twenty reactors. This fuel makes it possible to reuse the plutonium created by the reprocessing process (1% of the tonnages), but not the uranium resulting from this recycling, which nevertheless represents 95% of the volumes (the remaining 4% being ultimate waste). "The MOX industry allows us to save 10% of our natural uranium needs. By 2030, with this new sector, it is 20 to 25% less uranium that we will need," said Denis Lépée.
While, for its reuse, reprocessed uranium, must undergo a conversion phase and then be enriched again, this new sector will not benefit Orano. Following the call for tenders organized by EDF to carry out these operations, the utility will call on Russian Tenex (Rosatom ) and Urenco (with German, British and Dutch capital), then on its subsidiary Framatome at Romans-sur-Isère for the assembly of the fuel.
(Les Echos Sep. 10, 2018)
Urenco to enrich reprocessed uranium for EdF
On July 4, 2018, Urenco announced that it has signed a contract with French utility EdF to enrich reprocessed uranium.
N.B. On May 30, 2018, Urenco USA had requested NRC approval for the enrichment of feed with higher than natural assays, see here.
Framatome to produce reprocessed uranium fuel for use in French reactors
Framatome has signed a contract to design, fabricate and supply fuel assemblies using enriched reprocessed uranium to French utility EDF between 2023 and 2032. Framatome noted the project is subject to administrative and regulatory authorisations.
The fuel assemblies - to be produced at Framatome's facility at Romans-sur-Isère in the Drôme region of France - will incorporate uranium that has been derived from the reprocessing of used fuel at the La Hague plant. Once enriched, this uranium can be used again to fuel nuclear power reactors.
EDF is to use the fuel assemblies in a number of its reactors, which have been authorised to use such fuel.
EDF has made provision to store reprocessed uranium for up to 250 years as a strategic reserve. Currently, reprocessing of 1100 tonnes of EDF used fuel per year produces 11 tonnes of plutonium (immediately recycled as mixed-oxide fuel) and 1045 tonnes of reprocessed uranium converted into stable oxide form for storage.
(World Nuclear News May 25, 2018)
Russia to enrich reprocessed uranium for EdF
Techsnabexport (TENEX) will receive more than $ 1 billion from French Electricité de France (EdF) in 2023-2032 for processing [presumably conversion and re-enrichment] of uranium recycled from spent nuclear fuel.
(Kommersant May 25, 2018)
Nuclear fuel fabrication workers continue to receive highest individual radiation doses in France's nuclear sector
According to the 2016 report of the French Radiation Protection Authority Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN), the workers receiving the highest individual doses in the French nuclear industry are those employed in nuclear fuel fabrication. In 2016, the individual dose of exposed workers in fuel fabrication was 2.55 mSv, compared to 0.98 mSv for exposed workers in reactor operation, for example.
> View IRSN release Sep. 12, 2017 (in French)
> Download: La radioprotection des travailleurs - Exposition professionnelle aux rayonnements ionisants en France: bilan 2016 , IRSN 2017 (3.2MB PDF - in French)
French Nuclear Safety Authority, in view of potential re-classification of reprocessed uranium as a waste, orders study for disposal of reprocessed uranium (!):
France's Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) is taking first steps towards a reversal of the policy regarding the management of reprocessed uranium. While ASN still finds that the use of reprocessed uranium in current reactors is possible, it acknowledges that utilities have suspended its use in their reactors. So, ASN now eyes the possibility that at least some part of the reprocessed uranium might now longer be regarded as a resource, but as a waste.
Under these auspices, ASN has ordered the national radioactive waste management agency ANDRA, to prepare a feasibility study on the disposal of reprocessed uranium.
> View: ASN release April 6, 2016 (in French)
> Download: Avis no 2016-AV-0256 de l'Autorité de sûreté nucléaire du 9 février 2016 sur les études relatives à l'évaluation du caractère valorisable des matières radioactives remises en application du plan national de gestion des matières et des déchets radioactifs 2013-2015, en vue de l'élaboration du plan national de gestion des matières et des déchets radioactifs 2016-2018
> Download: Procédés de valorisation des matières radioactives présentes sur le sol français (AREVA, CEA, EDF, Solvay), 06 Janvier 2015 (687k PDF - in French)
ANDRA to study shallow underground deposit in a clay medium for potential disposal of reprocessed uranium:
More than five years later, at a meeting of the PNGMDR working group on Dec. 15, 2021, ANDRA delivered a presentation showing that the agency is still in the scoping phase. The only accomplishment achieved, so far, has been an "Analysis of the input data provided by the owners of materials in order to consolidate their chemical and radiological characteristics necessary for the choice and study of the selected scenarios".
Given the 4.5 billion year half life of uranium, ANDRA requests guidance on the "time scale on which disposal must be studied given the absence of radioactive decay". [It appears, however, that such guidance won't be necessary, as the uranium will have decayed away before the study will be completed...]
ANDRA does not envisage the disposal of the reprocessed uranium in one of the currently planned disposal centers; it rather plans to study shallow underground disposal in a clay medium at a new site to be determined, either involving direct storage of the drums (currently holding the reprocessed uranium in the form of U3O8), or storage of the drums in containers made of cementitious materials.
> Download: Etudes relatives au stockage de matières radioactives qui seraient requalifiées en déchets - Point d'étape (400kB PDF in French)
Study finds increased incidence of pleural cancer among French uranium enrichment workers
"[...] We analysed the relationship between exposure to soluble uranium compounds and exposure to external gamma-radiation and mortality in a cohort of 4688 French uranium enrichment workers who were employed between 1964 and 2006. [...]
SMR [standard mortality ratio] for pleural cancer was significantly increased (2.3, 95% CI 1.06 to 4.4), but was only based on nine cases. [...]"
Mortality (1968–2008) in a French cohort of uranium enrichment workers potentially exposed to rapidly soluble uranium compounds, by Zhivin S, Guseva Canu I, Samson E, et al., in: Occupational and Environmental Medicine, Published Online First: 10 December 2015
French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) demands additional precautions for the hard core of all fuel cycle facilities against external hazards
On Jan. 8, 2015, the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) issued decisions to all nuclear fuel cycle facilities ordering them to take additional precautions for the hard core of their installations against external hazards, such as earthquakes, floodings, and tornadoes.
French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) clarifies requirements for control of criticality hazards at nuclear base installations (INB)
> View ASN release Dec. 22, 2014 (in French)
> Download: Décision nº 2014-DC-0462 de l'Autorité de sûreté nucléaire du 7 octobre 2014 relative ŕ la maîtrise du risque de criticité dans les installations nucléaires de base (150kB PDF - in French)
Independent radiation laboratory CRIIRAD releases report on nuclear transports in the Rhône-Alpes region
> Download: Étude préliminaire sur le transport des substances radioactives en Rhône-Alpes , CRIIRAD, Dec. 10, 2014 (2.6MB PDF - in French)
[Preliminary study on the transport of radioactive materials in the Rhône-Alpes region (of France); Annexe C contains statistics of transports shipped or received at nuclear facilities in the area, such as Areva NC Pierrelatte, Comurhex Pierrelatte, EURODIF Production, among others]
Nuclear fuel fabrication workers still receive highest individual radiation doses in France's nuclear sector - though slightly lower than in previous year
According to the 2013 report of the French Radiation Protection Authority Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN), the workers receiving the highest individual doses in the French nuclear industry are those employed in nuclear fuel fabrication. In 2013, the individual dose of exposed workers in fuel fabrication was 2.46 mSv (a slight reduction from the 3.19 mSv in 2012), compared to 1.01 mSv for exposed workers in reactor operation, for example.
> View IRSN release July 10, 2014 (in French)
> Download: La radioprotection des travailleurs - Exposition professionnelle aux rayonnements ionisants en France: bilan 2013 , IRSN 2014 (2.1MB PDF - in French)
ASN orders Areva to improve emergency management measures at Tricastin and Romans-sur-Isère nuclear fuel facility sites after deadline exceeded
After Areva had failed to implement provisional emergency management measures at its Tricastin and Romans-sur-Isère sites by a June 30, 2013, deadline, the Nuclear Safety Authority ASN ordered Areva to implement the measures within four to eight months. The order concerns the Areva companies Eurodif Production, Comurhex, Socatri, Areva NC and SET at Tricastin and FBFC at Romans-sur-Isère.
> View ASN release July 29, 2013 (in French)
Nuclear fuel fabrication workers receive highest individual radiation doses in France's nuclear sector
According to the 2012 report of the French Radiation Protection Authority Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN), the workers receiving the highest individual doses in the French nuclear industry are those employed in nuclear fuel fabrication. In 2012, the individual dose of exposed workers in fuel fabrication was 3.19 mSv, compared to 0.90 mSv for exposed workers in reactor operation, for example.
> View IRSN release July 23, 2013 (in French)
> Download: La radioprotection des travailleurs - Exposition professionnelle aux rayonnements ionisants en France: bilan 2012 , IRSN 2013 (2.1MB PDF - in French)
Comment invited on guidance for the control of activities in the vicinity of nuclear installations
The Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) and the ministries of the environment of the interior are inviting public comment on a draft guidance to control activities in the vicinity of nuclear installations that are licensed as installation nucléaire de base (INB).
Comments have to be submitted by December 17, 2011.
> View ASN release Oct. 17, 2011 and download guidance (in French)
ASN releases supplemental safety reports on French nuclear fuel facilities prepared in wake of Fukushima disaster; Areva impedes download of its reports
On Sep. 16, 2011, nuclear regulator Autorité de sûreté nucléaire (ASN) released several reports on the safety at nuclear fuel plants. In the wake of the Fukushima disaster, ASN had requested these reports from the plant owners.
The reports prepared by Areva are only viewable as page images, impeding the download of the documents.
> Access Évaluations complémentaires de sûreté (ASN - in French)
The reports come to the follwing conclusions:
- Comurhex Pierrelatte conversion plant: the plant cannot withstand a major earthquake; it will be replaced by the Comurhex II conversion plant.
- Eurodif gaseous diffusion enrichment plant: the plant cannot withstand a major earthquake; it will be replaced by the George Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant.
- MELOX MOX fuel plant: the plant can withstand major earthquakes and floodings.
- FBFC Romans fuel plant: the plant can only withstand major earthquakes and floodings, once the refurbishment works currently underway are completed.
A report prepared by the Haut Comité pour la Transparence et l'Information sur la Sécurité Nucléaire sheds some light on the materials produced at every stage of the production of the nuclear fuel eventually used in the nuclear power plants operated by EdF in France. It also analyses the international transfers connected to the reprocessing of uranium. The report had been commissioned by Environment Minister Jean-Louis Borloo and the Office parlementaire de l'évaluation des choix scientifiques et technologiques.
Avis sur la transparence de la gestion des matières et des déchets nucléaires produits aux différents stades du cycle du combustible ,
Haut Comité pour la Transparence et l'Information sur la Sécurité Nucléaire, 12 juillet 2010 (HCTISN - in French)
The study found an increased incidence of pancreas cancer with women "that cannot be explained based on current scientific knowledge".
> Download Étude sanitaire sur les cancers autour du site nucléaire du Tricastin ORS Rhône-Alpes – Juin 2010 (1.3M PDF, ORS - in French) · alternate source
Comments can be submitted until May 25, 2010.
> View La refonte de la réglementation générale des INB (ASN - in French)
> View Refonte de la réglementation technique des installations nucléaires de base (Ministry of Ecology - in French)
Enrichment of French recycled uranium at Seversk enrichment plant (Russia)
> View here
On Nov. 6, 2007, the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) announced the publication of the décret "procédures INB" in the Official Journal of Nov. 3, 2007.
> View ASN release Nov. 6, 2007 (in French)
> View Décret n° 2007-1557 du 2 novembre 2007 relatif aux installations nucléaires de base et au contrôle, en matière de sûreté nucléaire, du transport de substances radioactives , J.O n° 255 du 3 novembre 2007 page 18026 (in French)
The uranium recovered from reprocessing of spent fuel in France is not expected to be used for the manufacture of nuclear fuel in the near future. French utility EdF rather has made provisions for long-term storage of the reprocessed uranium for 250 years. This was revealed in a report of the French Court of Auditors on the decommissioning of nuclear facilities and the management of radioactive wastes.
Usage of the reprocessed uranium (REPU) is problematic for several reasons: since the REPU is contaminated with the artificial uranium isotopes U-232 and U-236, special precautions are necessary during processing: the U-232 and its decay products cause elevated radiation doses for the plant personnel, and the U-236 as a neutron absorber requires higher enrichment levels to achieve the same reactivity. In consequence, use of the REPU is not very attractive at present market conditions: conversion is three times more expensive than conversion of natural uranium, and enrichment cannot be done in France's sole enrichment plant (Eurodif gazeous diffusion plant), since the REPU would contaminate the plant's circuits. For production of two test refueling batches for the Cruas nuclear power plant, the REPU was enriched in a foreign (presumably Russian) centrifuge enrichment plant.
Of the 1050 t of spent uranium oxide fuel annually generated in France, 850 t are being reprocessed at La Hague, at present. (In addition, 100 t of spent MOX fuel arise, which are not reprocessed at all.) From reprocessing of uranium oxide fuel, approx. 816 t of uranium and 8.5 t of plutonium are recovered. Of the uranium recovered, approx. 650 t are converted to the more stable oxide form for long-term storage, awaiting future uses.
The uranium recovered in the former Marcoule reprocessing plant has never been recycled into nuclear fuel at all. It still stays at Marcoule, in the liquid form of uranyl nitrate, 3800 t owned by EdF, and 4800 t owned by CEA and Cogéma.
Cour des Comptes:
Le démantèlement des installations
nucléaires et la gestion des déchets
radioactifs, Rapport au Président de la République
suivi des réponses des administrations
et des organismes intéressés, Janvier 2005
> Download full report (in French)
(formerly Comurhex)
ICPE, INB 175 (ECRIN)
Aerial View: Google Maps 
> See also: Comité Local d'Information et de Concertation (CLIC) Malvési (DREAL Languedoc-Roussillon - in French)
> See also: Plan de Prévention des Risques Technologiques (PPRT) Comurhex (DREAL Languedoc-Roussillon - in French)
> See also: Refluorination of depleted uranium oxide at Comurhex Malvési and Pierrelatte plants, France
General · Uranium Tetrafluoride (UF4) production · Uranium Dioxide (UO2) production project
Fire helicopter takes water from evaporation basin of Malvési uranium conversion plant
During the first big fire of the summer, which took place in Montredon-des-Corbières on July 5, a fire helicopter took 2000 litres of water from an evaporation basin of the Orano Malvési site.
(L'Indépendant Aug. 3, 2023)
Citizens ask European Parliament to monitor Orano's Malvési uranium conversion plant site
A group of citizens from Narbonne was heard on July 13 by the Committee on Petitions of the European Parliament to demand more transparency from Orano-Malvési. A check by the European Commission had already taken place on the site. No discrepancy was noted according to Orano.
(L'Indépendant July 27, 2022)
Security agents on strike at Orano's Malvési uranium conversion plant
Claiming in vain for nearly 6 months, with their management, the opening of salary negotiations, the security agents of the security company Seris Security, who are posted on the Orano-Malvési site, have decided, this Tuesday (May 24), to begin an indefinite strike.
(L'Indépendant May 24, 2022)
The indefinite strike by employees of the security company Seris Security, which began on May 24, ended last week.
(L'Indépendant June 5, 2022)
Demonstration against Orano's Malvési uranium conversion plant
More than a hundred people gathered in the city center of Narbonne to demonstrate against the Orano Malvési factory. The Sortir du Nucléaire 11 network denounces in particular two recent projects put in place "without any prior impact study".
[...] "We are mobilizing to denounce the pollution of this plant and especially against the new projects carried out on the plant: the TDN Thor, supposed to eliminate radioactive waste, but also against NVH (New Wet process line, Editor's note) which is a uranium dioxide production unit that was installed on the plant without any prior impact study."
(L'Indépendant Aug. 20, 2021)
Demonstration against Orano's Malvési uranium conversion plant
On Saturday February 29, 2020, a demonstration gathered 400 people in Narbonne against Orano Malvési and its new projects TDN [traitement des nitrates] and NVH [Nouvelle Voie Humide de production de dioxyde d'uranium].
(Sortir du nucléaire Aude, Feb. 29, 2020)
(The plant purifies and converts uranium ore concentrate containing U3O8 to uranium tetrafluoride (UF4), which is then further converted to uranium hexafluoride (UF6) at Orano's Pierrelatte plant.)
Fire at Orano's Malvési uranium conversion plant
A fire in a workshop at the Orano Malvesi site (nuclear fuel refining and conversion plant) occurred on Tuesday, October 11 around 7 a.m. According to the first observations, it seems that inside a room, a plastic part would have been consumed on an equipment which had just been restarted and which was therefore under surveillance. While smoke was emerging from the machine, the shift manager then quickly alerted the firefighters of the departmental fire and rescue service (Sdis).
Finally, when they arrived at the radioactive substance processing and storage site, the incident had already been brought under control by Orano Malvesi employees, many of whom have firefighting skills on the site.
(L'Indépendant Oct. 11, 2022)
Massive stockpile of uranium ore concentrate accumulated at Malvési uranium conversion plant
"Ms. Arditi specifies that there has been little or no production over the past two years. In this context, she would like to know if the number of stored uranium drums has increased, and if any drums have been waiting for a long time.
The Director of the Orano company replies that the stock present on site represents approximately 30,000 tonnes currently. In 2020, there were 35,000 tonnes. Inventories are therefore down slightly. However, the Director specifies that the storage of concentrate does not only depend on the production but also on the geopolitical situation of certain countries. The forecast, in 2022, is to continue to reduce the stock of concentrate on site."
> Download: Compte-rendu Commission de Suivi de Site (CSS) ORANO Cycle Malvési du 25 janvier 2022 (636kB PDF - in French)
Strontium-90 discovered in groundwater at Malvési uranium conversion plant site
"[...] traces of Strontium (Sr-90), an artificial radionuclide, have been found [in groundwater in 2020], the origin of this artificial radioelement remains to be determined. An analysis was requested during the last observatory to allow a deeper understanding of the subject."
> Download: Compte-rendu Commission de Suivi de Site (CSS) ORANO Cycle Malvési du 25 janvier 2022 (636kB PDF - in French)
Orano ordered to pay EUR 30,000 fine for work accident at Malvési uranium conversion plant
For an industrial accident case dating from 2017, SA Orano Cycle was ordered by the Narbonne court to pay a fine of EUR 30,000.
On February 8, 2017, an employee of the Amalis company, was carrying out a cleaning operation. Surprised by a flashback, the man had fallen from the top of a platform, fracturing his collarbone.
The injury had resulted in the victim's incapacity for work for several months, and he claimed compensation for the damage suffered. His employer, Amalis-Assainissement Maintenance Assiatnce Logistique sur Installations et Services, having gone out of business since February 15, 2018, Orano Cycle was judged alone.
Considering that the equipment intended to ensure the safety of the worker had not been made available by Orano, the Narbonne court ordered the latter to pay a fine of EUR 30,000. François Lurin, representing the company Amalis, and Stéphan Jolivet, representing the company Orano Cycle, who were also tried in a personal capacity, were released. For his part, the victim will have to wait until November 9 to find out if his requests for financial compensation are granted to him.
(L'Indépendant July 1, 2021)
Elevated radiation levels detected near Orano's Malvési conversion plant
The largest uranium processing site in France is located three kilometers from Narbonne (Aude). Concerned residents regularly check the level of radioactivity in the vicinity of the plant. At the barrier that limits access to the site, the counter goes off and exceeds the natural rate of radioactivity by four times.[...]
The management of the plant wants to reassure the measurements made by the residents.[...]
However, the local residents have taken cypress leaves that grow in the vicinity of the plant to have them analyzed. The laboratory responsible for the analyses observed 28 times more uranium in the samples taken to the east, in the direction of the wind, than in the leaves collected further away. "This means that certain populations near the site are permanently breathing uranium," said Bruno Chareyron, a nuclear physics engineer and director of a Criirad laboratory.
(France Info Apr. 29, 2021)
Strike at Orano's Malvési conversion plant ends after eight weeks
At 8 p.m. this Friday (Dec. 12), after an afternoon of negotiations, the management of Orano-Malvési and the CGT [union] finally reached an agreement, ending a strike that had started on October 16. A social movement whose demands focused on the re-internalization of maintenance operations and early retirement depending on the arduous nature of the work.
The suspension of the 80 employment contracts, which had aroused the indignation of the unions, was immediately lifted. Stopped since the start of the conflict, the production workshop, with around thirty CGT strikers, will be able to resume. "However, we are maintaining our annual technical shutdown in December, for a fortnight. We will restart in January," says one on the side of the management of the industrial site classified Seveso 2.
(L'Indépendant Dec. 12, 2020)
Workers at Orano's Malvési conversion plant on strike for more than five weeks
For more than five weeks now, the social conflict between the CGT and the management of the Orano-Malvézy factory continues. The movement was launched on October 16 by the union, in particular because of the "more and more massive" recourse to subcontracting to ensure the maintenance of the site.
(L'Indépendant Nov. 26, 2020)
ASN calls for studies on management of uranium conversion wastes generated at Orano's Malvési plant
On Aug. 10, 2020, the Nuclear Safety Authority ASN issued its opinion on the management of long-lived low level radioactive waste.
Concerning the uranium conversion wastes (RTCU) generated at Malvési, ASN considers that these wastes must be better integrated into the work on the scenarios for the management of long-lived low level radioactive waste. It recommends that studies for a RTCU storage facility be continued, involving representatives of the territories involved or likely to be. The objective is to provide, by a date set by the next edition of the PNGMDR, the technical and safety options for this installation, at a level of maturity corresponding to a preliminary draft.
> View: ASN release Aug. 10, 2020 (in French)
> Download: Avis nº 2020-AV-0357 de l'Autorité de sûreté nucléaire du 6 août 2020 sur les études relatives à la gestion des déchets de faible activité à vie longue (FA-VL) remises en application du plan national de gestion des matières et des déchets radioactifs 2016-2018, en vue de l'élaboration du cinquième plan national de gestion des matières et des déchets radioactifs , Aug. 6, 2020 (173kB PDF - in French)
Leaking drums of uranium ore concentrate received at Orano's Malvési uranium conversion plant in seven instances in 2019
During the year 2019, leaking drums of uranium ore concentrate were detected in sea containers arriving at the Malvési uranium conversion plant in seven instances. The transports in question originated from Niger (2x), Namibia (2x), Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Australia. Each of these events was rated Level 0 on the INES scale.
> Download: Orano: Rapport d'information du site Orano Malvési, Edition 2019 (3.4MB PDF - in French)
Dam stability of waste impoundment insufficient at Orano's Malvési uranium conversion plant
On May 25, 2019, the stability factor of the western embankment of INB No. 175 (Écrin - confined disposal of wastes from conversion) was found to be locally lower than prescribed. The situation was corrected by installation of draining strips over the entire area, and by placement of riprap. The event was rated Level 0 on the INES scale.
> Download: Orano: Rapport d'information du site Orano Malvési, Edition 2019 (3.4MB PDF - in French)
ASN issues license for continued waste disposal at Orano's Malvési uranium conversion plant
On Oct. 12, 2018, ASN issued a decision authorising Orano to start operation of INB No. 175 (Écrin - confined disposal of wastes from conversion), located on top of the old waste impoundments B1 and B2 (!).
Detonation and fire at Orano's Malvési uranium conversion plant
According to Orano, on Sep. 19, 2018, at 11h20, a smoke release was detected inside a building for the checking and control of materials of the Malvési site.
A storage barrel containing metal oxides from old productions is the origin of this event that occurred inside a containment lock.
2 operators working nearby were slightly injured and were taken in charge by the medical service of the site.
(Orano Sep. 19, 2018)
However, local media reveiled the same day that the fire was preceded by a detonation - not mentioned by Orano - that occured when opening the barrel. (L'Indépendant, France 3).
The same day (Sep. 19, 2018), the prefect of Aude issued an order temporarily prohibiting the opening of barrels containing recyclable uranium-containing materials (No. DREAL-UID.11.2018).
On June 20, 2019, the prefect of Aude partially lifted the order temporarily prohibiting the opening of barrels containing recyclable uranium-containing materials, for barrels generated at the Malvési site.
On Mar. 31, 2021, the prefect of Aude partially lifted the order temporarily prohibiting the opening of barrels containing recyclable uranium-containing materials, for barrels generated at INB 105 (conversion plant) and INB 138 (Uranium Remediation and Recovery Facility) at Tricastin.
On Dec. 3, 2021, the prefect of Aude completely lifted the order temporarily prohibiting the opening of barrels containing recyclable uranium-containing materials, for all barrels.
Dose rate from external radiation at site boundary of Orano's Malvési uranium conversion plant reaches new peak; 1 mSv standard only met by tricks
The dose rate from external radiation at the site boundary of Orano's Malvési uranium conversion plant reached a new peak of 0.77 mSv per year in 2017, a 75% increase over the 0.44 mSv reported for 2016. Previously, the highest value had been reported at 0.72 mSv for 2013.
These dose rates are based on the 2000-hour occupancy of a farmer working near the boundary, rather than on continuous occupancy. For continous occupancy, the dose rates would exceed the 1 mSv per year standard for all of the years reported: the 2017 value, for example, would be 3.37 mSv rather than the 0.77 mSv reported.
> Download: Orano: Rapport d'information du site Orano Malvési, Edition 2017 (2.3MB PDF - in French)
Note: In 2011, the Nuclear Safety Authority ASN cited Areva for exceeding the 1 mSv per year standard at its Pierrelatte conversion plant, where the standard is based on continuous occupancy.
> See: Dose rate at boundary of Areva's Pierrelatte conversion plant exceeds 1 mSv standard
During the following years, the dose rate from external radiation at the site boundary increased even further: to 0.80 mSv in 2018, and 0.84 mSv in 2019. For continuous occupancy, therefore, the dose rates would exceed the 1 mSv per year standard even further (3.5 mSv, and 3.7 mSv, respectively).
> Download: Orano: Rapport d'information du site Orano Malvési, Edition 2019 (3.4MB PDF - in French)
Only in 2020, the dose rate from external radiation at the site boundary showed a decrease to 0.47 mSv.
> Download: Compte-rendu Commission de Suivi de Site (CSS) ORANO Cycle Malvési du 25 janvier 2022 (636kB PDF - in French)
Orano's Malvési conversion plant to profit from suspension of operation at ConverDyn's Metropolis plant (Illinois)
In terms of activities, the Orano Malvési site will notably benefit from a contract signed between its parent company and its American competitor ConverDyn. Subsidiary of the Honeywell Group, this company decided last year to suspend the activity of its [Metropolis] conversion site - a situation that benefits the Narbonne plant.
In the short term, 40% of the uranium converted for use in US nuclear power plants will come from Malvési.
(La Tribune June 12, 2018)
Activists block train leaving Areva's Malvési conversion plant
A train leaving Areva's Malvési conversion plant near Narbonne for Areva's Tricastin site was blocked by some 20 anti-nuclear activists from 9:30 to noon on April 15, 2017. The activists called for "a public debate on nuclear power".
(Radio France Apr. 15, 2017)
French Radiation Protection Institute notes sharp increase of contamination incidents with transport drums holding uranium ore concentrate, demands improvement of filling procedure at Areva's overseas mines
In its latest biennial report on the safety of transports with radioactive material, the Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) noted a sharp increase in contamination incidents with imported drums holding uranium ore concentrate. These drums were filled at Areva's overseas mines and transported to the Malvési conversion plant.
The incidents consisted of minor spills of uranium ore concentrate found on the drums or on the means of transport. While there was no such incident in 2010 and one incident each in 2011 and 2012, the numbers since increased to four incidents in 2013, seven in 2014, and five in 2015.
IRSN therefore demands higher vigilance and corrective actions from Areva concerning the process of filling and closing the drums at its overseas mines.
> Download: Sûreté des transports de substances radioactives à usage civil sur le territoire français en 2014 et 2015 , Institut
de radioprotection et de sûreté nucléaire, Dec. 2016 (2.8 MB PDF - in French)
Court turns down appeals against proposed nitrate treatment plant at Orano's Malvési conversion plant:
In a decision handed down on Tuesday 14 May, the Marseille Administrative Court of Appeal rejected the five appeals lodged by the Rubresus, Colere and TCNA associations, which were hoping to have the prefectoral authorisations for the operation of new facilities for the incinerator of nitrated radioactive waste, known as TDN, cancelled at Orano Malvési's Narbonne site.
(L'Indépendant May 15, 2024)
Complementary expertise requested by investigating commissioner of supplementary public inquiry into proposed nitrate treatment plant at Orano's Malvési conversion plant:
[The investigating commissioner] pronounces "a favorable opinion", as in 2017, but this time "with reservations by asking to mandate an expert commission or an independent and recognized expert allowing to give a final favorable opinion on the reliability of the Thor process, before issuing an authorization order for the TDN project on the Malvesi site". According to the investigator, "a doubt remains on the reliability of the process which must be removed with an updated complementary expertise to the current technical conditions".
(L'Indépendant July 30, 2023)
Supplementary public inquiry into proposed nitrate treatment plant at Orano's Malvési conversion plant:
Following two rulings by the Marseille Administrative Court of Appeal on October 21, 2022, and by prefectoral decree of May 11, 2023, a supplementary public inquiry will be held for a period of fifteen consecutive days, June 5 - 19, 2023.
As part of the process of rectifying defects relating to the irregularity of the opinion of the environmental authority, the inadequacy of the impact study and the state of soil pollution in connection with the creation of a facility known as TDN (Traitement Des Nitrates) in the commune of Narbonne - Malvési site, the following will be submitted to the supplementary public inquiry:
- the supplements to the impact study associated with the application for authorization to operate the TDN project, including the following documents: soil pollution status at the Malvési site; storage, transport and treatment of very low-level waste (VLLW) from the TDN project; assessment of changes in the impact study for the TDN project;
- the opinion of April 6, 2023 issued by the environmental authority (MRAe) of the Conseil Général de l'Environnement et du Développement Durable competent for the Occitanie region.
> Access: Enquête Publique Complémentaire (in French)
Appeals court upholds construction permit for nitrate treatment plant (TDN) project at Malvési conversion plant:
The administrative court of appeal of Marseille did not overturn the judgment of the administrative court of Montpellier as the associations COL.E.R.E and Rubresus wanted. Its ruling of March 23 validates the building permit granted by the city of Narbonne for a nitrate treatment facility on the Orano Malvési site.
The association Collectif pour l'environnement des riverains élisyques (COL.E.R.E) and the association Rubresus were not heard by the administrative court of appeal of Marseille. The latter has indeed, in a decision on March 23, rejected their request for the annulment of the judgment of the administrative court of Montpellier dated October 15, 2019. The court had already refused to annul, at their request, the July 7, 2016 order by which the mayor of Narbonne had issued Orano a building permit for the construction of a nitrate treatment facility.
It should be noted that other appeals are still being processed by the courts. A final decision is expected in October. It should be only then that Orano Malvési will begin its project of setting up a nitrate treatment plant.
(L'Indépendant Apr. 4, 2023)
Appeals court orders additional analysis of environmental impacts of Nitrate treatment plant (TDN) project at Orano's Malvési conversion plant:
On October 21, 2022, the Marseille Administrative Court of Appeal recognized as founded two of the pleas raised by the associations Transparence des canals de la narbonnaise (TCNA) and Réseau "Sortir du Nucléaire" against the decree of 8 November 2017 authorizing the operation of TDN. [...]
[The court] asked the prefect of the Aude department to issue a regularization order after Orano Cycle has carried out an additional analysis of the impact study concerning the storage, transport and treatment of very low-level waste and transmission of a regular opinion from the competent environmental authority, both subject to an additional public inquiry, all within twelve months of notification of the order. It is only after this that the court will rule on the appeal.
(Réseau Sortir du Nucléaire Oct. 24, 2022)
> Download: Court opinion Nº 19MA05469, Oct. 21, 2022 (232kB PDF - in French)
Nitrate treatment plant (TDN) project, meant to eliminate slurry retention ponds at Malvési conversion plant, halted because of appeals:
[Orano's] TDN project, designed to treat liquid radioactive effluents, has been halted because local residents and associations have filed appeals to obtain the cancellation of the prefectoral authorization.
(Le Monde May 17, 2021)
Orano plans further changes at Malvési conversion plant, eliminating need for slurry retention ponds:
After a recently completed investment cycle of EUR 500 million over ten years, the Orano group is embarking on a new cycle of EUR 300 million for five years to come.
The new investment cycle will include the addition of a nitrate waste treatment unit (TDN) to meet more environmental requirements.
Operational in 2020, it will produce gaseous residues free of nitrate, and solid, which will be sent to a site of the National Agency for Radioactive Waste Management (Andra), which refuses today to accommodate nitrate waste. This new process will notably eliminate the retention ponds surrounding the Malvési site, thus reducing the risk of leaks.
(La Tribune June 12, 2018)
Prefect to authorize controversial waste treatment plant project at Areva's Malvési conversion plant:
The Prefect of Aude announced on Nov. 8 that he is going to authorize Areva's proposed treatment of nitrates contained in the liquid wastes stored at the site of Malvési near Narbonne.
(Le Figaro Nov. 8, 2017)
Demonstration against controversial waste treatment plant project at Areva's Malvési conversion plant:
On Nov. 5, 2017, between 2,000 and 3,000 people held a demonstration in Narbonne against a waste treatment plant proposed by Areva for its Malvési conversion plant. The nitrate treatment plant "TDN Thor" should be able to absorb some of the tailings ponds and transform part of the liquid waste into ultimate waste that can be stored elsewhere.
Particularly denounced by activists, the plant's NOx emissions will total 38 tonnes per year. However, this figure is relative, according to Maryse Arditi, president of the environmental association Eccla : "Until 2014, the plant emitted more than 150 t of NOx per year. Thanks to process improvements, these emissions fell to 82 tons in 2015. Even adding the TDN Thor, NOx releases would not reach those before 2014," she says.
(Le Monde Nov. 6, 2017)
Public inquiry into proposed nitrate treatment plant at Areva's Malvési conversion plant:
On Sep. 5, 2016, a public inquiry was opened into Areva's prosposal to construct a nitrate treatment plant for the liquids held in the evaporation ponds at its Malvési conversion plant. The proposed Thermal Organic Reduction scheme will produce a solid waste that is to be transferred to ANDRA's CIRES site for very low level radioactive waste.
Submit comments by October 5, 2016.
> Download related documents (Aude Dept. - in French)
Major spill of uranyl nitrate at Areva's Malvési conversion plant
On July 7, 2016, almost the complete contents of a vessel containing 41.8 m3 of a uranyl nitrate solution spilled during maintenance works. The major part of the spilled solution (37 m3) was collected in the sump, but 4.5 m3 (containing 110 kg of uranium) spilled on the ground and reached the rainwater collection system.
Areva proposed to rate the event level 0 on the INES scale, but ASN actually rated it level 1.
(ASN Oct. 14, 2016)
Transport of UF4 from Malvési to Tricastin switched from road to rail
The commissioning of rail transport became effective early 2015. A weekly exchange of 20 cylinders of uranium tetrafluoride (UF4 - purified natural uranium) between Malvési and Tricastin replaces many daily road transports.
(Rapport d'information du site AREVA Tricastin, Édition 2015, Areva, June 2016)
French Nuclear Safety Authority demands Areva to present proposal for management of future waste arisings at Malvési conversion plant site
Given that there exists no disposal path for the future arisings of waste slurries from operation of the Malvési conversion plant, the French Nuclear Safety Authority ASN demands Areva to present a management strategy for these wastes. For waste slurries arising from 2019, ASN demands to consider them as wastes of low specific activity with long half-lives (FA-VL).
Concerning current investigations by the national radioactive waste management agency ANDRA for the possibility of an additional slurry pond on the territory of the community of Soulaines (the only one that permitted the necessary geological investigations...), ASN demands a more thorough investigation of the underground of the site than performed so far.
> View: ASN release April 6, 2016 (in French)
> Download: Avis nº 2016-AV-264 de l'Autorité de sûreté nucléaire du 29 mars 2016 sur les études relatives à la gestion des déchets de faible activité à vie longue (FA-VL) remises en application du Plan national de gestion des matières et des déchets radioactifs 2013-2015, en vue de l'élaboration du Plan national de gestion des matières et des déchets radioactifs 2016-2018
> Download: Gestion à long terme des déchets à produire du procédé de conversion, PNGMDR 2013 - 2015, Rapport d'études, AREVA - Andra, Mars 2015 (633k PDF - in French)
French Nuclear Safety Authority demands Areva to present inventory of legacy wastes found at Malvési conversion plant site
The French Nuclear Safety Authority ASN demands Areva to present a physical and radiological inventory of historic wastes found in the Zone G of the Malvési site.
> View: ASN release April 6, 2016 (in French)
> Download: Avis nº 2016-AV-0255 de l'Autorité de sûreté nucléaire du 9 février 2016 sur les études relatives à la gestion des stockages historiques remises en application du plan national de gestion des matières et des déchets radioactifs 2013-2015, en vue de l'élaboration du plan national de gestion des matières et des déchets radioactifs 2016-2018
> Download: Gestion à long terme des déchets historiques du procédé de conversion, PNGMDR 2013 - 2015, Rapport d'avancement, AREVA - Site de Malvési (11), Décembre 2014 (3.0MB PDF - in French)
Protests in Germany along transport route of uranium ore concentrate destined for Areva's Malvési conversion plant in France
In the evening of Sep. 14, 2015, a train carrying 14 containers with uranium ore concentrate left Hamburg for Areva's Malvési conversion plant in Southern France. The uranium had arrived at the Hamburg port in the morning onboard the vessel "Mikahil Dudin". Vigils are held at several locations along the expected transport route.
(Sofa Münster Sep. 14, 2015)
High Court condemns Areva for disregard of environmental regulations at Malvési conversion plant
On Sep. 10, 2015, AREVA (formerly Comurhex) was condemned by the High Court of Narbonne for the disregard of environmental regulations established to prevent health and environmental hazards.
AREVA is guilty of at least 20 environmental violations. During six years (since 2009), important technical requirements were totally ignored - particularly regarding prevention of air pollution and pollution and soil water.
For example, the company has never carried out continuous monitoring of NOx emissions (nitrogen oxides) from its incinerator into the atmosphere. Similarly, while handling hazardous products on a daily basis, the company has always stored them in areas without any retention.
(France Nature Environnement Sep. 10, 2015)
ASN issues new license for improperly licensed waste storage ponds at Areva's Malvési conversion plant
By decree issued July 20, 2015, the Nuclear Safety Authority ASN authorized Areva to construct and operate a waste storage pond for 400,000 cubic metres of conversion plant residues as a nuclear base installation (installation nucléaire de base - INB).
In Dec. 2009, ASN had withdrawn control over existing basins B1 and B2 from Areva, as they were not properly authorized; a public inquiry into the new license was held in 2013 (see below).
> View: ASN release July 31, 2014 (in French)
> View: Decree of July 20, 2015 (in French)
Protest in Narbonne against rail transport of uranium ore concentrate
In the morning of Feb. 13, 2015, around 60 people gathered in front of the station of Narbonne to protest against the expected passing of a train, carrying a load of uranium ore concentrate from the Hamburg port to the Malvési conversion plant. The uranium ore concentrate originated from Namibia.
(La Dépêche du Midi Feb. 14, 2015)
Atmospheric deposition causes high activities of uranium and thorium nuclides in plant samples near Areva's Malvési conversion plant, study finds
"Uranium and thorium isotopes were measured in cypress leaves, wheat grains and lettuce taken in the surroundings of the uranium conversion facility of Malvési (South of France). The comparison of activity levels and activity ratios (namely 238U/232Th and 230Th/232Th) in plants with those in aerosols taken at this site and plants taken far from it shows that aerosols emitted by the nuclear site (uranium releases in the atmosphere by stacks and 230Th-rich particles emitted from artificial ponds collecting radioactive waste mud) accounts for the high activities recorded in the plant samples close to the site. The atmospheric deposition process onto the plants appears to be the dominant process in plant contamination. Dry deposition velocities of airborne uranium and thorium were measured as 4.6 × 10-3 and 5.0 × 10-3 m s-1, respectively."
Environmental consequences of uranium atmospheric releases from fuel cycle facility: II. The atmospheric deposition of uranium and thorium on plants, by Pourcelot, L; Masson, O; Renaud, P; et al., in: Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, Dec. 10, 2014 (aheadofprint)
Goldman Sachs stored uranium ore concentrate at Malvési conversion plant
> View Goldman Sachs to wind down uranium trading business - after U.S. Senate report sheds some light on it, raising a number of issues
Public inquiry into new license for improperly licensed waste storage ponds at Malvési conversion plant
On Nov. 21, 2013, the public inquiry started on the requested licensing of two waste storage ponds at the Malvési conversion plant as an Installation Nucléaire de Base (INB).
On Dec. 22, 2009, the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) had determined that the current license as an Installation Classée is insufficient for the decantation and storage basins B1 and B2 (see below).
Areva no longer wants to use these two basins for the decantation of new wastes. Given that a repository for the ultimate disposal of this waste material is not yet available in France, Areva rather plans to secure the basins for intermediate storage for a period of 30 years. Areva intends to accomplish this by placing a bituminous cover on top of the basins. In addition, the southern part of basin B2 is to host a disposal cell for wastes arising from the emptying of decantation basins B5 and B6.
Submit comments by December 30, 2013.
> Download Public inquiry documents (Aude - in French)
> View/download Public inquiry documents (Areva - in French)
Activists block UF4 transport leaving Malvési conversion plant
In the morning of Sep. 12, 2013, several activists of Réseau Sortir du nucléaire blocked a truck at the exit of the Comurhex Malvési conversion plant for almost one hour. The truck was transporting uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) to the site of Tricastin.
"We want to alert officials and the public about the fact that every day, three to five trucks carrying uranium tetrafluoride use the A7 and A9 motorways without special protection and in total obscurity", denounced Laura Hameaux, member of the network which brings together 940 associations. The demonstrators, belonging in particular to the group Stop Uranium, distributed leaflets denouncing the transport that can come, they say, up to "60 tonnes" of tetrafluoride per day.
(La Dépêche Sep. 12, 2013)
Upon arrival of the truck, activists equipped with a counter started to perform radiation measurements. The "normal" level of radioactivity observed in the open air before the arrival of the truck was 60 nSv/h. At a distance of 1 metre from the truck, 2800 nSv/h could be measured. In contact with the container, the counter climbed to 7200 nSv/h, that is 120 times natural background.
(Réseau Sortir du nucléaire Sep. 12, 2013)
On Feb. 20, 2014, the Criminal Court of Narbonne found an antinuclear activist guilty of blocking a transport of uranium tetrafluoride destined for the nuclear site of Tricastin, but the activist was exempted from punishment.
(L'Express Feb. 20, 2014)
Activists hold blockade of Comurhex Malvési conversion plant
A group named Stop Nucléaire held a blockade of the Comurhex site in Narbonne during two hours. The activists demand more transparency on the road transports of uranium.
(La Dépêche June 20, 2013)
Comurhex Malvési conversion plant obtains approval for capacity increase
On Aug. 1, 2012, the prefect of Aude issued order No. 2012107-0006, authorizing the capacity increase of the Comurhex Malvési conversion plant from 14,000 to 21,000 t U in the form of UF4 per year.
The order defines a maximum acceptable activity concentration of 1 Bq/g for plutonium-239 in the uranium feed for the plant. The moving average of the total amount of plutonium-239 measured in one year must not exceed 5 grams.
Residual plutonium from former processing of recycled uranium still circulating in and between Comurhex conversion plants
The Comurhex Malvési plant processed recycled uranium obtained from the La Hague reprocessing plant until 1983. This introduced a number of impurities into the plant, including fission products and plutonium. So far, it was known that these impurities have ended up in the decantation basins B1 and B2 - that is why these were recently declared INBs (Installation Nucléaire de Base) (see below).
Now it became known that the plutonium still circulates - not only within the plant, but even between the Malvési and Pierrelatte plants: when unloading the UF4 containers in Pierrelatte by sublimation, the impurities remain (as so called "heels") in the "empty" cylinders that are then returned to Malvési for refilling.
A draft order of the Prefect of Aude for the expansion of the Malvési plant now addresses the situation by defining a maximum acceptable activity concentration of 1 Bq/g for plutonium-239 in the uranium feed for the plant.
(Ecologie du Carcassonnais, des Corbières et du Littoral Audois (ECCLA) June 25, 2012)
Public inquiry into plan for prevention of technological risks at Comurhex Malvési conversion plant
The inquiry runs from June 18 to July 20, 2012.
> Download: related documents (DREAL Languedoc-Roussillon - in French)
Respirable uranium particles found on cypress leaves close to Comurhex Malvési uranium conversion plant
Uranium oxide and other airborne particles deposited on cypress leaves close to a nuclear facility , by Gieré R, Kaltenmeier R, Pourcelot L, in: Journal of Environmental Monitoring Vol. 14, No. 4, April 1, 2012, p. 1263-1273
Areva announces suspension of capacity increase at Malvési and Pierrelatte uranium conversion plants
On Dec. 13, 2011, Areva announced the suspension of the capacity increase at the Malvési and Pierrelatte uranium conversion plants.
(Le Monde Dec. 13, 2011)
Temporary shut down of Areva's Malvési and Pierrelatte uranium conversion plants for drop in demand after Fukushima disaster
French nuclear group Areva on Thursday (Sep. 15) said it would temporarily shut down two uranium conversion plants in France during November and December.
The temporary shutdown of the two plants, which employ around 570 staff, comes after a sharp fall in orders from Japanese nuclear power producers in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, said a spokeswoman at Areva.
The spokeswoman said the temporary shutdown would reduce estimated production to 10,880 tonnes in 2011, down from an initial goal of 13,400 tonnes for the full year.
The plants, which are owned by Areva's subsidiary Comurhex and are located in the southern French cities of Tricastin and Narbonne, chemically prepare uranium before its is enriched to become fuel for nuclear power plants.
(Reuters Sep. 15, 2011)
Nuclear Safety Authority finds that decantation basin which failed in 2004 at the Malvési conversion plant is not properly authorized, as it contains traces of artificial radionuclides; control over two basins withdrawn from Comurhex/Areva
On Dec. 22, 2009, the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) has determined that the decantation and storage basins B1 and B2 at the Malvési conversion plant do constitute operations to be licensed as "installation nucléaire de base" (INB) rather than "installation classée pour la protection de l'environnement" (ICPE).
Basin B2 had failed on March 20, 2004, releasing approx. 30,000 cubic metres of liquid and slurries.
Comurhex was ordered to submit an application for an INB license by Dec. 31, 2010. In the meantime, control over the two basins has been withdrawn from Comurhex/Areva and is exercised by ASN directly.
(ASN Jan. 4, 2010)
ASN's determination is based on the fact that these two basins contain traces of artificial radionuclides that result from the practice of processing irradiated fuel in the facility until 1983.
(ASN presentation at CLIC Comurhex meeting of Jan. 29, 2010)
Release of fluorine to the canal du Tauran
On Aug. 24, 2009, Areva detected a release of fluorine to the canal du Tauran, exceeding the authorized limit.
(Areva Aug. 25, 2009)
The permissible releases of 5 kg/day of fluorine and 230 kg/day of ammonium were heavily exceeded:
- fluorine: release of 781 kg on 23 Aug. and 340 kg on 24 Aug. 2009
- ammonium: release of 962 kg on 23 Aug. and 370 kg on 24 Aug. 2009
On Aug. 25 and 26, 2009, an excessive mortality rate of fish was observed in the canal de Tauran.
(Compte rendu CLIC Malvési, Sep. 14, 2009)
On Dec. 16, 2011, Comurhex was condemned to 60,000 Euro in fines for water pollution at the Malvési plant between Aug. 21 and 25, 2009.
(L'Express Dec. 21, 2011)
Elevated uranium concentrations found in groundwater on site of Malvési conversion plant
During the course of the year 2008, uranium concentrations showed strong increases with peaks up to 1.2 milligrams per litre in two groundwater monitoring wells located on the site of the Malvési conversion plant.
Areva has to submit explanations on the cause of the increases and on possible impacts on off-site groundwater by end June 2009.
(DRIRE Languedoc Roussillon: Installations Classées, Contrôle du site COMURHEX, Bilan 2008; DRIRE Languedoc-Roussillon: Compte Rendu, Réunion du CLIC Narbonne, Séance du 21 avril 2009)
Elevated contaminant concentrations found in surface waters near Malvési conversion plant after thunderstorm
After a thunderstorm on January 24, 2009, elevated concentrations of nitrate and uranium were found in surface waters near the Malvési conversion plant. There occured no overflow from the storage basins located on site.
(Areva Comurhex: Bilan annuel de fonctionnement, CLIC du 21 avril 2009)
Uranium concentration in surface waters near Malvési conversion plant exceeds WHO drinking water guidance
In a report released Sep. 24, 2008, Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN) discloses some environmental impacts of the Malvési conversion plant, in particular to surface waters outside the site, with uranium concentrations in excess of WHO's drinking water guidance value of 15 micrograms per litre. The artificial onsite pond contains average uranium concentrations of 110 micrograms per litre, with maximum values of 200 micrograms per litre at some locations.
> Download Etat de la surveillance environnementale et bilan du marquage des nappes phréatiques et des cours d’eau autour des sites nucléaires et des entreposages anciens de déchets radioactifs, 15 septembre 2008 (3.1MB PDF - in French)
Railcar with Yellow Cake shipment for Malvési conversion plant overloaded
A railcar carrying uranium ore concentrate from the Hamburg harbour (Germany) to the Comurhex conversion plant at Malvési was found to be overloaded when entering France at Apach. The railcar carried 68 t rather than the permitted 61 t.
(Saarbrücker Zeitung Aug. 13, 2008)
Leaking Yellow Cake container arrives at Comurhex Malvési uranium conversion plant
On July 26, 2007, a small spill of Yellow Cake was detected during the unloading of a container from a railcar at Comurhex's Malvési conversion plant. The container held 36 barrels of natural uranium concentrate (Yellow Cake) produced in Niger. It turned out that one of the uranium barrels was damaged and around 30 kg of Yellow Cake had spilled inside the container. Traces of spilled uranium were also found on the ship that had carried the container before the rail transport. The event was rated Level 1 of the INES scale.
(ASN Aug. 9, 2007)
Areva increases capacity at Comurhex Malvési conversion plant
On May 21, 2007, Areva announced that it is to spend EUR 240 million to build new facilities and expand existing facilities at its Comurhex Malvési conversion plant. First industrial production is scheduled for 2012, based on 15,000 metric tons of uranium per year. This figure may be increased to 21,000 tons to meet market requirements.
CRIIRAD finds unexpected radionuclide concentrations in slurries at Comurhex Malvési plant
On Nov. 14, 2006, the independent radiation laboratory CRIIRAD released a report giving the results of a radiation survey conducted at the Malvési conversion plant on Sep. 21 and 22, 2006. The slurries contained unexpected high concentrations of thorium-230, which might lead to inacceptable radiation doses from inhalation. Moreover, the artificial nuclide americium-241 was identified, probably caused from former processing of recycled uranium.
> Download related CRIIRAD documents
IRSN demands cleanup of soil contaminated from spills at Comurhex Malvési plant
On July 25, 2006, the Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN) performed a radiation survey of areas outside the Comurhex Malvési plant. It turned out that several areas were contaminated from uranium decay products (Th-234 and Pa-234m in particular) released during spills. IRSN demands the cleanup of those areas.
(Compte rendu d'intervention, IRSN, Oct. 2006)
New spill of slurries at Malvési conversion plant went undetected for one month
On June 20, 2006, a spill of an unreported amount of contaminated slurries occured from leaking pipework connecting decantation basin B5 with the treatment plant for the supernatant liquids. The spill covered a surface area of 350 square meters and was only detected on July 19, 2006.
(Compte rendu, Comité Local d'Information et de Concertation, Séance du 24 Juillet 2006 à Narbonne)
Production halted at Malvési conversion plant after new spill and for decantation pond dam failure hazard after heavy rain
On January 30, 2006, Comurhex had to halt parts of its production at Malvési due to heavy rainfall in the area. According to a Comurhex press release, the production halt was a preventive measure necessary to maintain a safety margin in the plant's effluent decantation ponds.
(Comurhex Jan. 30, 2006)
However, during heavy rain on Jan. 28 - 30, 2006, precipitation came into contact with the slurries still lying outside of the B2 dam broken in 2004 (according to Comurhex, bad weather had prevented the reconstruction of the dam). An unspecified amount of the contaminated liquid (carrying high loads of nitrate) then spilled into the canal of Tauran.
(Compte-rendu du CLIC Malvési, Comurhex-Narbonne, 16 février 2006)
On March 5, 2006, strong winds resulted in an overflow of several decantation ponds due to insufficient safety margins of the ponding water levels, leading to another spill of an unspecified amount of nitrate-contaminated waters to the canal of Tauran. During the period from end-January to mid-April, the amount of nitrate released by Comurhex (297 t NO3) was six times higher than in a complete year without incidents (46 t NO3). The release of uranium during that period (75 kg U) was only slightly higher than in a complete normal year (63 kg U).
(Compte-rendu du CLIC Malvési, Comurhex-Narbonne, 22 mai 2006; AREVA: CLIC du 22/05/06: Bilan des intempéries, Actions d’amélioration)
Production was resumed on April 1, 2006.
Dam failure of decantation pond at Malvési conversion plant
On March 20, 2004, a dam failure at decantation and evaporation pond B2 of the Malvési conversion plant released approx. 30,000 cubic metres of liquid and slurries. The liquid contained high concentrations of nitrate and led to elevated nitrate concentrations of up to 170 mg/L in the canal of Tauran for several weeks, while uranium concentrations remained unchanged. The dam failure is believed to be caused by an "abnormal presence of water" due to heavy rain in summer 2003. (Rapport environnemental, social et sociétal 2004, COMURHEX Malvési)
> View details
Derailment of railway car carrying uranium ore concentrates
On September 23, 2001, a railway car carrying 30 tonnes of uranium ore concentrates derailed at the Courbessac shunting yard near Nîmes (Gard) in Southern France. The uranium obviously originated from Niger. It was shipped via Benin and Britanny to the Comurhex conversion plant at Malvési near Narbonne (Aude). No uranium was spilled. (Midi Libre Sep 25, 2001)
Fire on railway car carrying uranium ore concentrates
On June 8, 2000, a beginning fire was detected on a railway car carrying uranium ore concentrate (magnesium uranate) from Niger to Malvési. The fire was noticed at the entry of the Chantenay station (near Nantes) and the train was stopped. Fire brigades extinguished the fire within minutes. (ASN)
Associations worried, as production tests have begun at Orano's Uranium Dioxide (UO2) production facility at Malvési:
On the site of the Orano group, in Malvési, near Narbonne, uranium dioxide production tests have begun. Two environmental protection associations [Rubresus and Colere] are concerned about this, especially since the commissioning of the site has not been the subject of a public inquiry or an environmental impact study.
(La Dépêche du Midi May 31, 2022)
Production difficulties at MELOX MOX fuel fabrication plant necessitate construction of new depleted UO2 production facility at Malvési:
> View here
Orano's Malvési conversion plant obtains authorization to produce uranium dioxide (UO2):
In a decree issued on July 26, 2018, the prefect of Aude authorized Orano to operate a reduction plant to produce uranium dioxide (UO2) containing 300 t U per year at its Malvési conversion plant [this translates into 340.3 t UO2 per year].
> Download: Arrêté préfectoral nº DREAL-UD11-2018-037 , July 26, 2018 (806kB PDF - in French)
[There is no mention in this document of the isotopic composition of the uranium to be processed, such as depleted/natural/enriched. Most likely, the plant will process depleted uranium for use in MOX fuel element production at Marcoule.]
No Environmental Impact Statement needed for proposed uranium dioxide (UO2) production at site of Orano's Malvési conversion plant
On June 28, 2018, the prefect of the Occitana region decided that no Environmental Impact Statement is required for Orano's proposal to construct a plant for the production of 300 t uranium dioxide (UO2) per year at its Malvési site near Narbonne.
The purpose of the proposal is to "relocate on French territory the production of uranium dioxide (UO2) used in the manufacture of nuclear fuels, in order to have a sustainable and controlled supply after the shutdown of production (in 2021) at the Lingen site in Germany."
> Download: Décision DREAL Occitanie , June 28, 2018 (114kB PDF - in French)
(Philippe Coste, formerly Comurhex)
> see also: Orano Tricastin, General and Services
Aerial view: Google Maps
ICPE, INB No. 105 (recycled uranium)
(The plant converts uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) supplied from Orano's Malvési plant to uranium hexafluoride (UF6).)
> See also: decommissioning issues (INB 105)
Information about Comurhex plant (Nuclear Safety Authority - ASN, in French)
> See also: Plan de Prévention des Risques Technologiques (PPRT) AREVA NC, usine W, et COMURHEX
> See also: Refluorination of depleted uranium oxide at Comurhex Malvési and Pierrelatte plants, France
Spill of UF4 at Orano's Pierrelatte uranium conversion plant
On June 7, 2021, a leak of uranium powder occurred in the unloading hall of a tank of natural uranium in Orano's conversion installations at Pierrelatte.
The transport tanks used between the Orano sites at Malvési and Pierrelatte are equipped with vent plugs, which are closed at Malvési before shipment. As part of procedures related to the transport of radioactive substances, a check of the tanks is carried out before shipment. Upon receipt, another check is carried out on these tanks at the Pierrelatte site before unloading operations, which are carried out in a confined hall.
On 7 June, the teams at Pierrelatte did not notice, during the checks, that the chain holding the plug of the vent of a tank containing natural uranium in solid form had been partially inserted, during its closure at Malvési, between the lower edge of the plug and the edge of the opening, causing a leak. When the tank was pressurized for unloading, a dispersion of powder occurred, which triggered the alarm of the atmospheric monitoring beacon in the hall. However, the teams did not immediately suspend the unloading because this beacon had caused false alarms on previous occasions. Once the powder dispersion was identified, operations were suspended, the tank was put in a safe configuration and clean-up operations of the hall and the tank were initiated.
This event did not have any consequences for the installations, people or the environment. However, the management of the event on the site was subject to some deviations or delays, reflecting shortcomings in the safety culture. On the proposal of the operator, this event was therefore classified at level 1 on the INES scale.
(ASN June 14, 2021)
Two workers contaminated with uranium hexafluoride in accident at Orano's Pierrelatte uranium conversion plant
On October 22, during a maintenance operation on the Tricastin site, two employees of the Endel/Engie company, Orano's subcontractor, had an accident. While they were cutting a compressed air distribution circuit, a loss of seal between the compressed air circuit and the transfer of uranium material occurred, with a release of material. One of the two workers scratched his hand with his grinding tool. Both workers have been transferred to hospital.
Orano specifies that the workers had their protective equipment (respiratory protection mask, waterproof protective clothing) and that they resumed their activity outside the controlled area. The accident was declared to the nuclear safety authority with a proposal to classify this event at level 0 on the INES scale (out of 7).
For his part, Gilles Renault, president of the association Ma Zone contrôlée , believes that the seriousness of the accident is underrated. "The workers received UF6 (uranium hexafluoride, editor's note) on them, some of it got through their protective equipment. They were hit in the face and on the body. One of them returned home covered in food paper to sweat. The other had to have his wound cleaned."
Analyzes are underway to find out the doses of radioactivity that the workers could have received. Uranium hexafluoride is a radioactive material. It causes skin burns, serious eye damage and proven risk of serious damage to the respiratory tract according to the UN classification.
(Le Dauphiné Nov. 7, 2020)
ASN finds conditions at effluent treatment plant of Orano's Pierrelatte uranium conversion plant 'not satisfactory'
On Sep. 29, 2020, the Nuclear Safety Authority ASN conducted an unannounced inspection of the St 900 effluent treatment plant at the Pierrelatte uranium conversion plant site. The St 900 plant is to be replaced by Unit 68, which is currently under construction and should be operable in the third quarter of 2021.
This inspection followed in particular the significant event for the environment, declared at the request of ASN on September 21, 2020, and relating to an acid solution leak during an operation to unclog a rotary fabric filter at St 900.
"The conclusions of this inspection are not satisfactory. The inspectors observed dilapidated St 900 equipment, a configuration that has not changed and that involves practices poorly suited to current containment standards and an insufficient general level of cleanliness. In addition, there is a very tense general production situation leading to a reduction in risk control in the management of non-conformities or technical difficulties. Thus, the inspectors noted that the operator had not carried out any risk analysis prior to the operation to unclog the nitric acid filter at the origin of the significant event and had not accompanied its realization by any operational or specific monitoring document. The inspectors also noted that the condition of the facilities did not provide sufficient guarantees in terms of containment and retention of hazardous and radioactive substances used in the facility.
The operator will have to upgrade the St900 to make its process more reliable, as planned, but also to limit the risks of spillage and dispersion of hazardous substances and effluents. With a view to continuing to operate the St 900 beyond the stated deadlines, the operator will then have to carry out an overall compliance study of the St 900 and upgrade it accordingly. The inspectors also noted deviations in the processing of FIFA files ('fast action information sheet') aimed at informing and dealing with deviations from the installation benchmarks and shortcomings in the treatment of deviations in general." [emphasis added]
> Download: ASN Inspection Report INSSN-LYO-2020-1011, Oct. 12, 2020 (552kB PDF - in French)
ASN finds disposal cells for contaminated soil at Orano's Pierrelatte uranium conversion plant 'in unacceptable condition'
On July 2, 2020, the Nuclear Safety Authority ASN conducted an inspection of the disposal cells for contaminated soil at the Pierrelatte uranium conversion plant site.
"The inspection of July 2, 2020, focused on the two cells of soil excavated for the construction of Hydrofluoric Acid Storage Unit 61, built in 2009, initially planned for a
short period of storage. These cells contain soil with historical radiological pollution (natural and reprocessed uranium) and chemical pollution (in particular fluorides, mercury, and chromium). [...] This inspection was aimed in particular at assessing the demand for the operator to perpetuate these cells by improving their superior coverage.
The conclusions of this inspection are not satisfactory. Indeed, the inspectors noted that two polluted soil cells were in unacceptable condition and that the main regulatory requirements of the decision [2] concerning them were not complied with: top cover degraded and leaky, strong suspicion of leakage of the lower geomembranes, absence of regular maintenance and general surveillance, and lack of management of water collected by drains at the bottom of the cells. In addition, the operator was not able to provide any supporting evidence for the resistance of the geomembrane and its good implementation during the construction of works.
The operator must take corrective action as soon as possible. In view of the non-conformities identified during the inspection relating to the general poor condition of the cells and to the absence of operating and monitoring measures for these installations, ASN asked the operator to declare an event significant for the environment. Finally, the inspectors expressed the feeling that the licensee lacked transparency towards ASN regarding the condition of these storage cells." [emphasis added]
> Download: ASN Inspection Report INSSN-LYO-2020-0889, July 13, 2020 (189kB PDF - in French)
Orano reported 19 incidents at its Pierrelatte uranium conversion plant in 2019
Of the 19 incidents reported by Orano for its Pierrelatte uranium conversion plant in 2019, 13 were classified according to the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES), and six according to the European scale of industrial accidents (ARIA). Most of the INES-rated incidents were related to the temporary exceeding of release limits for various substances in the chimney of the fluorination workshop.
> Download: Rapport d'information du site Orano Tricastin,
Edition 2019 , Orano Cycle, June 2020 (3.8MB PDF - in French)
> Download: Supplément du rapport d'information 2019 , Orano Cycle, June 2020 (4.1MB PDF - in French)
ASN finds pollution prevention measures at Orano's Pierrelatte uranium conversion plant 'not satisfactory'
"The inspection of June 8 and 9, 2020 focused on the measures taken by the operator to prevent and manage pollution following spills of dangerous or radioactive substances. This inspection took place only at the facilities. The inspectors were interested in the methods of management of dangerous substances aimed at preventing spillage or pollution, in the management of storm water networks and the containment basin. They visited the storage areas 70 and 71 for hazardous substances, the St100E effluent treatment station, the lifting stations and the containment basin and several unloading and retention areas. They also carried out a simulation exercise of sulfuric acid spillage on the roadway, and the solicitation of the containment basin, without however requesting the intervention of the departmental fire and rescue service (SDIS) of the Drôme.
The conclusions of this inspection are not satisfactory. In fact, the inspectors noted many deviations and areas for improvement. In particular, they detected non-conformities on the retention of the sulfuric acid tank of the effluent treatment plant as well as on the fuel storage and unloading facilities of the new emergency boiler. Furthermore, although the operator has known for more than two years that part of its rainwater network is not intact, it has still not finalized the analysis of the situation or put in place compensatory measures. The inspectors also detected that the operator did not have an up-to-date stormwater network plan taking into account in particular the commissioning of the containment basin in June 2019. The operator will also have to take measures to better manage its retention and label packaging of materials and waste. Finally, it will have to specify the operating methods of the containment basin. As for the exercise, it was possible to identify difficulties, in particular due to a lack of information, encountered by the rescue team in responding to this scenario." [emphasis added]
> Download: ASN Inspection Report INSSN-LYO-2020-0399, June 18, 2020 (597kB PDF - in French)
Orano inaugurates Comurhex 2 ("Philippe Coste") conversion plant at Tricastin
On Monday Sep. 10, 2018, Orano inaugurates its new Comurhex 2 uranium conversion plant at the Tricastin site. The construction cost of Euro 1.15 billion was twice the initial estimate. The additional cost at the Malvési site, where the first stage of the conversion takes place, will be another EUR 150 million.
Comurhex 2 reduces the consumption of ammonia, nitric acid and water compared to the old plant shut down at the end of 2017.
The trials of Comurhex 2 started in the spring, but "the hour of truth will be the end of the year," said program director Jean-Luc Vincent, with the first flow of UF6 expected in November.
The ramp-up will be gradual: Orano aims for a production of 5,000 t in mid-2019, then to reach its maximum capacity of 15,000 t at the end of 2020.
(Les Echos Sep. 10, 2018)
On Dec. 20, 2018, Orano announced that the new Philippe Coste conversion plant has now been successfully commissioned.
The major equipment of the industrial process - the flame reactor - was commissioned on December 12, 2018.
The plant will reach its rated output of 15,000 tons in 2021, once some more new equipment has been added.
Uranium exposure might be risk factor for circulatory system diseases, study among former Areva conversion plant workers finds
> View here
Areva's Comurhex I conversion plant at Pierrelatte remains closed until improvements of flood protection completed
On Sep. 28, 2017, Areva announced that it is performing works to limit the impacts of a potential flooding of the site in view of the stability problems identified with a flood protection dike (see here). The nuclear safety authority ASN has demanded that the plant remains halted, until the works are completed. Areva expects to complete the works within one month.
On Oct. 23, 2017, nuclear safety authority ASN authorized the resumption of operations at the conversion plant.
Storage yard for 62,000 tonnes of uranium licensed at Areva Tricastin site
> View here
Violation of criticality rules at Areva's Pierrelatte conversion plant
On Feb. 17, 2017, Areva announced that two waste containers located in a storage area of the conversion plant were found to contain uranium enriched higher than the permitted 2.5%.
According to a Feb. 24, 2017, release of the Nuclear Safety Authority ASN, six containers holding up to 55% of uranium were found in an area, where only traces of uranium were allowed, and 2 containers holding less than 1% of uranium, but enriched to 20-25% U-235. ASN rated this incident Level 1 on the INES scale.
Deformed cylinder valve found at UF6 cylinder at Areva's Pierrelatte conversion plant site
During a check in a storage yard of cylinders holding natural uranium hexafluoride, an operator found that the fill valve of a cylinder showed a slight deformation, but no leak was found.
Areva determined that the valve was damaged during the cooling phase of the cylinder during which the UF6 crystallizes from gazeous to solid form. If the valve had actually failed during the cooling phase, when gazeous UF6 is still present, the impacts could have been severe.
ASN rated the event level 1 on the INES scale.
(ASN Oct. 14, 2016; Areva Oct. 6, 2016)
Heat exchanger leak leads to temporary exceeding of contaminant concentration limits in effluents of Areva's Pierrelatte uranium conversion plant
A leak in a heat exchanger used to cool a potassium solution required for the washing of process gases lead to the temporary exceeding of the limits for uranium concentration and pH in plant effluents. ASN rated the event Level 1 on the INES scale.
(ASN Oct. 10, 2016)
Hydrogen fluoride release at Areva's Pierrelatte conversion plant
On Feb. 23, 2016, a release of hydrogen fluoride (HF) occured inside the HF storge building at the flange of a recently changed valve.
(ASN Mar. 18, 2016)
Violation of criticality rules at Areva's Pierrelatte conversion plant
On Oct. 16, 2015, Areva declared a significant event at its Pierrelatte conversion plant, when the uranium-235 contents in two containers holding recycled uranium was found to slightly exceed the authorized limit. ASN rated the event Level 1 on the INES scale.
(ASN Oct. 26, 2015)
Nuclear Safety Authority issues licence for continued operation of Areva's existing Comurhex Pierrelatte conversion plant, as replacement by Comurhex 2 project is delayed
In its CODEP-LYO-2015-024792 decision of 30 June 2015, Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire (ASN) oversees the requirements by the continued operation of certain installations classified for the protection of the environment of the COMURHEX uranium plant conversion, located in the perimeter of the INB No. 105 on Areva's nuclear site of Tricastin.
The permanent cessation of activity of these installations had been prescribed by the prefectural decree of July 23, 2010 within five years at most, or the end of July, 2015.
The project to replace these facilities with new facilities COMURHEX 2 having been delayed, AREVA asked in 2014 ASN for a postponement of the closure of the old plant facilities COMURHEX 1 until the end of 2017.
Considering that the plant COMURHEX 1 facilities had not been subject to complementary safety assessments resulting from the accident of Fukushima experience feedback, ASN conditioned their continued operation beyond 2015 on an improvement of the control of nuisance and risks and the implementation work of strengthening the robustness of the facilities.
The analysis of the ASN and its technical support, the IRSN, has verified that the improvements proposed by AREVA are likely to reduce the risks and disadvantages of plant COMURHEX 1 facilities.
ASN has therefore set requirements in order to take note of AREVA's commitments and impose additional reinforcements deemed necessary after its technical instruction. ASN officially set the new date of cessation of plant facilities COMURHEX 1 to the end of 2017.
(Areva July 15, 2015)
> Download: Décision CODEP-LYO-2015-024792 du président de l'ASN du 30 juin 2015 , July 13, 2015 (ASN - in French)
Parliamentary commission doubts oversized capacity increase at Areva's Comurhex Pierrelatte conversion plant
On July 8, 2015, the financial commission of the French parliament released a report on Areva. The report in particular doubts the planned capacity increase of the Comurhex conversion plant from 15,000 to 21,000 t/a, while the current capacity of 8,000 to 9,000 t/a already by far exceeds the needs of domestic client EdF (3,000 to 4,000 t/a).
(Le Devoir July 7, 2015)
> Download financial commission report No. 2952 , July 15, 2015 (Assemblée Nationale - in French)
Areva fails to perform inspections of lifting lugs of 48Y transport cylinders for uranium hexafluoride
Since June, the international agreement on the transport of uranium hexafluoride in Type 48Y cylinders has been modified to include visual inspections of the cylinders' lifting hugs.
Areva announces that nine transports of empty cylinders have been conducted since end June without performing the newly prescribed inspections.
Areva proposes to rate the event level 1 on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES).
(Areva Aug. 25, 2014)
Faulty welds detected at lifting lugs of a batch of 48Y transport cylinders for uranium hexafluoride
On 18 December 2013, AREVA NC reported to the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) the discovery of a detached lifting lug on a 48Y cylinder in a storage yard at Pierrelatte.
Following this discovery, AREVA NC has suspended shipments on public roads as well as handling operations using lifting lugs for 48Y cylinders of the same manufacturing batch. AREVA NC has also checked the weld quality of a sample of 48Y cylinders: first results of these tests suggest that a significant portion of that 48Y cylinder batch have defects in the welds of the lifting lugs. A 48Y cylinder from another batch but the same manufacturer (Terrenoire) also has such defects. To date, however, the checks have not identified similar defects for 48Y cylinders produced by other manufacturers.
Given these initial results and pending further details, ASN asked the nuclear operators holding 48Y cylinders to restrict the use of 48Y cylinders manufactured by Terrenoire and for which the quality of the welds at the lifting lugs was not verified. These restrictions include a ban on the shipping of such cylinders on public roads and on handling operations using the lifting lugs.
(ASN Feb. 25, 2014)
Public comment invited on risk prevention plan for Areva's Comurhex Pierrelatte conversion plant and Usine W depleted uranium deconversion plant
Submit comments by April 11, 2014.
> View announcement and download related documents (in French)
Uranium hexafluoride cylinder overfilled at Comurhex Pierrelatte conversion plant
On July 26, 2012, Areva announced that in April an uranium hexafluoride cylinder had been overfilled at the Comurhex Pierrelatte conversion plant. After a transport within the plant, the cylinder was found to exceed the weight standard set up by the company for that purpose, but was still below the standard set by the authorities. The event was rated level 1 on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES).
Residual plutonium from former processing of recycled uranium still circulating in and between Comurhex conversion plants
> See here
Uranium hexafluoride cylinders mixed up at Comurhex Pierrelatte conversion plant
On April 29, 2012, a mixup of identification numbers led to the use of the wrong UF6 cylinder for a recurring test at the Comurhex conversion plant in Pierrelatte. The bar code reader meant to prevent such mixup was out of service at the time, and the double checking of the identification numbers prescribed in this case had not taken place. The event had no immediate impacts. The event was rated level 1 on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES).
(ASN May 15, 2012)
Areva announces suspension of capacity increase at Malvési and Pierrelatte uranium conversion plants
> View here
The dose rate at the boundary of Areva's Pierrelatte conversion plant exceeds the 1 mSv per rolling 12 months standard for continuous occupancy at two locations. This became apparent as Areva is now using more sensitive films in the dosimeters placed at the site perimeter. As there is nobody living at the site perimeter, no residents were exposed to excess radiation doses. ASN rated the event level 1 on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES), as Areva failed to adequately report the event for several months.
(ASN Oct. 20, 2011)
[BTW, in its annual reports "Rapport d'information sur la sûreté nucléaire et la radioprotection du site AREVA Tricastin", Areva does not report the external radiation doses at the site boundary at all.]
Temporary shut down of Areva's Malvési and Pierrelatte uranium conversion plants for drop in demand after Fukushima disaster
> View here
Release of fluorine and nitrogen at Comurhex Pierrelatte conversion plant
On May 10, 2010, a gaseous release of fluorine and nitrogen occured at a non-nuclear section of the Comurhex Pierrelatte facility. The release caused no injuries nor impacts on the exterior of the site.
(Areva May 20, 2010)
Nuclear Safety Authority condemns poor management of Areva/Comurhex Pierrelatte uranium conversion plant
"[...] In view of this examination, the inspectors consider that the rigour of exploitation and the conformity of the INB No. 105 appears very insufficient in comparison with the regulation. In spite of a low risk presented by the installations, the management of those is regarded as unsatisfactory. The reference frame of safety of the INB No. 105 does not correspond at the real state of the installations. In addition, the management of the modifications and consignments is not based on a formalized reference frame. Periodicities of certain controls periodicals are not respected and others are not carried out. Lastly, certain wastes stored in area No. 61 do not present a satisfying containment and the conditions of storage do not respect the commitments made by the owner to limit the consequences of possible flooding. Three notable reports were raised at the end of this inspection. [...]" (ASN Nov. 27, 2009, emphasis added)
> Download ASN Lettre de suite d'inspection, Usine de préparation d'hexaflorure d'uranium - COMURHEX, Inspection du : 18/11/2009, Nov. 27, 2009 (PDF - in French)
Uranium concentration in groundwater near Pierrelatte conversion plant exceeds WHO drinking water guidance
In a report released Sep. 24, 2008, Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN) discloses that groundwater south of the Pierrelatte conversion plant contains uranium concentrations in excess of WHO's drinking water guidance value of 15 micrograms per litre. Due to the proximity of various other nuclear facilities at the Tricastin site, the origin of these values remains to be determined.
> Download Etat de la surveillance environnementale et bilan du marquage des nappes phréatiques et des cours d’eau autour des sites nucléaires et des entreposages anciens de déchets radioactifs, 15 septembre 2008 (3.1MB PDF - in French)
Uranium leak in sewage system of Comurhex Pierrelatte conversion plant
On Aug. 22, 2008, Areva reported a minor leak in the sewage system of the Comurhex Pierrelatte conversion plant. The amount of uranium escaped is believed to be on the order of 250 grams.
Areva presents study on health risks for residents from operation of nuclear facilities at the Tricastin site
> View here
Areva increases capacity at Comurhex Pierrelatte conversion plant
On May 21, 2007, Areva announced that it is to spend EUR 370 million to build new facilities at its Comurhex Pierrelatte conversion plant. First industrial production is scheduled for 2012, based on 15,000 metric tons of uranium per year. This figure may be increased to 21,000 tons to meet market requirements.
Uranium spill at Comurhex Pierrelatte conversion plant
On December 3, 2003, about 150 grams of uranium were inadvertently released into the rainwater collection system of the Comurhex Pierrelatte plant.
> View ASN release, Jan. 28, 2004 (in French)
ASN cites Comurhex on deficiencies at Pierrelatte conversion plant
On Oct. 29, 2003, the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) issued a citation to Comurhex on deficiencies regarding fire prevention at its Pierrelatte uranium conversion plant.
> View ASN release Oct. 29, 2003 (in French)
> Download ASN citation Oct. 29, 2003 (PDF - in French)
Pierrelatte uranium conversion plant flooded
During the night from 19 to 20 October, 2001, a water leakage flooded the Comurhex uranium conversion plant at Pierrelatte. The plant was not in operation at that time. The water became contaminated with traces of residual uranium from the floor and the walls of the facility. A part (approximately 200 cubic meters) of the contaminated water flowed into the surroundings of the building. The maximum uranium concentration found in the water was 2 milligrams per litre. The event was rated Level 1 of the INES scale. (ASN 31 Oct 2001)
A total of 100,000 casks containing low-level radioactive waste from the Comurhex uranium conversion plant at Pierrelatte in Southern France have been dumped in a domestic waste deposit in the nearby community of Solérieux (Drôme dept.). In the Pierrelatte plant, Comurhex, a COGEMA subsidiary, is converting UF4 to UF6 for later enrichment in the Eurodif plant. The wastes consist of calcium fluorine, contaminated with uranium. The amount of wastes dumped was 1000 tonnes per year.
After the situation had been made public by MP Michèle Rivasi, Comurhex decided to stop dumping at Solérieux and to keep the wastes on site at Pierrelatte for intermediate storage, until a proposed national low-level waste facility will be operable in 2002.
Sources: Le Monde 22 Jul 1999, Nuclear Fuel 26 July 1999, dpa 3 Aug 1999
> View map (ANDRA)
Incidents at Comurhex Pierrelatte conversion plant
Comurhex Pierrelatte events (ASN - in French)
INB No. 155
Information about TU5 plant (Nuclear Safety Authority - ASN, in French)
> see also: Orano Tricastin, General and Services
Vial holding sample of reprocessed uranium lost at Orano Pierrelatte TU5 conversion facility
The company Orano Chimie Enrichissement declared on December 11, 2023 to the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) a significant safety event relating to the presence of a vial containing uranium in a bag of compactable waste.
The TU5 installation, operated by Orano Chimie Enrichissement on the Pierrelatte site, constitutes basic nuclear installation (INB) no. 155 which transforms uranyl nitrate from spent fuel reprocessing operations into U3O8 in the form of a chemically stable powder. Once manufactured, each batch of U3O8 is sampled and packaged in a vial. To monitor manufacturing quality, the operator then creates an average sample by mixing a fraction of each of the forty samples already made.
On November 23, 2023, during the creation of an average sample, the TU5 operations teams identified the absence of a sample. Research was carried out on the installation but the safety services and those of the material accounting of the Orano platform of Tricastin were only informed of this discrepancy on November 30. The specific search procedure was then initiated.
In this context, the teams from the Trident installation (INB 138), which is responsible for conditioning nuclear waste for the entire platform, found the bottle in question on December 1 in a bag of compactable waste coming from the TU5 workshop. The bottle remained closed and the integrity and surface contamination checks on the bag provided for by all of the platform's waste management procedures had been respected. Consequently, this event had no consequences on people or the environment. However, U3O8 is not intended to be disposed of as waste. In addition, the one-week delay between the identification of the discrepancy and the triggering of the research procedure at the platform level appeared too long compared to the deadlines provided for by the operator's internal framework.
Taking into account the non-compliance with the rules relating to waste and the delay in processing the deviation, the incident was classified at level 1 of the INES scale (international scale of nuclear events graduated from 0 to 7 in ascending order of gravity).
(ASN Dec. 13, 2023)
ASN finds operational rigor "not satisfactory" at Orano's TU5 uranyl nitrate conversion plant and Usine W depleted uranium deconversion plant
The unannounced inspection of 8 September on the TU5 workshop (INB no. 155) and the Usine W (ICPE) focused on the rigor of the operating rounds. [...]
It emerges from this inspection that the operational rigor observed in the context of rounds is not satisfactory in terms of cleanliness and the management of certain operations (skip of zone, waste not evacuated) in particular on rounds "technical stops" that the inspectors were able to follow. However, the roundsmen observed had a good command of the installations and the consignments for the first operations to be carried out during the technical shutdown were correctly carried out. [...]
After the change of shift supervisors, the inspectors took part in the technical stoppage on September 8 at the start of the afternoon.
The inspectors, during this round, noted that the cleanliness of the installation on the inspected premises as well as the rigor of operation was not satisfactory:
- Unidentified nuclear waste not evacuated in the non-uranium effluent room, in the H2O2 room,
- Large quantities of soiled rags on the floor in the H2O2 room,
- Nuclear samples stored in a cabinet without any identification for several years in the HNO3 room,
- Bucket filled with liquid with a garden hose connected to an unidentified pipe without the operator being able to explain the function of this pipe,
- Vinyl handle several meters long on a valve in the unidentified HNO3 zone descending into a retention.
During the rounds carried out, the inspectors noted the lack of provision of equipment to control people entering the truck hall, while there is a transition at this location between a nuclear waste zone (room H2O2) and a conventional waste area (truck hall). [emphasis added]
(Inspection no INSSN-LYO-2022-0370 , Sep. 20, 2022 - PDF in French)
Revision of effluent standards for TU5 uranyl nitrate conversion plant
ASN invites comment on proposed revision of effluent standards for TU5 uranyl nitrate conversion plant:
"Concerning gaseous discharges, the existing discharge limit values are significantly reduced and supplemented. For certain parameters not regulated until now, a concentration limit has been added. The associated monitoring is adapted accordingly. [...]
With regard to liquid discharges, the discharge limit values have also been revised significantly downwards and are in line with the actual discharges from the installation. Chemical parameters have been added, based on article 32 of the order of February 2, 1998. The associated monitoring is adapted accordingly. [...]"
Submit comments by July 1, 2022.
> View related documents (ASN - in French)
ASN issues revision of effluent standards for TU5 uranyl nitrate conversion plant:
On Aug. 10, 2023, ASN released the decisions taken on May 11, 2023.
> Download: Décision nº 2023-DC-0757 de l'Autorité de sûreté nucléaire du 11 mai 2023 fixant les valeurs limites de rejet dans l'environnement de l'installation nucléaire de base nº 155, dénommée TU5, située à Pierrelatte (PDF - in French)
> Download: Décision nº 2023-DC-0758 de l'Autorité de sûreté nucléaire du 11 mai 2023 fixant les prescriptions relatives aux prélèvements et ŕ la consommation d'eau, aux transferts et rejets d'effluents et à la surveillance de l'environnement de l'installation nucléaire de base nº 155, dénommée TU5, située à Pierrelatte (PDF - in French)
Greenpeace blocks railway track used for transport of reprocessed uranium from France to Russia
Six Greenpeace activists blocked a railroad in southern France on Tuesday (Nov. 16), saying they were seeking to prevent loads of reprocessed uranium from getting exported to Russia.
The tracks the activists stood on are located in the commune of Pierrelatte just outside an Orano plant where radioactive material is processed and stored.
Orano, a multinational company headquartered in France, said Russian state nuclear firm Rosatom has a contract to buy 1,150 tons of reprocessed uranium that it plans to convert into nuclear fuel at its Seversk plant, in Siberia, and ultimately use in reactors to produce energy.
The material is set to be sent in several shipments, Orano said.
(AP Nov. 16, 2021)
Greenpeace activists sentenced for blocking railway track used for transport of reprocessed uranium from France to Russia:
Seven Greenpeace activists were sentenced this Friday, February 24, by the Valence court for having blocked access to the Orano Tricastin nuclear site (Drôme). Fines range from 500 to 800 euros. At the hearing, on January 13, between 500 and 1000 euros in fines were required.
The court also ordered the anti-nuclear NGO to pay Orano a symbolic euro in damages.
The activists had chained themselves to a truck, November 16, 2021, in front of the entrance to the Orano site in Saint-Paul-Trois-Châteaux to denounce the sending of recycled uranium to Russia.
(Le Dauphiné Libéré Feb. 24, 2023)
ASN approves continued operation of TU5 uranyl nitrate conversion plant
On Oct. 14, 2021, the Nuclear Safety Authority ASN concluded its periodic review of INB 155 by approving the continued operation of the TU5 uranyl nitrate conversion plant and the associated P18 storage building. The plant processes uranyl nitrate (recovered from spent nuclear fuel at the La Hague reprocessing plant) into the form of U3O8, which is then stored in the P18 building.
> View: ASN information note , Oct. 14, 2021 (in French)
> Download: Dossier de réexamen périodique de l'installation nucléaire de base (INB) nº 155, dénommée installation TU5 et exploitée par Orano Chimie-Enrichissement sur la commune de Pierrelatte (Drôme) , ASN Oct. 2021 (1MB PDF - in French)
Violations regarding waste management revealed at Orano's Usine W depleted uranium deconversion plant and TU5 uranyl nitrate conversion plant
> View here
Justice bars Greenpeace from approaching Orano's uranium transports
The Paris court on Friday (July 19) ordered Greenpeace France to "to not approach within 250 meters" nuclear waste convoys from two Orano subsidiaries (formerly Areva) and to "impede or hinder in any way the loading or unloading operations" of radioactive material.
This decision, relayed in a statement by the environmental organization, runs until September 25, when the public debate on the management of radioactive materials in France ends.
On June 12, in particular, activists of Greenpeace France have repainted in fluorescent orange, with the mention "radioactive", five vats of a train carrying reprocessed uranium Vierzon station (Cher). The uranium came from the Orano factory in La Hague, destined for the Pierrelatte plant (Drôme).
(Reuters July 19, 2019)
Greenpeace "repaints" train carrying reprocessed uranyl nitrate from La Hague to Pierrelatte
Activists of Greenpeace carried out, Wednesday (June 12) afternoon, in Vierzon station (Cher), a symbolic operation. They repainted part of a train supposed to transport "radioactive" waste between two sites of the Orano nuclear group.
According to the prefecture of Cher, the train left Wednesday morning from Valognes (Manche) and going to Pierrelatte (Drôme), carrying uranyl nitrate, a derivative of uranium. It was the liaison between two sites of the Orano nuclear group (formerly Areva). The convoy resumed its course normally after its scheduled stop in Vierzon station. The identities of the five activists present were noted.
"While a radioactive convoy was passing through Vierzon station, several activists painted two of its vats in orange and affixed a radioactive logo," Greenpeace said in a statement. "Through this action, we denounce the frequency of radioactive convoys that crisscross France every day, including in densely populated urban areas, and the lack of transparency with regard to populations," says the environmental organization.
(Le Parisien June 13, 2019)
ASN identifies numerous violations regarding waste management at Orano's TU5 uranyl nitrate conversion plant
On 6 March 2018, the Nuclear Safety Authority ASN carried out an unannounced inspection on the subject of waste management at Orano's Usine W and TU5 uranyl nitrate conversion facilities, which were not operating at the time.
This inspection revealed numerous violations in the regulation and the implementation of the waste management of the facility.
ASN rated the event Level 1 of the INES scale.
(ASN Mar. 16, 2018)
Study among French nuclear workers finds increased mortality risk from exposure to reprocessed uranium
> View here
Spill of uranyl nitrate at Areva's Tricastin site
On Dec. 9, 2014, Areva announced that a spill of uranyl nitrate was detected in its denitrification plant at the Tricastin site. The plant converts uranyl nitrate, as obtained from reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, to uranium oxide. The operations at the plant were halted immediately.
The company proposed to rate the event Level 1 on the INES scale.
On Dec. 15, 2014, Areva further announced that the spill implied the release of 3.5 m3 of uranyl nitrate to the retention system designed for this purpose. A small fraction of the release spilled onto the floor of the nearby workshop and another workshop located on a lower level. The spill was caused from the failure of a flange in a circuit containing uranyl nitrate.
Criticality rules violated at TU5 conversion facility
On June 30, 2006, Areva notified the Nuclear Safety Authority ASN that concentrations of uranium-235 in excess of the licensed 1% had been found in several drums. On July 18, 2006, ASN ordered Areva to take urgent measures to assure the licensed level in all drums.
(ASN July 18, 2006)
Explosion in TU5 conversion facility
On March 16, 2002, a 200-litre tank of low-level liquid radioactive waste exploded at Cogéma's Pierrelatte TU5 conversion facility. An investigation done by the Nuclear Safety Authority ASN revealed two handling errors which had led to the mixing of chemically incompatible liquids in the tank. The explosion caused no injuries and no releases to the environment. The event was classified level 1 on the INES scale.
(ASN April 10, 2002)
The plant processes recycled uranium from the La Hague reprocessing plant from the chemical form of UO2(NO3)2 (uranyl nitrate) into U3O8.
INB No. 168
> see also: Orano Tricastin, General and Services
Orano plans higher enrichment assays at Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant
François Lurin, senior executive vice president of Orano's Chemistry-Enrichment Business Unit, set out the French fuel cycle company's enrichment plans in a video interview released to coincide with World Nuclear Symposium 2023. [...]
Customers have also approached Orano about supplying higher enrichment assays, Lurin said. Known as LEU+, this material is enriched to 5-8% uranium-235. "The first step is going from 5 to 6%," he said. "We have initiated the regulatory process to obtain approval to do this. We should be able to provide higher enrichment essays up to 6% by 2025."
Increasing assays from 6 to 8% will require further investment in the GB-II plant, which Lurin said the company will launch once it obtains "firm commitments" from customers. The regulatory process will take up to three years, he added.
Orano "should be able" to provide the various forms of enriched uranium to supply the different small modular reactor and advanced reactor technologies that are being developed, Lurin said. The company can produce the high-assay low-enriched uranium - also known as HALEU - that these reactors will need either by enrichment at its existing facilities, or by deconversion of uranium hexafluoride.
(WNN Sep. 11, 2023)
Capacity increase from 7.5 to 11 million SWU/a at Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant obtains building permit:
On Monday June 17, the Prefect of Drôme signed the building permit for the extension of the Georges Besse 2 uranium enrichment plant located on the Orano Tricastin site (Drôme and Vaucluse).
(Orano June 25, 2024)
Public inquiry into Orano's proposal for capacity increase from 7.5 to 11 million SWU/a at Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant:
The planned modification should make it possible to commission an extension to the North unit of the Georges Besse II factory located on the Tricastin site in order to increase its nominal production capacity from 7.5 to 10.4 million SWU/a with a maximum production capacity of 11 million SWU/a. This increase requires the construction of an extension to the existing building with the addition of 4 modules to the north of the factory for which a building permit application has been requested.
This public inquiry will take place from Friday March 29, 2024 to Tuesday April 30, 2024 inclusive.
> Access Inquiry documents
Orano's Board of Directors approves capacity extension of Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant:
The Board of Directors of Orano, at its meeting held today on October 19, 2023, has approved the investment in the project to extend the production capacity of the Georges Besse 2 uranium enrichment plant on the Tricastin site (Drôme et Vaucluse). With a forecast investment amount of 1.7 billion euros, this plan will enable Orano to increase its production capacities by more than 30%, corresponding to 2.5 million SWUs.
The project consists of building a further four modules identical to the fourteen existing modules with the same recognized, tried-and-tested technology and with a reduced environmental footprint.
(Orano Oct. 19, 2023)
Proposed expansion of Orano's Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant does not include modules for enrichment of reprocessed uranium:
[The existing Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant] consists of two distinct modular enrichment units, called North and South units, and a support workshop called RECII.
- the North unit of Georges Besse 2 (GB2-Nord) is intended for the enrichment of uranium (uranium hexafluoride UF6) and currently comprises 4 modules allowing the enrichment of natural uranium only and 2 mixed modules allowing the enrichment, either of natural uranium, or of uranium resulting from the treatment/recycling of spent fuels (called "URT module"). [...]
Today, the enrichment of the URT (reprocessed uranium) is not considered as an alternative to the project insofar as two existing modules on the northern unit can be used. This capacity would be sufficient for the recycled fuel needs of the French reactor fleet. To date, Orano has no order to enrich the URT of its electricity producer customers. Based on this assumption, this project does not take into account any new URT module.
> Download: Projet d'extension de l'usine d'enrichissement d'uranium Georges Besse 2, Dossier de la concertation , Orano Jan. 2023 (6.4MB PDF - in French)
Public consultation on Orano's proposal for capacity increase from 7.5 to 11 million SWU/a at Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant:
The project for a new enrichment plant, called Georges Besse II, was the subject of a public debate in 2004. This debate had already made it possible to discuss the possibility of increasing the plant's capacities up to at 11 million SWU/year, the threshold targeted today. The CNDP [Commission nationale du débat public] decided to relaunch a prior consultation because substantial changes in the circumstances justifying the plan to extend the plant's capacities have occurred since the first public debate, which ended in 2004.
The consultation starts on Feb. 1, 2023.
Submit comments by April 9, 2023.
> Debat public: Usine d'enrichissement d'uranium Georges BESSE II (CNDP - in French)
> Projet Extension GB2: Les documents de la concertation (Orano - in French)
> See also: Public Debate on Eurodif centrifuge enrichment plant project (2004)
Orano considers capacity increase from 7.5 to 11 million SWU/a for Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant:
On Oct. 5, 2022, the Commission Nationale du Débat Public made a decision to relaunch the consultation on Orano's Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant project for a capacity increase from 7.5 to 11 million SWU/a, at costs of EUR 1.3 billion.
In view of Ukraine war, Orano considers expansion project for its Pierrelatte enrichment plant:
Due to the geopolitical crisis that is shaking Eastern Europe and Russian supply uncertainties, the uranium enrichment market is facing strong demand. Asked by its customers, Orano is considering the expansion project for its enrichment plant in Pierrelatte.
(Le Dauphiné Libéré June 22, 2022)
Violation of criticality rules at Orano's Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant
On November 30, during an internal check after a maintenance operation on the Georges Besse II plant, the operator noted a display defect in a material storage room and the presence of 6 vacuum cleaner barrels. instead of 5 as provided for in the standard.
These vacuum drums contain small amounts of uranium material, which are recovered following maintenance operations.
(Orano Dec. 3, 2020)
Anomaly with cooling of uranium hexafluoride cylinders at Orano's Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant
The enrichment company of Tricastin, a subsidiary of Orano Cycle, declared on 19 October 2018 to ASN a significant event relating to the non-respect of a security requirement relating to the prohibition to move in its enrichment plant a container holding not fully solidified uranium hexafluoride (UF6).
In this plant, UF6 is enriched in isotope 235 by a centrifugation process. For the purposes of the industrial process, the UF6 of the containers is liquefied by heating in an autoclave before sampling. The containers must then be cooled for a period of time sufficient to ensure complete solidification of the UF6 before leaving the autoclave, according to a requirement of the safety reference system of the installation. Indeed, in the event of damage to a container, solidified UF6 presents less risk for employees and the environment.
By analyzing the evolution profile of the internal pressure of the last sampled containers, the operator found, on 17 October 2018, that it was unable to guarantee the complete solidification of UF6 at the end of the time he has set for cooling the containers. Thus containers could be removed from the autoclaves without complete solidification of the UF6.
As there was no event affecting the tightness of the displaced UF6 containers, this difference did not result in any impact on the facility, personnel or environment.
Given the non-compliance with a security requirement that affected several UF6 containers, the incident was rated at level 1 of the INES (International Nuclear Event Scale) scale of 8.
(ASN Oct. 29, 2018)
Areva's Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant reaches full capacity
The Areva Georges Besse II enrichment plant successfully reached its full production capacity of 7.5 million SWUs in 2016, on schedule as planned.
(Areva Jan. 18, 2017)
Violation of criticality rules at Areva's Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant
On Oct. 17, 2016, a detector for condensation inside an autoclave used for sampling at Areva's Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant was found to be inoperable. The detector is meant to confirm the absence of water which might compromise criticality safety in case of a leak of uranium hexafluoride inside the autoclave.
The nuclear safety authority ASN has classified this event at level 1 on the INES scale.
(ASN Jan. 16, 2017)
On Jan. 4, 2017, the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) held an unannounced inspection at the site.
"The inspection findings confirmed the existence of a safety culture failure: operation of the autoclave was continued for two weeks after the discovery of the unavailability of the water detection probe, subject to the implementation of a compensatory measure set up by the local team without any formality. In addition, the operator has detected a wiring error in the affected probe, but he was all the less able to explain the origin that he holds an FEE [test execution sheets] which would have shown a good functioning of the water detection (probe, electrical transmission and display) when it is put into service. In addition, the traces of the temperature recordings inside the autoclaves show anomalies which will need to be analyzed. In addition, when the unavailability of a water detection probe does not set off an alarm, the operator must propose a robust measure to ensure that an autoclave cannot be put into operation if it contains water. At the end of the inspection, ASN has requested the reclassification of the significant event causing the inspection to level 1 of the scale of the International Nuclear Events Institute (INES) which has 8. [...]" (ASN Jan. 25, 2017) [emphasis added]
Hexafluoride cylinders without valve protection cover found at Areva's Georges Besse II enrichment plant
On July 1, 2016, four uranium hexafluoride containers in a storage yard were found to have no valve protection covers.
The nuclear safety authority ASN has classified this event at level 1 on the INES scale.
(Areva July 18, 2016 / ASN July 26, 2016)
Violation of criticality rules at Areva's Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant
On March 2, 2016, a violation of critiality rules occured with the transport of nuclear material within the facility.
The nuclear safety authority ASN has classified this event at level 1 on the INES scale.
(Areva Mar. 29, 2016 / ASN Apr. 1, 2016)
Deformed cylinder valve found at UF6 cylinder at Areva Tricastin site
During testing prior to weighing a cylinder holding enriched uranium hexafluoride in the Reconditioning, Sampling and Control workshop (RECII) to obtain a sample of the substance, an operator found that the cylinder filling valve was distorted.
Investigations immediately confirmed the absence of a leak at the cylinder.
However, it was immediately transferred to the workshop's maintenance station to replace the affected valve.
The cause of the deformation and the time when it occured remain unknown.
The nuclear safety authority ASN has classified this event at level 1 on the INES scale.
(Areva Mar. 7, 2016 / ASN Mar. 10, 2016)
Violation of criticality rules at Areva's Tricastin site
On Dec. 10, 2015, Areva announced that the mass of slightly enriched uranium held in a storage area at the AREVA Tricastin site exceeded the permitted 180 kg.
Areva proposes to rate the event Level 1 on the INES scale.
(Areva Dec. 10, 2015)
Small release of uranium hexafluoride from a cylinder valve at Areva's Tricastin site
On Nov. 19, 2015, an operator has identified a slight release of fumes from the valve of a cylinder holding uranium hexafluoride of natural uranium isotopic composition stored in a yard at the AREVA Tricastin site.
Areva proposes to rate the event Level 1 on the INES scale.
(Areva Nov. 19, 2015)
Parliamentary commission doubts profitability of Areva's Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant project
On July 8, 2015, the financial commission of the French parliament released a report on Areva. The report in particular doubts the profitability of the Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant project, in view of the decline of the SWU market price by 30% between 2009 and 2013, while the cost for the plant increased by 43% from EUR 2.8 billion to EUR 4 billion between 2006 and 2013.
(Le Devoir July 7, 2015)
> Download financial commission report No. 2952 , July 15, 2015 (Assemblée Nationale - in French)
ASN finds pollution prevention at Areva's Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant 'not satisfactory'
On Dec. 16, 2014, the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) held an inspection of Areva's Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant.
"The conclusions of the inspection are not satisfactory. Indeed, the inspectors noted failures or inadequacies concerning the various aspects of the management of refrigeration units discussed during the inspection: commissioning of equipment with a fluoride refrigerant leak, undefined requirements and methods of use of leak detection systems, missing certificate of competence of an operator carrying out periodic leakage checks, anomalies concerning the performance of periodic checks, insufficient traceability of evidence of different interventions carried out on each piece of equipment. After chronic leaks having been detected on certain refrigeration units since their installation, the operator has since 2012 realized technical improvements aimed at restoring a normal operating situation of these groups. While the operation and maintenance of the refrigeration units at the George Besse II plant are subcontracted to specialized companies, the operator must remain involved in the reception, maintenance and the operation of this equipment." (ASN Jan. 7, 2015) [emphasis added]
Violation of criticality rules at Areva's Tricastin site
A small sample of enriched uranium slightly exceeded the allowable 5% enrichment margin during an internal transport from the production site to a laboratory.
Areva proposes to rate the event Level 1 on the INES scale.
(Areva Dec. 10, 2014)
The Nuclear Safety Authority ASN confirmed this rating on Dec. 17, 2014.
Flawed UF6 cylinder tests at Areva's Tricastin site
The tightness of empty UF6 cylinders at Areva's Tricastin site has been tested with insufficient pressure.
Areva proposes to rate the event Level 1 on the INES scale.
(Areva Oct. 24, 2014)
Violation of criticality rules at Areva's Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant
During maintenance works in the Société d'Enrichissement du Tricastin (SET), a default calibration was found on a weighing equipment used to control the absence of matter in pumps after use [to prevent a criticality by uncontrolled accumulation of enriched uranium].
Installed at the end of the enrichment process these pumps transfer uranium to the storage containers.
Areva proposes to rate the event Level 1 on the INES scale.
(Areva May 21, 2013; ASN May 25, 2013)
Violation of criticality rules at Areva's Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant
Due to a miscalibration of minimum flow stop valves, the withdrawal rate of enriched uranium hexafluoride from the centrifuges could have become too low, increasing the assay beyond critiality safety margins.
The event was rated Level 1 on the INES scale.
(ASN Apr. 8, 2013)
Areva launches commercial production of Georges Besse II North centrifuge uranium enrichment plant
On March 29, 2013, Areva celebrated the commercial launch of the Georges Besse II North uranium enrichment plant at the Tricastin site.
The North plant enters into service two years after the South plant in accordance with the project schedule.
Georges Besse II is being ramped-up gradually to have an enrichment capacity of 7.5 million SWU per year by 2016.
(Areva Mar. 29, 2013)
Areva suspends capacity increase at Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant
On Dec. 13, 2011, Areva announced the suspension of the capacity increase at the Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant at Tricastin.
(Le Monde Dec. 13, 2011)
Areva offers India stake in Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant
Global nuclear power major Areva is open to giving a minority stake in its uranium enrichment plant to Nuclear Power Corporation of India (NPCIL). Though a formal offer has not yet been made, a senior Areva executive said the two companies have held informal discussions on the proposal.
(Business Standard Dec. 18, 2010)
Georges Besse II enrichment plant inaugurated
The Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant was inaugurated on Dec. 14, 2010.
The plant's production capacity will now be increased by adding further modules. Full capacity is expected in 2016, two years ahead of schedule. It will have a production capacity of 7.5 million SWU (Separative Work Units), which could be increased to 11 million SWU.
(Areva Dec. 14, 2010)
Further Japanese companies acquire equity stake in Areva's Georges Besse II enrichment plant project
Tohoku Electric Power and Kyushu Electric Power will use the Japan France Enrichment Investing Company to acquire 2% of the outstanding shares in Société d'Enrichissement du Tricastin (SET) Holding. This means that the Japan France Enrichment Investing Company will come to hold 4.5% of SET Holding outstanding shares.
The Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. and Sojitz Corporation previously announced on March 30, 2009 their official participation in a new uranium enrichment plant project advanced by AREVA NC of France. Under that plan, the companies worked through Kansai Sojitz Enrichment Investing (a joint venture formed with an equity breakdown of 80% by Kansai Electric and 20% by Sojitz) to acquire 2.5% of the outstanding shares of SET Holdings (a subsidiary of AREVA NC), with that deal completed on June 30, 2009.
(Asahi Nov. 4, 2010)
First cascade of Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant starts operation
On Dec. 9, 2009, Areva announced that it has started the operation of the first cascade of the Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant project.
Areva's Georges-Besse II uranium enrichment plant will dispose of section to enrich recycled uranium
According to a speaker of Electricité de France (EDF), the Georges-Besse II centrifuge uranium enrichment plant, currently under construction and to be completed by 2012, will provide the capability to enrich recycled uranium recovered from spent fuel.
(Le Monde Oct. 12, 2009)
Areva open to Georges-Besse II uranium enrichment plant investors - report
French nuclear group Areva is ready to welcome new investors in the capital of its Georges-Besse II (GB II) uranium enrichment plant, a senior manager told French newspaper Les Echos.
"We would be glad if Italy and Spain joined us, and we could also look elsewhere," said Francois-Xavier Rouxel, executive vice-president of Areva's enrichment business.
(Reuters July 21, 2009)
Korean utility acquires equity stake in Areva's Georges Besse II enrichment plant project
On June 15, 2009, Areva announced that it has signed an agreement with Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Co. Ltd. (KHNP) under which the South Korean utility is to take a 2.5% stake in the Société d'Enrichissement du Tricastin (SET) holding which operates the Georges Besse II enrichment plant. KHNP is a subsidiary of Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), a wholly government-owned corporation.
First centrifuge cascade of Georges Besse II uranium enrichment plant inaugurated
On May 18, 2009, the first centrifuge cascade of the Georges Besse II uranium enrichment plant was inaugurated, where production is set to commence this year.
(Areva)
Japanese companies acquire equity stake in AREVA's Georges Besse II enrichment plant project
On March 30, 2009, Areva announced that the Japanese corporations Kansai and Sojitz have signed an agreement with AREVA under which they will acquire a 2.5% share in the holding company of Société d'Enrichissement du Tricastin (SET), the operator of the Georges Besse II enrichment plant.
Areva accelerates domestic centrifuge enrichment plant project
Areva has made a decision to launch the construction of a second unit of the Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant project within a few weeks, rather than in 2012, as previously planned. The unit will have a capacity of 3.2 million SWU; the completion is now foreseen for 2016, rather than 2018.
(Les Echos Dec. 11, 2008)
Suez acquires an equity stake in Areva's new Georges Besse II centrifuge uranium enrichment plant
Suez and Areva have signed an agreement giving Suez 5% ownership interest in the company that holds the Georges Besse II uranium enrichment plant.
Suez, through its Energy Services business line, is building the electrical installations, and supplying the fluid management systems and the HVAC and process cooling equipment of the new plant, which is scheduled for startup in 2009.
With the agreement, Suez will be able to secure a portion of its nuclear reactor supply needs in enriched uranium.
Georges Besse II is one of France's largest current industrial investments, representing a total of close to EUR 3 billion.
(Suez/Areva Jun. 3, 2008)
Construction commences at Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant
Construction of the first section of the Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant has commenced. First production is expected in 2009. (Le Dauphiné Libéré, 29 Oct. 2006)
Areva and Urenco announce creation of Joint Venture ETC (Enrichment Technology Company)
On July 3, 2006, Areva and Urenco signed the agreement to settle ETC (Enrichment Technology Company), the Joint Venture between Areva and Urenco in the field of uranium enrichment centrifuge technology.
The Joint Venture is now effective with the acquisition by Areva of a 50% equity stake in ETC. This opens the way for the construction of the new Georges Besse II enrichment plant.
(Areva July 3, 2006)
Kazatomprom to obtain share in French enrichment plant in exchange for uranium deliveries?
> See here
Dutch parliament to vote on agreement giving Areva access to Urenco's centrifuge enrichment technology
In March 2006, the lower house (Tweede Kamer) of the Durch parliament will vote on the Cardiff Agreement which will give Areva/Cogéma access to Urenco's centrifuge enrichment technology, while excluding access to classified design information. The agreement extends the 1970 Almelo Treaty which is the basis of the trilateral Urenco consortium. The agreement, while excluding the enrichment of uranium for nuclear bombs, would allow for the enrichment of uranium for France's nuclear navy.
In the United Kingdom, the Cardiff Agreement was presented to Parliament in October 2005 and ratified before the end of the year. (Nuclear Fuel Jan. 16, 2006)
The German government approved the Cardiff Agreement on October 15, 2005; involvement of parliament was not deemed necessary. (MdB Johannes Pflug, Feb. 15, 2006)
Agreement between the governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Kingdom of the Netherlands regarding collaboration in centrifuge technology: Cardiff, 12 July 2005 (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office - 399k PDF)
European Commission approves Areva/Urenco centrifuge enrichment venture
On Oct. 6, 2004, the European Commission decided that French government-owned Areva may acquire a stake in Urenco's subsidiary Enrichment Technology Co Ltd (ETC). The approval was given on the condition that the companies would act independently on capacity increases, and that Euratom surveillance would be strengthened.
(Dow Jones Oct. 6, 2004)
COMMISSION DECISION of 06.10.2004 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No COMP/M.3099 – Areva/Urenco/ETC JV) (276k PDF)
From 1 September to 22 October 2004, a public debate was held in the departments of Drôme, Gard, Vaucluse, and Ardèche, neighbouring the planned centrifuge enrichment plant "Georges Besse II" in southern France.
Débat public sur le projet Georges Besse II (in French)
> Download: Le dossier du maître d'ouvrage (in French)
> See also: Communiqué du Réseau Sortir du nucléaire (1 Sep 2004) (in French)
European Commission extends probe into Areva/Urenco venture
The European Commission has launched a detailed investigation into Areva's proposed acquisition of a 50% stake in Enrichment Technology Company (ETC). At this stage, the Commission is concerned that the joint venture may result in less R&D with regards to centrifugation technology and lead to higher prices for enriched uranium used for fuel in nuclear power plants.
(European Commission June 22, 2004)
AREVA secures Urenco's gas centrifuge technology and launches new enrichment plant project
COGEMA's parent company AREVA Group signed an agreement with URENCO shareholders on Nov. 24, 2003, under which it will acquire a 50% equity interest in Enrichment Technology Company (ETC).
ETC comprises all of URENCO's centrifuge design and manufacturing activities as well as its R&D in the field of centrifuge equipment and installations for uranium enrichment to produce nuclear fuel.
A new enrichment plant, to be named Georges Besse II, will be built at the Tricastin site with a total investment around EUR 3 billion. Production capacity will be increased gradually starting in 2007 and reach its nominal level around 2016. The actual construction is expected to get under way in early 2005, once government authorizations have been obtained and relevant international treaties have been modified allowing AREVA to take an equity interest in ETC. This is supposed to be done in the 4th quarter of 2004.
(Areva Nov. 26, 2003)
COGEMA considering new centrifuge enrichment plant at Tricastin (France)
COGEMA's parent company AREVA made a first step to abandon uranium enrichment by gaseous diffusion. In a Memorandum of Understanding, URENCO and AREVA have agreed to develop plans for working together in the field of centrifuge technology for uranium enrichment. The companies envisage a 50-50 joint venture to build a new centrifuge enrichment plant that would progessively replace the existing Tricastin plant capacity beginning from 2007.
(Areva/Les Echos Oct 9, 2002)
"COGEMA's enrichment subsidiary Eurodif, reportedly in partnership with Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute, is considering building a centrifuge enrichment facility at COGEMA's Tricastin site. Yves Coupin, head of COGEMA's uranium division, stated that additional centrifuge units would 'complement' the existing gaseous diffusion units and allow more flexibility in adjusting capacity to meet market demand. Coupin also said that initial SILVA capacity under the joint COGEMA/CEA laser enrichment research venture could come into operation before the end of next decade." (UI News Briefing 98.44, see also FreshFUEL 11/9/98 )
Aerial view: Google Maps
INB No. 93
Information about Tricastin plant (Nuclear Safety Authority - ASN, in French)
> See also: DU exports of Eurodif's enrichment facility (France) · Upgrading of French enrichment tails in Russia
> See also: Tails Deconversion - Usine W, Pierrelatte, Drôme, France
> See also: Cogéma's Depleted Uranium Storage Project (France)
> See also: Areva Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant project, Tricastin (Drôme)
> see also: Orano Tricastin, General and Services
> View more recent issues
Goldman Sachs stored unenriched uranium hexafluoride at Eurodif enrichment plant
> View Goldman Sachs to wind down uranium trading business - after U.S. Senate report sheds some light on it, raising a number of issues
Eurodif gaseous diffusion plant at Tricastin halts uranium enrichment operations on June 7, 2012
Today, after 33 years of uninterrupted operation, EURODIF's Georges Besse enrichment plant, located in the Tricastin site in France's Drôme department and operated by AREVA, permanently ceased production at the end of the shutdown process begun last May 14.
(Areva June 7, 2012)
The Eurodif gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment plant will finally halt enrichment operations at 03:30 hrs on June 7, 2012. It will be replaced by the Georges-Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant.
(Le Figaro June 4, 2012)
ASN identifies deficiencies that led to overfilling of 48Y cylinder at Eurodif enrichment plant
On Feb. 9, 2012, the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) held an inspection at the Eurodif gaseous diffusion enrichment plant.
"The inspectors noted that an ED [defined requirement] relating to the redundancy of the shutdown system of the filling of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) containers, to include valves and automatisms, was not observed and had led to the overfilling of a 48Y type container. Failure to comply with the ED and the consequent overfilling have, following the inspection, made the subject by the operator of the notification to ASN of an event significant for safety. The resulting corrective actions must be taken as quickly as possible." (ASN Feb. 20, 2012)
Public inquiry on cleaning phase at Eurodif gaseous diffusion enrichment plant at Tricastin
On Dec. 19, 2011, Areva announced that a public inquiry will be held until Jan. 20, 2012, on the license amendment request to perform the cleaning phase at the Eurodif gaseous diffusion enrichment plant.
> Download related avis (Vaucluse - in French)
> View related documents (Areva - in French)
Eurodif gaseous diffusion enrichment plant at Tricastin to be closed in 2012 and dismantled
Eurodif's gaseous diffusion plant at Tricastin will be closed in 2012: after a five-month period of progressive shut down of the machines, the complete shut down is expected in October 2012.
In the subsequent cleaning phase, chlorine trifluoride will be injected into the machines to remove residual uranium. This will allow the recovery of 300 tonnes of uranium and reduce the radiation levels of the machines.
In the dismantling phase following from 2016, 130,000 tonnes of contaminated steel will have to be managed. Areva hopes to achieve a contamination level below 100 Bq/g, for the steel can be disposed at ANDRA's low-level radioactive waste site.
The decommissioning cost so far has been announced as Euro 600 million, but Areva now has re-evaluated the cost at Euro 725 million. The trade unions, though, talk about billions of Euros.
(Le Dauphiné Libéré Sep. 16, 2011)
UF6 cylinder heated at Eurodif plant without connection to installations
On Aug. 8, 2011, a UF6 cylinder was heated at the Eurodif enrichment plant site for unloading, without being connected to the installations. The cylinder - a thin-wall model not suitable for transport purposes - contained depleted uranium hexafluoride that was to be transfered to a standard cylinder model. The pressure inside the cylinder did not exceed specifications and no UF6 was released.
The event was rated level 1 on the INES scale.
(ASN Aug. 8, 2011)
Faulty locking device at overpack of UF6 cylinder in yard of Eurodif enrichment plant - again
On July 19, 2011, in the yard of the Eurodif enrichment plant, an open locking device was found at the overpack of a cylinder loaded with liquid uranium hexafluoride, awaiting solidification of the contents.
The event was rated level 1 on the INES scale.
(ASN July 22, 2011)
Workers on strike at Eurodif enrichment plant
About 50 employees are on strike at Eurodif's Tricastin enrichment plant to protest against a reorganization of their work.
(Le Parisien July 12, 2011)
UF6 container overfilled at Eurodif enrichment plant
On May 27, 2011, a container has been slightly overfilled with enriched UF6 product at the Eurodif enrichment plant in Tricastin. Eurodif has proposed to rate this event level 1 on the INES scale.
(Midi Libre, May 30, 2011)
The authorized limit of 430 kg in the cristallisator was exceeded by 14 kg; the safety limit of 543 kg was not reached.
(ASN June 1, 2011)
Faulty locking devices at overpack of UF6 cylinders
On March 25, 2011, ASN was notified by Areva that locking devices of overpacks of cylinders carrying natural and/or enriched uranium hexafluoride had inadvertently opened during transport in three cases in 2010 and 2011. Although the American designer of the locks had modified them in view of these incidents, Areva failed to implement these modifications. The event was rated level 1 on the INES scale.
> View ASN Avis d'indident May 12, 2011 [in French]
EURODIF enrichment plant to continue operation until end 2012
The EURODIF enrichment plant that had been scheduled for shutdown end 2010, will continue operation until end 2012, according to industry minister Eric Besson.
(Les Echos Nov. 24, 2010)
Iran's stake in EURODIF enrichment plant called into question by U.N. sanctions
U.N. Security Council resolution 1929 , adopted in June, bans the sale of any stakes in uranium mines to Iran, as well as shares in any commercial operations linked to the production of nuclear materials or technology. It also says that "all states shall prohibit such investment."
Council diplomats told Reuters that the latest steps clearly ban the sale of new stakes to Iran but are less clear on whether any previously held Iranian stakes in uranium mines or other nuclear-related operations should be divested.
(The Namibian Oct. 19, 2010)
Iran owns a 10% stake in Eurodif through its 40% stake in SOFIDIF.
> See also: Iran's stake in Rössing uranium mine causing headaches in view of U.N. santions (Namibia)
Crystallizer overfilled at Eurodif enrichment plant - again
On 27 Mar. 2010, following an alert from a gauge at a crystallizer of the Pierrelatte plant, Eurodif noted an excess amount of product in this receptacle, approx. 30 kgs above the 700 kg operational limit. The safety limit of 1485 kgs has never been attained. The crystallizer serves to separate the uranium hexafluoride from other unwanted gases present in the diffusion installation.
The event was rated level 1 on the INES scale.
(ASN Apr. 1, 2010)
Crystallizer overfilled at Eurodif enrichment plant
On 24 Feb. 2010, following an alert from a gauge at a crystallizer of the Pierrelatte plant, Eurodif noted an excess amount of product in this receptacle, approx. 30 kgs above the 700 kg operational limit. The safety limit of 1485 kgs has never been attained. The crystallizer serves to separate the uranium hexafluoride from other unwanted gases present in the diffusion installation.
The event was rated level 1 on the INES scale.
(ASN Mar. 15, 2010)
Violation of criticality rules at Eurodif enrichment plant
On Jan. 29, 2009, inspectors of the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) found that four barrels with fissile waste material were inadequately stored. No criticality occured. The event was rated level 1 on the INES scale.
(Areva Feb. 3, 2009; ASN Feb. 11, 2009)
Public enquiry into abatement of flooding hazard at Areva's Tricastin site
Areva intends to perform protective measures against the flooding hazard in case of heavy precipitation at the Tricastin site, in particular from the Gaffière creek crossing the site and from a canal next to the site.
From Feb. 18, to March 21, 2008, the project is subject of a public enquiry held in the surrounding communities.
(Areva Feb. 18, 2008)
Unexpected criticality hazard found in Tricastin enrichment plant
During maintenance work, on Dec. 4, 2007, an unexpected deposit of uranyl fluoride (UO2F2) was detected inside a crystallization unit used to fill the enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF6) into the product transport cylinders. The presence of uranyl fluoride in this unit had not been foreseen in the safety analysis of the plant. Such a deposit of uranyl fluoride might lead to a criticality event, in particular in the presence of water. A likely cause for the formation of the uranyl fluoride deposit was the entry of water into the equipment. The event was rated Level 1 on the INES scale.
(ASN Dec. 11, 2007, Areva Dec. 6, 2007)
Areva presents study on health risks for residents from operation of nuclear facilities at the Tricastin site
> View here
Regulator cites Eurodif for failure to report criticality-related event in enrichment plant
By letter dated March 29, 2007, the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) demands an explanation from Eurodif, why the violation of a criticality-related criterion had not been reported to the authority. In January 2007, the boron concentration in the cooling water of the enrichment cascades had fallen below the permissible level. This might have resulted in a criticality excursion (an uncontrolled chain reaction accompanied by heavy radiation releases) in the plant.
While Eurodif restored the boron concentration upon discovery of the condition, Eurodif failed to report the event to ASN. This failure was only discovered by ASN during an inspection on March 26, 2007.
Kazatomprom to obtain share in French enrichment plant in exchange for uranium deliveries?
> See here
Tricastin events (ASN, in French)
Serving the following facilities at Tricastin: Philippe Coste conversion plant, TU5 conversion plant for uranyl nitrate, Georges Besse 2 centrifuge enrichment plant, former EURODIF gaseous diffusion enrichment plant, Usine W deconversion plant for depleted uranium, among others
Non-compliance to safety rules at Orano Tricastin site
Monday, November 27, the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) noted a level 1 discrepancy on the INES scale (international nuclear event classification scale, which has seven levels), concerning a control operation on the nuclear site. Orano Tricastin (straddling the Drôme and Vaucluse). This discrepancy concerns "non-compliance" with an operating benchmark which took place during an inspection of packages transporting uranium-bearing material, as part of an activity to dismantle a historic site.
(Le Dauphiné Libéré Nov. 27, 2023)
Violation of criticality rules at Orano Tricastin site
On March 30, a regulatory deviation was identified concerning rail transport to the Orano Tricastin site. The transport comprised 2 wagons loaded with 18 packages of uranium materials. The specialist carrier, a subsidiary of the Orano group, loaded and transported 16 packages on one wagon and 2 packages on another wagon. This type of load is limited to 20 packages per wagon but requires shipment approval from the Nuclear Safety Authority if it exceeds 10 packages per wagon, which was not issued before the start of transport.
(Orano Apr. 13, 2022)
Earthquake has no impact on Orano Tricastin site
In the late morning [of Nov. 11, 2019], the earthquake that occurred near the Montélimar basin was felt on the Orano Tricastin site.
The observed intensity of the shaking was lower than the trigger values of the site security systems. No damage was observed on our installations. There has been no impact on the safety of our facilities that are currently operating.
(Orano Nov. 11, 2019)
Three workers exposed to fumes from burning depleted uranium shavings near Areva's Tricastin site
After a fire at the company STMI [Areva's subsidiary Société des Techniques en Milieu Ionisant] of Bollène Monday (Oct. 9), in a hangar containing barrels of depleted uranium, three people were taken care of, exposed to "slightly radioactive" smoke, says the prefecture.
It is the second fire in 15 days at the same place: this Monday in Bollène, the alert was given at 12:16, in a hangar containing barrels of depleted uranium shavings. The fire started while one of these barrels was handled. Immediately the employees, helped by the firemen, were able to extinguish the fire.
The prefecture says, that there was no release outside the hangar where the fire took place.
The prefect of Vaucluse asked the company to suspend the handling of drums at this location, time for further appraisals and inspections.
(France Bleu Oct. 10, 2017)
Stability 'anomaly' identified in flood protection dike at Areva Tricastin site
As part of the experience feedback following the Fukushima accident and supplementary safety assessments, EDF studied the earthquake resistance of the flood protection dams around the Tricastin plant. The complementary geotechnical investigations carried out revealed an anomaly on a limited portion of a dike located upstream of the EDF power station and the AREVA Tricastin site, concerning an area of sand layers liable to be destabilized in the event of a major earthquake (Séisme Majoré de Sécurité), while confirming its holding at the Historically Likely Maximal Earthquake.
(Areva Aug. 22, 2017)
On Aug. 28, 2017, nuclear safety authority ASN rated this event Level 1 on the INES scale. On Sep. 28, 2017, ASN raised the rating to Level 2.
> See also: Areva's Comurhex I conversion plant at Pierrelatte remains closed until improvements of flood protection completed
> See also: Nuclear Safety Authority demands improvement of flood protection at Areva's Usine W depleted uranium deconversion plant
Insufficient pressure used in tests of 160 UF6 cylinders at Areva's Tricastin site
On Oct. 23, 2014, Areva NC announced to ASN that the mandatory tests for the tightness of 30B and 48Y cylinders had been performed in a way that did not conform to regulations. For 160 cylinders tested in 2014, a pressure between 6.4 and 6.8 bars had been used instead of the prescribed 6.9 bars.
The event was classified level 1 on the INES scale.
(ASN Nov. 6, 2014)
Activists hold blockade of Tricastin site
After having awaited in vain the arrival of trucks from the Malvési conversion plant, members of Sortir du nucléaire and CAN 84, supported by Greenpeace, blocked the access to the Tricastin site.
(le Dauphiné Libéré June 20, 2013)
Faulty locking devices at overpack of UF6 cylinders
On March 25, 2011, ASN was notified by Areva that locking devices of overpacks of cylinders carrying natural and/or enriched uranium hexafluoride had inadvertently opened during transport in three cases in 2010 and 2011. Although the American designer of the locks had modified them in view of these incidents, Areva failed to implement these modifications. The event was rated level 1 on the INES scale.
> View ASN Avis d'indident May 12, 2011 [in French]
Tricastin nuclear site partly flooded
In the early morning of Dec. 15, 2008, a rapid rise of the Gaffière river crossing the Tricastin site led to partial flooding of several installations on the site, in particular the SOCATRI facilities. Areva subsidiary Société auxiliaire du Tricastin (SOCATRI) operates an effluent treatment plant mainly for the Eurodif enrichment plant. The water level rise was caused by heavy precipitation and water regulation measures of upstream dams.
(ASN Dec. 15, 2008)
In July 2007, Areva presented a study performed by Institut National de l’Environnement Industriel et des Risques (INERIS) in March 2006 on possible health impacts of the operation of the nuclear facilities located at the Tricastin site, in particular the existing Georges Besse I and the future Georges Besse II enrichment plants, the Comurhex conversion plant, and the Socatri and Pierrelatte nuclear fuel facilities. The study investigated only the hazards for residents, limited to the hazards from chemical toxicity occuring during regular operation of the facilities. According to the study, none of the risks investigated are causing concern.
> Download Etude d’évaluation des risques sanitaires (ERS) (in French)
Évaluation des risques sanitaires liés au fonctionnement des établissements AREVA de la plateforme du Tricastin: usines Georges Besse I et II, SOCATRI, COGEMA Pierrelatte et COMURHEX (1er niveau d'approche), Bilan des études sanitaires, Rapport final, par Corinne MANDIN, Institut National de l’Environnement Industriel et des Risques (INERIS), Mars 2006
Elevated radiation found around Tricastin nuclear site
The independent radiation monitoring group CRII-RAD identified external radiation doses up to 20-fold above natural background at several locations around the Tricastin site of nuclear installations. The site comprises, among others, the Eurodif enrichment plant. CRII-RAD suggests that the source of the excess radiation observed is nuclear material stockpiled on site.
> View CRII-RAD release Oct 8, 2002 (in French)
> Download CRII-RAD monitoring results (PDF, in French)
Parcs uranifères du Tricastin (INB 178, INB 179)
Fourniture Locale d'Entreposage d'Uranium de Retraitement - FLEUR (INB 180)
ASN invites comment on revision of requirements for the uranium storage areas at Tricastin
ASN propopses a complete overhaul of the requirements applicable to the operation of the uranium storage areas at INBs 178 and 179.
INB 178 comprises the following sites:
- P01: 7,000 t U, mainly as UF6, at less than 5% U-235 (except for some sampling bottles at less than 20% U-235)
- P03: 5,000 t U, of which 3 t U as uranium solutions, at less than 5% U-235 (except for some sampling bottles at less than 20% U-235)
- P04: 34,000 t U, mainly as UF6 and uranyl nitrate, at less than 5% U-235 (except for some sampling bottles at less than 20% U-235)
- P17: 16,000 t U, as U3O8, at less than 1% U-235
INB 179 comprises:
- 93,500 t U at less than 10% U-235, and 1 t thorium
The concentration of U-232 in reprocessed uranium is limited to 3.5 ng/g, except for 50 ng/g in UF6 cylinders. Areas holding reprocessed uranium in P17 and P35 are surrounded by radiation shields of depleted uranium or non-radioactive materials.
ASN moreover proposes a modification of the requirements applicable to the operation of the uranium storage areas at INB 93 (former Eurodif gaseous diffusion plant).
Submit comments by 23 January 2023.
> View ASN announcement, Jan. 10, 2023 (in French)
Fourniture Locale d'Entreposage d'Uranium de Retraitement (INB 180 - FLEUR/P36)
ASN authorizes commissioning of new storage buildings for reprocessed uranium (INB 180 - FLEUR) at Tricastin:
On 3 January 2023, ASN authorized the commissioning of basic nuclear installation (INB) 180, called Fleur (Local supply for the storage of reprocessed uranium). This facility, the creation of which was authorized on March 18, 2022 by decree no. 2022-391, makes it possible to store around 30,000 tonnes of uranium in a maximum of four buildings, in addition to the current storage facilities on the site.
(ASN Jan. 12, 2023)
> View ASN release Jan 12, 2023 (in French)
Public inquiry into commissioning and operation of new storage buildings for reprocessed uranium (INB 180 - FLEUR) at Tricastin:
The Nuclear Safety Authority ASN is submitting draft decisions on the commissioning and the operation of the newly built storage buildings for reprocessed uranium at Tricastin P36 for public consultation.
This INB can store around 30,000 tonnes of uranium in a maximum of four buildings, in addition to the current storage facilities.
It is currently made up of two identical buildings consisting of a framework, a cover and a metal cladding. It is designed to store uranium oxides, mainly uranium sesquioxide (U3O8) from the processing of irradiated nuclear fuels (known as "URT") and natural uranium dioxide (UO2), and whose uranium-235 content is less than 1%.
The concentration of the artificial uranium isotopes in the reprocessed uranium is limited to 3.5 ng/g [2772 Bq/g] for uranium-232, and to 0.438% [10,487 Bq/g] for uranium-236.
In order to reduce the lateral flow of ionizing radiation outside the storage buildings, DV70 type containers filled with "attenuating materials" [i.e. depleted uranium in the form of U3O8] are interposed between the containers of reprocessed uranium and the cladding of the storage buildings.
Submit comments by December 12, 2022.
> Access related documents (ASN - in French)
Public inquiry into construction of new storage buildings for reprocessed uranium P36 at Tricastin:
The proposed storage consists of 4 buildings (65 m x 47.15 m each), each holding 14,080 barrels filled with 358 kg reprocessed U3O8 each, surrounded by 300 containers DV70 filled with 6,500 kg depleted U3O8 each (used for radiation shielding). So, the total amounts per building are 5,041 t reprocessed U3O8 and 1,950 t depleted U3O8. The combined capacity of all 4 buildings is 20,163 t reprocessed U3O8 (17,097 t U) and 7,800 t depleted U3O8 (6,614 t U). The 4 buildings are to be surrounded by an embankment of 6 metre height.
Submit comments by December 3, 2020.
> Download: related documents , Nov. 2, 2020 (Drôme - in French)
Orano plans to construct four additional buildings to extend storage capacity for reprocessed uranium at Tricastin:
On Oct. 26, 2017, Areva filed a request for a license amendment to construct four additional buildings to increase the authorized storage capacity for reprocessed uranium in the form of U3O8 at Tricastin by 13,950 t U.
At the end of 2016, 29,440 t U of reprocessed uranium in the form of 34,717 t U3O8 were stored in 144,587 barrels at Parcs P17, P18, and P35 in Tricastin, using the licensed capacity to 91%.
The radiation shielding for the new buildings is to be provided by an earthen wall of 6.50 metres height, rather than by depleted uranium oxide, as used in the existing buildings.
> Download: Matières radioactives - Besoins en entreposage de l'uranium appauvri, de l'uranium de recyclage détenus par New AREVA , Groupe de Travail PNGMDR, Montrouge, le 1er décembre 2017 [released on May 24, 2019] (2.3 MB PDF - in French)
Public inquiry into proposed construction of new UF6 cylinder maintenance workshop (AMC2) at Tricastin
Atelier de Maintenance des Conteneurs (AMC)
The "AMC2" project consists of creating a new Maintenance Workshop on the Orano Tricastin platform, dedicated to the maintenance operations of transport containers for uranium hexafluoride (UF6). These containers are of the "48 inch cylinder" and "30 inch cylinder" type.
Submit comments by January 12, 2022.
> Download: related documents (Drôme - in French)
> See also: Registre dématérialisé (in French)
Almost 100,000 t of depleted uranium oxide in use as radiation shield for Orano's reprocessed uranium stored at Tricastin
At the end of 2016, 168,600 t U of depleted uranium were stored in the form of 198,821 t U3O8 at Tricastin, almost half of which was used to shield the radiation from 29,440 t U (34,717 t U3O8) of reprocessed uranium stored at Parcs P17, P18, and P35.
> Download: Matières radioactives - Besoins en entreposage de l'uranium appauvri, de l'uranium de recyclage détenus par New AREVA , Groupe de Travail PNGMDR, Montrouge, le 1er décembre 2017 [released on May 24, 2019] (2.3 MB PDF - in French)
Storage yard for 62,000 tonnes of uranium licensed at Areva Tricastin site
On March 7, 2017, nuclear safety authority ASN licensed installation nucléaire de base nº 178, called Parcs uranifères du Tricastin. The license allows for the storage of up to 62,000 tonnes of uranium with a maximum enrichment of 5% U-235. For uranium recovered from spent nuclear fuel by reprocessing, the concentration of the isotope U-232 is limited to 3.5 ng/g [2772 Bq/g] uranium, unless the uranium is in the form of UF6, for which the limit is 50 ng/g [39,605 Bq/g] uranium.
> Download: Décision CODEP-CLG-2017-009844 du président de l'Autorité de sûreté nucléaire du 7 mars 2017 fixant à AREVA NC des prescriptions pour l'installation nucléaire de base no 178 dénommée Parcs uranifères du Tricastin, exploitée par AREVA NC sur le site du Tricastin dans les communes de Pierrelatte et de Saint-Paul-Trois-Châteaux (département de la Drôme) , 7 mars 2017 (in French)
50,000 tonnes of depleted uranium oxide in use at Tricastin to shield radiation from 7,360 tonnes of stored reprocessed uranium oxide
In wake of the Fukushima disaster, the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) requested operators of nuclear facilities to prepare supplemental safety reports to assess various natural hazards. In its report on the Tricastin site, Areva made an amazing disclosure: the product storage area P18 of the TU5 uranyl nitrate conversion facility holds 7,360 tonnes of reprocessed U3O8 in 213-Liter barrels, while approximately 50,000 tonnes of depleted U3O8 are used as a biological shield at the periphery of the storage area.
For comparison: the Bessines depleted uranium oxide storage facility has a capacity of 199,900 t.
So, one may wonder whether the closure of the nuclear fuel cycle actually is a viable option, if the safe storage of the recycled product requires such an absurdly massive shielding. After all, the uranium has to be processed further to be recycled into nuclear fuel...
Or, is this just an undeclared on-site storage facility for depleted uranium oxide of the adjacent Usine W depleted uranium deconversion plant? After all, the Bessines depleted uranium oxide storage facility is almost full and would not have sufficient space left to store this amount.
> Access Evaluation complémentaire de la sûreté des installations nucléaires de base, Site du Tricastin, Areva, Septembre 2011 , p. 86 (ASN - in French)
Installation d'Assainissement et de Récupération de l'Uranium (INB 138)
Public consultation on revised environmental discharge limits of Orano's uranium recovery and waste treatment plants at Tricastin
Installation d'Assainissement et de Récupération de l'Uranium (IARU)
Submit comments by December 6, 2021.
> View: ASN release Nov. 14, 2021 (in French)
Ateliers de maintenance, de traitement des effluents et de conditionnement de déchets (Ex-SOCATRI)
Submit comments by December 6, 2021.
> View: ASN release Nov. 15, 2021 (in French)
ASN finds pollution prevention measures at Orano's uranium recovery plant at Tricastin 'globally unsatisfactory'
On Sep. 16, 2021, the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) conducted an inspection on measures for prevention of pollution and nuisances at the Uranium Remediation and Recovery Facility (IARU) [formerly SOCATRI].
"The inspection of September 16, 2021 concerned the topic of pollution prevention and pollution control within INB 138, called the Uranium Clean-up and Recovery Facility (IARU). The inspectors visited the installation's surface treatment facilities: the two spray workshops, located in zones 12D and 19D, the small parts treatment workshop (APP) in zone 20D, the dip treatment workshop (ATT) in zone 21D, the premises for stock solutions in zone 26D and for unloading solutions and effluents in zone 49D. The objective of this control was to examine compliance with the requirements applicable to surface treatment installations, defined in the order of June 30, 2006 [3], in the version in force on the date of publication of the order of February 7, 2012 amended [2].
The conclusions of the inspection are mixed and generally unsatisfactory. First, the inspectors noted that the surface treatment facilities were in good shape. They raised the good mastery of these by the operators and their desire to do well despite aging facilities that were not designed for the use that is made of them today. Actions have been launched to initiate compliance but remain insufficient. In fact, some deviations, notable for some, were noted by the inspectors. Thus, several regulatory deviations were observed with the order of June 30, 2006 [3], in particular at the level of the retention and heating devices of the baths, at the level of the identification of risks, water inlets and outlets. unloading as well as in monitoring water consumption. The persistence of such deviations without associated compliance actions, following a periodic review including a compliance analysis, is deemed unsatisfactory. Corrective actions are expected to bring the surface treatment workshops back into compliance. On the other hand, experience feedback should be drawn for future reviews of other INBs on the platform. The quality and completeness of the analysis of compliance with applicable regulatory texts carried out in the context of reviews should be improved as well as the integration of the associated corrective actions into the review action plan." [emphasis added]
> Download: ASN Inspection Report CODEP-LYO-2021-044921 , Sep. 30, 2021 (286kB PDF - in French)
ASN detects hole in wall meant to protect Orano's nuclear waste treatment workshop at Tricastin from flooding
On Nov. 5, 2020, the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) conducted an inspection at the Integrated treatment of nuclear waste from Tricastin (TRIDENT) workshop (part of INB 138) [formerly SOCATRI].
"A perimeter wall equipped with cofferdams is installed around the TRIDENT workshop in order to provide protection against external flooding and containment of fire extinguishing water from the TRIDENT workshop.
During their visit to the workshop, the inspectors noted a square-shaped opening in this low wall that did not fully guarantee its role in protecting against flooding.
Request A1: I ask you to proceed as soon as possible with the filling of the hole in the peripheral protective wall of the TRIDENT workshop."
(ASN Nov. 10, 2020)
ASN finds fire prevention measures at Orano's uranium recovery plant at Tricastin 'globally unsatisfactory'
On June 10, 2020, the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) conducted an inspection on fire prevention measures at the Uranium Remediation and Recovery Facility (IARU) [formerly SOCATRI].
"The inspection of June 10, 2020 concerned the subject of fire within INB 138, called the Uranium Remediation and Recovery Facility (IARU). The inspectors visited different premises in which the activities of storage, treatment of waste and effluents, repair and decontamination of equipment and utilities take place. The objective of this check was to examine the measures taken to prevent the risks associated with the fire and to verify, on a sample basis, compliance with the commitments made to ASN during previous inspections on this subject.
The conclusions of this inspection are mixed and globally unsatisfactory. Firstly, the inspectors noted progress in your management of the heat load, both organizationally and operationally. Commitments have been kept, such as the completion of work on the fire extinguishing water retention facilities and compliance with smoking bans outside designated areas. The inspection deadlines for mobile intervention resources verified by the inspectors are respected.
However, some shortcomings, notable for some, were noted by the inspectors. Thus, it was observed that regulatory deviations persist in room 35D, a contaminated solvent storage area. The inspectors also noted shortcomings in the management of fire detection systems. Control of the fire risk for the laundromat needs to be demonstrated or reinforced, if necessary. Finally, corrective actions are expected in your risk prevention practices, heat load management, accessibility of response resources and provisions for limiting the consequences of a fire." [emphasis added]
> Download: ASN Inspection Report INSSN-LYO-2020-0406, June 24, 2020 (238kB PDF - in French)
In addition, ASN held a remote inspection of the same site on June 23, 2020. ASN found the results to be 'globally unsatisfactory', again.
Non-commissioning of an automatic seismic detection and cut-off system at Orano's Tricastin site
On 24 October 2019, following the annual verification check of the automatic closing of the valves in the event of seismic detection, the operator identified that the seismic detection device at the SOCATRI uranium recovery plant on Orano's Tricastin site had never been put into service.
The event was ranked at level 1 of the INES scale.
(ASN Nov. 29, 2019)
Violation of criticality rules at Orano's Tricastin site
On Nov. 4, 2019, a radioactive waste drum at the SOCATRI plant (INB No. 138) was found to contain 414 grams of uranium-235, thus exceeding the regulatory limit of 300 grams.
The incident was rated Level 1 on the INES scale.
(ASN Nov. 8, 2019)
Violation of criticality rules at Areva's Tricastin site
On Sep. 3, 2015, Areva's subsidiary SOCATRI declared two criticality safety-related events. SOCATRI performs auxiliary services at the Tricastin site, performing maintenance of parts containing radioactive material and operating an effluent treatment plant. The events refer to failures discovered by an ASN inspection on June 25, 2015, concerning a missing formal prohibition to bring more than one lot of radioactive material into one workshop, and the missing double analysis of effluents arriving at the treatment station.
(ASN Sep. 8, 2015)
Uranium spill at Areva's effluent treatment plant in Tricastin
On Sep. 11, 2013, during the repackaging of a drum containing potassium diuranate, 30 kg of uranium were spilled in a room in the SOCATRI facilities.
The event was rated level 1 on the INES scale.
(ASN Nov. 15, 2013)
(Areva subsidiary Société auxiliaire du Tricastin (SOCATRI) operates an effluent treatment plant mainly for the Eurodif enrichment plant.)
Study finds elevated uranium levels in groundwater near Tricastin nuclear site partly caused by former site activities
A study conducted by IRSN after the 2008 incident at Socatri concluded that the uranium levels in excess of WHO's 15 µg/L drinking water guidance found in the alluvial groundwater of the community of Bollène are probably linked to the former activity of the nuclear site, while the levels found at the community of Lapalud are of natural origin.
> View IRSN release Sep. 17, 2010 (in French)
> Download report Etude sur l'origine du marquage par l'uranium dans la nappe alluviale de la plaine du Tricastin , DEI/2010-004, Direction de l'Environnement et de l'Intervention, IRSN 2010 (34.5MB PDF - in French)
French wine appellation "Coteaux du Tricastin" wins name change after uranium spill
A French wine that shared its name with a nearby problem-plagued nuclear power plant on Wednesday (June 9, 2010) won the right to change its designation.
The Tricastin wines of southern France will now be known as the Grignan-Les Adhemar, according to a ruling from the powerful Inao agency tasked with regulating French agricultural products.
The decision capped a two-year campaign by wine producers to change the wine's official designation after a series of minor accidents at the Tricastin nuclear plant made headlines in 2008.
The decision will not come into effect immediately as there is a two-month period during which any opponent of the ruling can come forward.
Despite several soil and water tests that confirmed there was no radiation poisoning in the vineyards from the 2008 accident, the Tricastin wines never managed to recover. Production has dropped 40 per cent over the past two years.
(AFP June 9, 2010)
An appellation in the south of France is looking to change its name in order to avoid being associated with a uranium leak at a nuclear power station in the same region.
The Coteaux du Tricastin appellation, which neighbours Côtes du Rhône Villages, has resented its association with Tricastin Nuclear Power Centre for some time.
Henri Bour, head of the Coteaux du Tricastin appellation, told French news website nouvelobs.com that the region has wanted to change its name 'for about ten years'.
The push for a name change follows the intense media coverage of a uranium leak at the Tricastin nuclear site earlier this month.
'Now, it's useless for a producer to try to sell a bottle of Coteaux du Tricastin - people would laugh in their face,' said Brice Eymard, head of the economic department at the Rhône wine trade body, InterRhône.
A meeting of the administrative appellation council is set for 5 August, where members will discuss the possibility of changing the name Tricastin to Grignan, a local village in the center of the region.
(Decanter July 24, 2008)
Uranium-containing waste liquid spills at Tricastin nuclear site
During the night of July 7, 2008, 30 cubic meters of liquid containing 12 grams of uranium per litre (totalling 360 kg of uranium), spilled for unknown reasons from a holding tank at the effluent treatment plant of the Tricastin nuclear site. The effluents seeped into the soil and partly reached the "la Gaffière" river, and then the "le Lauzon" river. The resulting uranium concentration in the "la Gaffière" river was measured at approx. 1000 times normal background.
The effluent treatment plant is operated by Areva subsidiary Société auxiliaire du Tricastin (SOCATRI), mainly for the Eurodif enrichment plant.
(ASN July 8, 2008)
On July 11, 2008, in a rare move, the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) ordered the shutdown of SOCATRI's uranium effluent treatment plant (STEU). At an inspection held on July 10, 2008, ASN had found that the measures taken to prevent any further spills are not satisfactory and that the information given by the licensee to the authority was incomplete. ASN further announced to sue the licensee for the deficiencies identified.
From the announcements made, it is unclear whether the shutdown will have any impacts on the operation of Eurodif's enrichment plant.
On July 16, 2008, the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) announced that groundwater and surface water monitoring results had returned to normal except for two locations. Apparently, these higher values are not related to the recent spill, however. A recently completed IRSN study had already identified a few locations with elevated uranium concentrations in groundwater, the source of which has not yet been identified.
On June 17, 2010, the public prosecutor's office requested an EUR 100,000 penalty against Areva's subsidiary SOCATRI and the shutdown of the litigious section of the plant.
(Le Monde June 17, 2010)
The Tribunal de Grande Instance of Carpentras (Vaucluse) has ruled that SOCATRI is not guilty of water pollution, but it has imposed a EUR 40,000 penalty for neglect to notify the authorities of the accident immediately.
(Le Figaro Oct. 14, 2010)
Appeals court finds Areva guilty of 2008 uranium spill in Tricastin and imposes 300,000 EUR fine:
Socatri, a subsidiary company of Areva, was found guilty Thursday (Sep. 29) of the offence of "discharge of toxic substances in groundwater" after a uranium spill in July 2008.
In its order, the Court of Appeal of Nîmes condemned Socatri to a fine of 300,000 Euros, and to the payment of 20,000 Euros of damages to each association among the plaintiffs, including Sortir du Nucléaire, Amis de la Terre, Greenpeace and France Nature. In addition, Socatri will have to pay 10,000 Euros to ten residents.
(Le Monde Sep. 30, 2011)
Court of Cassation upholds conviction of Areva for 2008 uranium spill in Tricastin:
On November 26, the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal filed by Areva Socatri after its conviction for water pollution as a result of the significant uranium spill that occurred in July 2008 at the Socatri Tricastin plant.
(Sortir du Nucléaire Nov. 27, 2013)
> See also related information from
